Chavez v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 16 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 1:11-cv-03025-AA |
| Parties | DANIEL MIKE CHAVEZ, Plaintiff, v. DAVID R. ROBINSON; LISA MOORE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
This matter comes before the Court on separate Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant David R. Robinson and Defendant Lisa Moore. ECF Nos. 50, 52. The Court heard oral argument on both motions on April 10, 2018. ECF No. 67. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 49, shall be dismissed with leave to amend.
As the parties observed at oral argument, this case has a convoluted history. For the sake of clarity, the Court has divided its summary of the factual and procedural background into separate sections dealing in turn with the underlying state criminal case and then the federal civil rights case.1
On May 22, 2008, a grand jury issued an indictment against Plaintiff Daniel Mike Chavez in Klamath County Circuit Court Case No. 0800999CR. Halley Decl. Ex. 1. The indictment alleged the following seven counts:
Counts 6 and 7, both alleging Felony Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, were subsequently dismissed. Halley Decl. Ex. 1, at 1.
On March 20, 2009, a jury convicted Chavez of Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5, but acquitted Chavez on Count 2. Halley Decl. Ex. 2. On April 28, 2009, Chavez was sentenced to sixty months of probation for Count 1, eighteen months in prison for Count 3, with sixty months of post-prison supervision, and thirty days in jail for Counts 4 and 5. Halley Decl. Ex. 3. Chavez was also required to register as a sex offender. As part of his probationary sentence for Count 1, Chavez was ordered to:
Submit to and pay for evaluation by an approved sex offender program. If deemed eligible, defendant shall enter, participate in, successfully complete and pay for such treatment at the direction of the probation officer. The sex offender program, and the terms of the program, are to be designated by defendant's probation officer.
The post-prison supervision imposed on Count 3 had a similar requirement. ORS 144.102(4)(b) requires the parole board or supervisory authority to impose certain special conditions for supervision in sex offense cases, including:
Entry into and completion of or successful discharge from a sex offender treatment program approved by the board, supervisory authority or supervising officer. The program may include polygraph and plethysmograph testing. The person is responsible for paying for the treatment program.
ORS 144.102(4)(b)(F).
Chavez timely filed an appeal of his conviction and sentence. Chavez served out his prison term before his appeal was resolved and the appeal remained pending when Chavez returned to Klamath Falls and began to serve his term of probation and post-prison supervision. Defendant Lisa Moore was assigned as Chavez's probation officer and Moore was responsible for monitoring Chavez's compliance with both his probation and post-prison supervision, including the mandatory sex offender treatment. Moore directed Chavez to attend the sex offender treatment program provided by Defendant David R. Robinson.
As part of the sex offender treatment program, Robinson required that Chavez admit to the conduct underlying his convictions. The terms of the sex offender treatment program also permitted Robinson to share anything Chavez said in treatment with Moore. Chavez had consistently maintained his innocence and believed that his pending appeal was both meritorious and likely to reverse his convictions. Chavez feared that if he made the admissions required byRobinson, those statements would be used against him following remand from the Oregon Court of Appeals. Chavez refused to admit the conduct underlying his convictions and invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Chavez was sanctioned three times during the course of his supervision, allegedly for his refusal to admit the offense conduct as part of his sex offender treatment. The first two sanctions were imposed in June 2010 and August 2010. On September 1, 2010, the state court issued an order granting Chavez immunity for any statements he made about his offense conduct in the course of sex offender treatment.2 Chavez was sanctioned a third time in March 2011.3 The record concerning these sanctions is extremely sparse, but it appears that Chavez was jailed for violating either the terms of his probationary sentence under Count 1 or the terms of his post-prison supervision under Count 3.4 The record does not clearly indicate the length of these sanctions, nor does it contain any details about the specific reasons for the sanctions.
On February 15, 2012, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed Chavez's conviction based on the prosecution's concession of error and remanded the case to the Klamath County Circuit Court. State v. Chavez, 248 Or. App. 260 (2012).
On remand, Chavez entered into a plea petition in which he agreed to enter a plea of no contest to Count 1 of the indictment. Naumes Decl. Ex. 2. In exchange, the prosecution agreed to dismiss Counts 3, 4, and 5, and to recommend a sentence of time served with a requirement that Chavez register as a sex offender. Id.
On February 13, 2014, the state court accepted Chavez's plea of no contest to Count 1 and dismissed all other counts pursuant to the plea agreement. Naumes Decl. Ex. 1. The judgment required that Chavez register as a sex offender, but is otherwise silent as to penalties. Id.
Chavez initially filed this action on March 9, 2011, shortly before his third jail sanction and nearly a year before the Oregon Court of Appeals issued its ruling on Chavez's appeal. ECF No. 2. On April 3, 2014, Senior District Judge Panner sua sponte dismissed Chavez's complaint with prejudice based, in part, on qualified immunity. ECF Nos. 13, 14.
Chavez appealed and, on April 15, 2016, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of dismissal. Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that this case "raises serious questions about the scope of Fifth Amendment protections for probationers undergoing sex offender treatment," but the procedural posture of the case necessarily narrowed the scope of the federal appeal to whether qualified immunity was an appropriate consideration during IFP screening. Id. at 1165. The Ninth Circuit did not,therefore, reach the merits of Chavez's claims. Id. at 1169-70 ().
Following remand, the case was reassigned to this Court. ECF No. 25. At Chavez's request, pro bono counsel was appointed and the operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC") was filed on December 27, 2017.5 ECF Nos. 30, 38, 49. These motions followed.
Where a plaintiff "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," the court must dismiss the action: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to state a viable claim, a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This means a complaint must contain "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The complaint must contain "well-pleaded facts" which "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 679.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and its allegations taken as true. Rosen v. Walters, 719 F.2d 1422, 1424 (9th Cir. 1983). Bare assertions, however, that amount to nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
Chavez brings a single claim against Moore and Robinson for violation of his rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of his federal rights." Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). To maintain a claim under § 1983, "a plaintiff must both (1) allege the deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
A federal court does not have jurisdiction "'to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.'"...
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