CHCA Woman's Hosp., L.P. v. Lidji

• Decision Date: 21 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–0357.,12–0357.
• Citation: 403 S.W.3d 228,56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 735
• Parties: CHCA WOMAN'S HOSPITAL, L.P. d/b/a The Woman's Hospital of Texas and Woman's Hospital of Texas, Inc., Petitioners, v. Scott LIDJI and Angela Lidji, as next friends of R.L., a minor, Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

403 S.W.3d 228

56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 735

CHCA WOMAN'S HOSPITAL, L.P. d/b/a The Woman's Hospital of Texas and Woman's Hospital of Texas, Inc., Petitioners,

v.Scott LIDJI and Angela Lidji, as next friends of R.L., a minor, Respondents.

No. 12–0357.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Feb. 5, 2013.

Decided June 21, 2013.

Kirsten M. Castañeda, Mike A. Hatchell, Locke Lord LLP, Austin, TX, Robert Eugene Bell, William Howard Whitaker, Serpe Jones Andrews, Callender & Bell, PLLC, Houston, TX, for CHCA Woman's Hospital, LP.

Gaines West, Jennifer D. Jasper, West Webb Allbritton & Gentry PC, College Station, TX, for Scott Lidji.

Justice LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this interlocutory appeal, we are once again called upon to interpret and apply the Texas Medical Liability Act's (TMLA) expert-report requirement, contained in section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. With respect to health care liability claims governed by the TMLA, a claimant is generally required to serve an expert report on each physician or health care provider against whom such a claim is asserted no later than 120 days after the original petition is filed. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 74.351(a).¹ Failure to do so results in dismissal of the claim with prejudice and an award of attorney's fees on the motion of the affected defendant. Id. § 74.351(b). The issue presented here is whether a claimant's nonsuit of a health care liability claim before the expiration of the 120–day period tolls the expert-report period until suit is refiled. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that it does and therefore affirm the court of appeals' judgment.

I. Background

Scott and Angela Lidji, as next friends of their daughter, R.L., sued CHCA Woman's Hospital, L.P. d/b/a The Woman's Hospital of Texas and Woman's Hospital of Texas, Inc. (CHCA) for injuries sustained by R.L. following her premature birth. The Lidjis allege that, as a result of improper treatment while in CHCA's Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, R.L. suffered severe and permanent neurological damage. The Lidjis filed a health care liability claim against CHCA on April 2, 2009 (the First Suit). On July 27, 2009, 116 days after filing their original petition, the Lidjis nonsuited their claim. Just over two years later, on August 15, 2011, the Lidjis filed a new lawsuit against CHCA and several other health care providers (the Second Suit). ² The same day they filed the Second Suit,³ the Lidjis served an expert report on CHCA.

CHCA objected to the report as untimely and moved to dismiss the claim against it with prejudice. SeeTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 74.351(b). CHCA asserted that the deadline to serve the report expired on July 31, 2009, which was the 120th day after the Lidjis filed their original petition in the First Suit.⁴ The Lidjis responded that their nonsuit tolled the expert-report deadline, such that they had four days after filing the original petition in the Second Suit to serve the report on CHCA. The trial court overruled CHCA's objection and denied the motion to dismiss.

CHCA appealed the trial court's order. See id. § 51.014(a)(9) (allowing an interlocutory appeal from an order denying relief sought under section 74.351(b)). The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “a claimant's nonsuit, filed prior to the expiration of section 74.351's 120–day time period for serving expert reports, tolls the running of the 120–day period until the claimant re-files his claims, at which point the claimant has the time remaining from the 120–day period to serve the defendant with his expert report.” 369 S.W.3d 488, 496. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the Lidjis timely served their expert report on day 117 of the statutory period. See id.

CHCA now seeks interlocutory review by this Court. The Lidjis moved to dismiss CHCA's petition for review, arguing that we lack subject matter jurisdiction over the merits of the appeal. We first determine whether we have such jurisdiction before resolving the substantive issue presented.

