Chavez v. Franco

• Decision Date: 17 February 2016
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 15-701 WJ/GBW
• Parties: MICHAEL CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. GERMAN FRANCO, Warden, and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

MICHAEL CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. GERMAN FRANCO, Warden, andTHE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Respondents.

Civ. No. 15-701 WJ/GBW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

February 17, 2016

ORDER (1) OVERRULING IN PART AND SUSTAINING IN PART OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION AND (2) DISMISSING PETITIONER'S §2254 HABEAS PETITION

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on review of the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition ("PFRD") (doc. 13) and Petitioner's Objections (doc. 14). Petitioner initially brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) and motion to expand the record (doc. 9). In his PFRD, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Petitioner's petition without prejudice and denying his motion to expand as moot. Doc. 13 at 1. This recommendation was based on the finding that Petitioner's writ to the New Mexico Supreme Court raised only one claim, Ground Four, as a basis for relief. Doc. 13 at 4-6 (concluding that only Ground Four was exhausted). The Magistrate Judge held that, with respect to the other claims, mere mention to the state supreme court was not sufficient where the substance of the arguments was not addressed in Petitioner's writ of certiorari. Id. at 5. The PFRD concluded that, except for one claim (Ground Four), Petitioner's claims "cannot be deemed fairly presented through a complete round of the state's established appellate process for purposes of exhaustion." Id. at 6. Having determined that Petitioner had filed a "mixed" § 2254 petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the PFRD reasoned that adjudication on the merits was not permitted. Id. at 6-7. Accordingly, the PFRD recommended dismissal of the petition in its entirety "pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims." Id.

As required, the Court has conducted a de novo review of those portions of the PFRD to which Petitioner objected. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 766-67 (10th Cir. 2000). For the reasons given below, the Court sustains in part and overrules in part Petitioner's objections and dismisses the Petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Judgment

On August 9, 2011, Petitioner executed a Plea and Disposition Agreement by which he pled no contest to two counts of first-degree (felony) murder in exchange for the dismissal of counts alleging: (1) attempted armed robbery; (2) conspiracy to commit armed robbery; and (3) shooting at or from a motor vehicle. Doc. 11-1 at 3. The resulting sentence for the two counts would be "Concurrent Sentences for a single Termof Life Imprisonment (thirty (30) years without the possibility of parole)."¹ Doc. 11-1 at 5. In accordance with the agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment on October 20, 2011. Doc. 11-1 at 1-2. Petitioner did not pursue a direct appeal.

B. Petitioner's State Habeas Proceedings

Petitioner filed his initial pro se state habeas petition in the Twelfth Judicial District on April 23, 2012, presenting four grounds: (1) his impaired mental health made his plea involuntary; (2) evidence was unlawfully obtained from a vehicle seized from his co-defendants pursuant to a warrant listing an incorrect VIN number; (3) police continued to interrogate him after invoking his right to remain silent; and (4) the assistance of his counsel was ineffective because counsel misled him about the nature of his plea, misrepresented his chances of success at trial, and failed to raise Petitioner's history of mental health issues. Doc. 11-1 at 9-12. Thereafter, the Court appointed habeas counsel, who amended the petition to elaborate on the four presented grounds and add additional theories of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See doc. 11-1 at 64-75. Following an evidentiary hearing, the state District Judge denied the petition. Doc. 11-2 at 18-20.

Petitioner filed his petition for writ of certiorari to the New Mexico Supreme Court on December 3, 2014. Doc. 11-3. In this writ, Petitioner provided a proceduralhistory of the case in the state trial court, including a summary of arguments presented in the initial habeas petition. See doc. 11-3 at 2-4. Petitioner then presented a single question for review: whether Petitioner had received ineffective assistance of counsel when he was not apprised of the terms and conditions of his sentence contemplated in his plea agreement. Doc. 11-3 at 5-9. The petition was denied on February 3, 2015. Doc. 11-4 at 1.

C. Petitioner's Federal Habeas Claims

In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner sets forth four claims as grounds for relief:

1. Violation of Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights because he did not knowingly enter into his plea, as he never understood the meaning of the life sentence to which he was agreeing;

2. Evidence used against Petitioner was unlawfully seized because the vehicle where incriminating evidence was discovered contained a different VIN number from that listed on the search warrant, and police allegedly seized the Petitioner's clothing without probable cause, a warrant, or his consent;

3. Violation of Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights because police allegedly continued to interrogate him to elicit an incriminating response after he had invoked his right to remain silent and right to counsel; and

4. Ineffective assistance of counsel because Petitioner's attorney did not explain to him the true meaning of a life sentence prior to his plea of no contest to the charge of first-degree felony murder.

See doc. 1 at 6-11.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For a claim to be cognizable under § 2254, it must allege a constitutional violationor a violation of a "constitutional dimension" — that is, "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" or "an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 83 (1983). Where a state court adjudication of a petitioner's claims on the merits² exists, a federal court may grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus of a person in state custody if the resulting decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law" or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court will construe his objections liberally. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, objections to the proposed findings and disposition of a Magistrate Judge must be made with specificity; general or conclusory objections are insufficient. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., With Bldgs., Appurtenances, Improvements, & Contents, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (10th Cir. 1996). The Court will "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).

III. ANALYSIS

The Court has interpreted Petitioner's response to state four distinct objections relating to the analysis in the PFRD.

A. Objection 1: Exhaustion

Petitioner first objects to the Magistrate Judge's proposed finding that he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to Grounds One, Two, and Three. Doc. 14 at 1. As correctly explained in the PFRD, a federal court cannot grant a petition for habeas corpus under § 2254 unless the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). A petitioner must prove either that he exhausted state court remedies or that exhaustion would have been futile. See Selsor v. Workman, 644 F.3d 984, 1026 (10th Cir. 2011). "A claim has been exhausted when it has been 'fairly presented' to the state court." Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1011 (10th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner asserted all of his grounds to the state trial court in both his pro se petition and his amended petition. See doc. 11 at 5; doc. 13 at 4. However, as laid out in the PFRD, exhaustion requires one complete round of the state's established appellate review process, including fair presentation to the New Mexico Supreme Court. Doc. 13 at 4-5 (citing Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212, 1231 (10th Cir. 2014); Jernigan v. Jaramillo, 436 F. App'x 852, 855 (10th Cir. 2011)). Petitioner does not challenge that he failed to exhaust at least one ground (Ground Two) asserted in his federal petition. See doc. 12 at 2-3; doc. 14 at 1. Rather, Petitioner's objection again argues that Grounds One and Threehave been exhausted, as they were presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court in a manner which alerted it to his allegations of constitutional error. Doc. 14 at 1; see also doc. 12 at 2; doc. 11-3 at 2-4. The Court joins the Magistrate Judge in rejecting this argument.

For the reasons expressed in the PFRD, the Court agrees with the proposed finding that the sole issue presented for review on appeal in state court was whether Petitioner had received ineffective assistance of counsel when he was apprised of the sentencing conditions in his plea agreement. Doc. 11-3 at 5. The Court is further persuaded by the fact that the argument section of Petitioner's state writ is entirely dedicated to the legal standard and factual application of this single claim. See doc. 11-3 at 6-9. Consequently, the Court agrees that Grounds One and Three were not fairly presented to the state supreme court through mere mention in the procedural background section. See Bland, 459 F.3d at 1011; Welch v. Milyard, 436 F. App'x 861, 869 (10th Cir. 2011).

Petitioner attempts to avoid this result by pointing to the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2008). As in this case, the petitioner in Wooten was represented by counsel, who presented all of the grounds...