Chavies v. Commonwealth , 2010–SC–000479–MR.
| Decision Date | 27 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2010–SC–000479–MR.,2010–SC–000479–MR. |
| Citation | 354 S.W.3d 103 |
| Parties | Christopher CHAVIES, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thomas More Ransdell, Assistant Public Advocate, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellant.
Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky, Courtney J. Hightower, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Criminal Appellate Division, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellee.
A circuit court jury convicted Christopher Chavies of manufacturing methamphetamine; receipt of stolen property worth $500 or more, but less than $10,000; and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court sentenced him to a total of fifty years' imprisonment.
Chavies now appeals his conviction as a matter of right,1 contending the judgment must be reversed because of (1) improper admission of evidence seized during a search of his vehicle, (2) insufficient evidence of the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine, (3) insufficient evidence of the offense of receipt of stolen property, and (4) improper admission of amended and dismissed charges in the penalty phase of the trial.
We find no reversible error on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.
A Kentucky state police officer, while driving through his neighborhood, spotted a man standing in the garage of a for-sale house and an unfamiliar car pulling out of its driveway. The officer stopped the driver of the car, Chavies, for not wearing a seatbelt and reckless driving. After arresting Chavies for an unrelated outstanding warrant, the officer drove back to the for-sale house from which Chavies had come. A realtor provided a key; and police searched the house, finding a trespasser, Owen Hurley, hidden in a closet. Hurley admitted to making and smoking methamphetamine in the house; and he reported that Chavies took items from the house, including a computer and a box of lights. Based on this information, police looked through the window of Chavies's car and saw a laptop bag and a box of lights. Upon searching the vehicle, police discovered numerous items stolen from the residence and a mobile methamphetamine lab.
The grand jury indicted Chavies, charging him with second-degree burglary; manufacturing methamphetamine; receipt of stolen property worth $500 or more, but less than $10,000; and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Chavies made two motions to suppress the evidence found in his car, which the trial court denied. The jury convicted Chavies of manufacturing methamphetamine; receipt of stolen property worth $500 or more, but less than $10,000; and being a second-degree persistent felony offender.
Chavies argues the trial court erred in denying his two motions to suppress evidence seized during the search of his vehicle. In the first motion, he contended the traffic stop was invalid because it was not based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Chavies claimed in the second motion that the warrantless search of his car was illegal because it did not fall under an exception to the warrant requirement. We find that the trial court properly denied both of these motions.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provide safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures. “Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provides no greater protection than does the federal Fourth Amendment.” 2
The standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion is two-fold. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and are deemed conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.3 And the trial court's application of the law to the facts found is reviewed de novo.4
Chavies argues the trial court erred by denying his first motion to suppress because the police officer did not have articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop his vehicle. He claims his actions did not constitute reckless driving, and the officer could not see whether he was wearing a seat belt. We find that the trial court properly denied Chavies's motion to suppress because there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court's factual findings, and the trial court properly applied the law to the facts.
“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ ” under the Fourth Amendment.5 Traffic stops are similar to Terry stops and must be supported by articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.6 “[T]he level of articulable suspicion necessary to justify a stop is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the evidence.” 7
At the evidentiary hearing concerning Chavies's first motion to suppress, the arresting officer testified that he followed Chavies as he turned left out of the subdivision. As Chavies turned left again into the next driveway, the officer saw he was not wearing a seatbelt. The officer turned his car around and found that Chavies had pulled out of the driveway and was turning back into the subdivision. When Chavies saw the officer, he jerked back into the main road. The officer stopped him for driving without a seat belt and reckless driving.
Based on the officer's testimony, we find there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the officer stopped Chavies for not wearing a seatbelt and reckless driving. The officer had articulable reasonable suspicion that Chavies violated these traffic laws. So the traffic stop was constitutional, and the trial court properly denied Chavies's first motion to suppress.
Chavies argues the trial court erred by denying his second motion to suppress because the warrantless search of his vehicle was unconstitutional. We find that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because the search and seizure were valid under the plain-view and automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures “is preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer.” 8 But there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the plain-view and automobile exceptions.
The plain-view exception to the warrant requirement applies when the object seized is plainly visible, the officer is lawfully in a position to view the object, and the incriminating nature of the object is immediately apparent. 9
Some confusion exists concerning a potential fourth element to the plain-view exception—inadvertent discovery by the police. It is necessary to clarify in this opinion whether inadvertent discovery is part of the plain-view exception in Kentucky because, if it is, the plain-view exception cannot apply to the police seizure of evidence from Chavies's car.10
The U.S. Supreme Court included the inadvertent discovery element in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.11 But the majority of the Court never expressly adopted the Coolidge plurality's discussion of the plain-view exception.12 The Court resolved the issue in Horton v. California by holding that “even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate ‘plain-view’ seizures, it is not a necessary condition.” 13 Following the Supreme Court's lead, this Court stated in dicta that the plain-view exception no longer requires inadvertent discovery of the evidence. 14 But in Hunt v. Commonwealth,15 we included the inadvertent discovery element in the plain-view exception analysis.
Hunt does not signal a reversion in Kentucky law back to requiring inadvertent discovery in the plain-view exception. The inadvertent discovery analysis was not central to the holding in Hunt. Because Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provides no greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, we do not require inadvertent discovery of the evidence under the plain-view exception.
Chavies contends (1) the laptop and lights seized were not in plain view; (2) the incriminating nature of the objects was not immediately apparent; and (3) even if the plain-view exception does apply, the police were not authorized to search the entire vehicle. We disagree.
The laptop and lights were in plain view. Chavies argues the computer and lights themselves were not visible because the computer was in a laptop bag, and the lights were in a box. We disagree. Hurley said Chavies took lights packaged in a box and a computer. Police saw in Chavies's car the original packaging for the lights, as Hurley described, and a laptop bag. It is sufficient that the police saw a laptop bag in the car. Police did not have to see the laptop itself as long as they had probable cause to believe the laptop bag was stolen or contained a stolen computer.
The incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent. Where the nature of the evidence is not inherently criminal, probable cause of its incriminating nature is necessary.16 In the context of the plain-view exception, the U.S. Supreme Court defined probable cause as
a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,” (citation omitted) that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A “practical, nontechnical” probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. (Citation omitted.) 17
Chavies argues the police could not have probable cause to believe the items were stolen based on Hurley's...
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