II. Interlocutory Appeal Jurisdiction

As indicated above, a party who has been denied relief sought under section 74.351 of the TMLA may seek an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 51.014(a)(9). However, the court of appeals' judgment in an interlocutory appeal is generally final, and we lack jurisdiction over such cases unless a specific exception applies. Tex. Gov't Code § 22.225(b)(3). One such exception allows us to consider a petition for review on interlocutory appeal in a case in which the court of appeals “holds differently from a prior decision of another court of appeals ... on a question of law material to a decision of the case.” Id. § 22.001(a)(2); accord id. § 22.225(c). For jurisdictional purposes, “one court holds differently from another when there is inconsistency in their respective decisions that should be clarified to remove unnecessary uncertainty in the law and unfairness to litigants.” Id. § 22.001(e). CHCA asserts that the court of appeals' decision in this case conflicts with that of the Third Court of Appeals in Estate of Allen v. Scott & White Clinic, No. 03–08–00576–CV, 2011 WL 2993259 (Tex.App.–Austin July 22, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.), thereby conferring jurisdiction. We agree.

In Estate of Allen, the claimant Estate sued several health care providers under the TMLA and nonsuited its claims 118 days after filing its original petition. Id. at *2. Nearly four months later, the Estate filed a second TMLA suit against the providers and attached an expert report to its petition. Id. On the date the petition in the second suit was filed, the Estate made arrangements for the sheriff's office to serve the providers with process and furnished the office with the relevant documents; however, the providers were not actually served with the petition and expert report until four days later. Id. The trial court granted the providers' motion to dismiss. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the “Estate's decision to nonsuit [the providers] did not toll the passage of the 120–day deadline.” Id. at *5. This is the exact opposite conclusion, on the same issue, that the court of appeals reached in the case at hand.

The Lidjis contend that the court of appeals' discussion of the tolling issue in Estate of Allen was dicta, as the focus of the parties' dispute in that case was not whether the nonsuit tolled the report deadline, but whether the Estate's service of the report two days after the tolled deadline should relate back to the date it made arrangements for service because it acted with due diligence in attempting to serve the providers. The Lidjis, however, mischaracterize the holding in Estate of Allen. The court of appeals expressly decided that case on the tolling issue, holding that the deadline expired before “the Estate made arrangements to serve and actually served [the providers] with its expert report.” Id. By resolving the tolling issue against the Estate, the court of appeals did not even reach the due diligence question. In fact, one justice on the panel concurred in the judgment on the grounds that the Estate had failed to prove that a due-diligence exception applied, but nevertheless disagreed with the majority opinion, opining that “the filing of a nonsuit tolls the 120 days for the period between the filing of the nonsuit and the refiling of the same claim.” Id. at *6 (Henson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In sum, we hold that the First Court of Appeals in the underlying case and the Third Court of Appeals in Estate of Allen held differently on a question of law material to a decision of the case: whether a plaintiff's nonsuit of a health care liability claim tolls the expert-report deadline. ⁵ Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over CHCA's petition for review under sections 22.001(a)(2) and 22.225(c) of the Texas Government Code.

III. Analysis of Tolling Issue

The outcome of this case rests on our interpretation of various provisions of the TMLA. Matters of statutory construction are legal questions that we review de novo. Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 177 (Tex.2012). The aim of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent, id., which is generally reflected in the statute's plain language, Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex.2012). We analyze statutory language in context, considering the specific section at issue as well as the statute as a whole. In re OAG, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2013 WL 854785 (Tex.2013) (citing Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex.1999)).

The TMLA provides a statutory framework governing health care liability claims. The Legislature's stated purposes in enacting the TMLA included “reduc [ing] excessive frequency and severity of health care liability claims” and “decreas[ing] the cost of those claims,” but doing so “in a manner that will not unduly restrict a claimant's rights.” Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R. S., ch. 204, § 10.11(b)(1)–(3), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884. We have noted that, with these purposes in mind, “the Legislature struck a careful balance between eradicating frivolous claims and preserving meritorious ones.” Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex.2008).

As part of this statutory framework, the TMLA sets forth the following expert-report requirement:

In a health care liability claim, a claimant shall, not later than the 120th day after the date the original petition was filed, serve on each party or the party's attorney one or more expert reports, with a curriculum vitae of each expert listed in the report for each physician or health care provider against whom a liability claim is asserted. The date for serving the report may be extended by written agreement of the affected parties. Each defendant physician or health care provider whose conduct is...