Chavez v. Won, Case No.: 1:19-cv-0595 JLT
| Decision Date | 14 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:19-cv-0595 JLT |
| Parties | RORY CHAVEZ, Plaintiff, v. YONG KYUN WON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER VACATING THE HEARING DATE OF DECEMBER 18, 2020
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REQUEST TO DECLINE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
(Doc. 45)
Rory Chavez asserts he encountered disability access barriers when visiting Havana House Smoke Shop and seeks to hold Yong Kyun Wong, Young Ae Wong, and GIJ Enterprises liable for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Unruh Civil Rights Act. (See Doc. 1) Defendants seek summary adjudication of Plaintiff's claim under the ADA. In addition, Defendants contend the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims (Doc. 45) Plaintiff opposes the motion, asserting there is no admissible evidence that Defendants' property complies with the ADA, and the Court should maintain supplemental jurisdiction. (Doc. 46)
The Court finds the matter suitable for decision without oral arguments, and the matter is taken under submission pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). Therefore, the hearing date of December 18, 2020 is VACATED. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is DENIED.
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Plaintiff "is a California resident with physical disabilities" and he "uses a wheelchair for mobility." (Doc. 1 at 1, ¶ 1; DSF 1) Plaintiff alleges that in December 2018, he visited Havana House Smoke Shop, which is located at 3221 Niles Street in Bakersfield, California. (Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 5, 10) The real property at that location is owned by Yong Kyun Wong and Young Ae Wong, and defendant GIJ Enterprises operated Havana House Smoke Shop at the time of Plaintiff's visit. (Id. at 2, ¶¶ 3-5; see also Doc. 45 at 6)
Plaintiff asserts he went to Havana House Smoke Shop "with the intention to avail himself of its goods or services and to assess the business for compliance with the disability access laws." (Doc. 1 at 3, ¶ 10) He reports the store "is a facility open to the public, a place of public accommodation, and a business establishment." (Id., ¶ 11) Plaintiff alleges "[p]arking spaces are one of the facilities, privileges, and advantages offered by Defendants to patrons of the Store." (Id., ¶ 12) According to Plaintiff, on the date of his visit, "the defendants did not provide accessible parking in conformance with the ADA Standards." (Id., ¶ 13) In addition, Plaintiff reports that "the defendants did not provide accessible paths of travel leading to the entrance of the Store in conformance with the ADA Standards." (Id., ¶ 16) Plaintiff "personally encountered" the identified barriers, which "denied the plaintiff full and equal access" to the store. (Id., ¶¶ 18-19)
At the time of the complaint was filed in May 2019, Plaintiff reported the barriers remained and Defendants did not provide accessible parking or accessible paths of travel in compliance with the ADA standards. (Doc. 1 at 3, ¶¶ 14, 17) Plaintiff asserts he would return to Havana House SmokeShop "to avail himself of goods or services and to determine compliance with the disability access laws once it is represented to him that the Store and its facilities are accessible." (Id. at 4, ¶ 23) However, he was "deterred from doing so because of his knowledge of the existing barriers and his uncertainty about the existence of yet other barriers on the site." (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for violations of the ADA and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. (See generally Doc. 1)
Defendants filed their second motion for summary adjudication, which is now pending before the Court, on November 3, 2020. (Doc. 45) Defendants contend Plaintiff's request "for injunctive relief must be dismissed because it is moot: all of the paint striping and signage for the accessible parking spaces at the [Store] presently comply with current accessibility standards under both federal and state law." (Doc. 45 at 6) In addition, Defendants assert "the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims." (Id.) Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion on December 4, 2020. (Doc. 46) Defendants not file a reply.
The "purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In addition, Rule 56 allows a court to grant summary adjudication, or partial summary judgment, when there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a particular claim or portion of that claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standards that apply on a motion for summary judgment and a motion for summary adjudication are the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), (c); Mora v. Chem-Tronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
Summary judgment, or summary adjudication, should be entered "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the "initialresponsibility" of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. An issue of fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, while a fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1422, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). A party demonstrates summary adjudication is appropriate by "informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue of a material fact. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsuhita, 475 U.S. at 586. An opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 587. The party is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that a factual dispute exits. Id. at 586 n.11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party is not required to establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). However, "failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The Court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving party demonstrated there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the Court can only consider admissible evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988)). Further, evidence must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party" and "all justifiable inferences" must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Orr, 285 F.3d at 772; Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of the Civil Procedure, "an affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated."
Under the Federal Rules, "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702. However, "an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to [a] legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law." Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Crow Tribe of Indians v. Racicot, 87 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1996) ( ) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff objects to statements made by Christy Kim in her declaration and the Certified Access Specialist Inspection Report dated October 6, 2020 ("the CASp Report"). (See Doc. 46-1) The site visit was performed on September 22, 2020 by Sarah Ibrahim, EIT (Engineering-In-Training). (Doc. 45-3 at 6; see also Doc. 45 at 3, K...
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