Cheairs v. Lawson, 01-A-01-9011-CH00386
| Decision Date | 01 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-A-01-9011-CH00386,01-A-01-9011-CH00386 |
| Citation | 815 S.W.2d 533 |
| Parties | Robert Lee CHEAIRS, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Robert LAWSON, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Safety, Respondent/Appellant. 815 S.W.2d 533 |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. & Reporter, George H. Coffin, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for respondent-appellant.
James T. Sanderson, Bolivar, for petitioner-appellee.
This dispositive issue before this Court is whether the provisions of Tenn.R.Civ.P. 6.05 may be used to extend the time for filing a petition to review a final order of the Tennessee Department of Safety. We conclude that such an order cannot be considered "notice or other paper" as provided for in the rule, and that the time prescribed by statute for initiating an appeal to the Chancery Court will not be extended by Rule 6.05.
The appellee, Robert Cheairs, was arrested in 1987 for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. At the time of his arrest, officers seized 23.4 grams of cocaine and $6,490.00 in cash. Several days after the arrest, an additional $14,390.00 was seized from a safe deposit box as being drug related.
On May 11, 1988, a forfeiture hearing was held before the Department of Safety to determine whether the seized money represented the proceeds of drug transactions. A final order was entered on July 22, 1988 directing that the funds be forfeited. A petition for review was filed in the Davidson County Chancery Court on September 22, 1988, sixty-two days after the entry of the final order.
The judicial review of final decisions in contested cases under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act is governed by Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-322. Under that provision, petitions for review must be filed in the Chancery Court within sixty days after the entry of the agency's final order. See Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 4-5-322(b)(1). Thus, the appellee's petition in this case was clearly filed two days past the statutory deadline. But the Chancellor rejected the State's position that the petition was untimely. Because it appeared that the final order of July 22, 1988 was sent to the appellee through the mail, the Chancellor concluded that three additional days must be added to the prescribed period of time. The Chancellor relied on Tenn.R.Civ.P. 6.05 which provides:
Additional Time After Service by Mail
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period.
The Chancellor then affirmed the forfeiture of the $6,490.00 seized at the time of the appellee's arrest, but reversed the forfeiture of the $14,390.00 seized from the safe deposit box because the State's proof was "weak and remote." On appeal, the State contends that the Chancellor erred in relying on Rule 6.05...
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...from the date of entry of the agency's final order, rather than from the petitioner's receipt of the order. See Cheairs v. Lawson, 815 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Houseal v. Roberts, 709 S.W.2d at For the purposes of determining whether the sixty day period applies to a petition ......
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