Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America

• Decision Date: 01 December 1916
• Docket Number: 17S65
• Citation: Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 192 S. W. 387 (Mo. 1916)
• Parties: CHEEK v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

192 S.W. 387

CHEEK v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA

No. 17S65

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 1, 1916

Motion for Rehearing Denied February 20, 1917.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court: Leo S. Russleur, Judge.

Action by Robert T. Check against the Prudential Insurance Company of America.

Judgment for defendant, sustaining a demurrer to the petition, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded for trial.

All concur.

OPINION

WOODSON J.

The plaintiff brought this suit in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, against the defendant to recover actual and punitive damages sustained by him through the alleged unlawful refusal of the latter to give him a letter of clearance in violation of section 3020. R. S. 1909, upon his leaving its employment as an Insurance agent; also for its unlawful agreement and conspiracy with the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, by which they agreed between themselves that neither would, for a period of 2 years, employ any employe leaving the employ of the other regardless of the cause thereof.

The petition was in two counts. The first was bottomed upon the statute before mentioned, and the second on the unlawful conspiracy pleaded. A general demurrer was filed to each count, stating, in substance, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant, which was by the court sustained. The plaintiff declining to plead further, judgment was rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff duly appealed to this court.

The rulings of the trial court require a careful consideration of the petition filed, which is as follows:

"For cause of action plaintiff states that the defendant is now and at all times hereinafter stated was, a corporation under the laws of the state of New Jersey and doing a life insurance business in the state of Missouri under license from the insurance department of said state, and has an office in the city of St. Louis in charge of a superintendent or manager.

"That plaintiff for more than 10 years last past has been engaged as solicitation agent in the business of industrial and ordinary life insurance, and is not experienced in other lines of business, or qualified to earn his living except in the said business of soliciting applications and collecting premiums in the department of life insurance. Plaintiff is now, and has been for more than 8 years past, a citizen and resident of the city of St. Louis, and has no such acquaintance as would enable him to secure employment, except in the line above stated and in the city of St. Louis.

"Plaintiff stated that heretofore, to wit, in the month of June, 1808, he entered into the employ of the defendant, and continued in the employment of said defendant up to heretofore, to wit, December 7, 1911, when he resigned the said employment and left the services of defendant; that during the entire period of his employment as aforesaid, he served said company in different capacities, sometimes as assistant superintendent of a department, sometimes as collector, and solicitor, and the said company had no cause, and never claimed to have any cause, for dissatisfaction with the services rendered by plaintiff.

"Plaintiff states that he had been in the service of said defendant corporation for a period exceeding 90 days, to wit, for 14 years, and on the 3d day of October, 1912, demanded a letter from the superintendent of defendant in the city of St. Louis, setting forth the nature and character of the services rendered by plaintiff to such corporation and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause plaintiff had quit such service. Plaintiff states that heretofore, to wit, on said 3d day of October, 1912, said defendant, through its superintendent, or manager, of its business in the said city of St. Louis, refused to give plaintiff such a letter as is provided by statute, and plaintiff states that at divers and sundry times between December 7, 1911, and, to wit, October 3, 1912, defendant, through its superintendent and manager in said city of St. Louis, also refused to give plaintiff the letter required by said statute, although demand was made by plaintiff for the same.

"Plaintiff states that because of said refusal to give plaintiff the letter required by the statute as aforesaid, he had been unable to secure employment from other life insurance companies in the city of St. Louis in his line of business, and whereas before leaving said service of defendant he was able to earn, to wit, from $ 100 to $ 130 per month, be line been unable to secure employment in his said line of business because of said refusal, and has been damaged in the sum of $ 2,000.

"Plaintiff states that said refusal on the part of said defendant, through its said superintendent, or manager, to give him the said letter required by statute was willful. Wherefore plaintiff asks judgment for the sum of $ 2,000 actual, and $ 3,000 punitive, damages.

"And for a second and further cause of action plaintiff states that the defendant is now, and was at all the times hereinafter stated, a corporation under the laws of New Jersey, and duly licensed to do a life insurance business in the state of Missouri and maintaining an office in the city of St. Louis in said state.

"Plaintiff states that the defendant is engaged in the business of industrial and ordinary life insurance, employing a large number of solicitors and agents, and its chief competitors are the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of the state of New York and the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company of the state of Maxsachusetts, defendant, and said other two companies having a monopoly of the industrial life insurance business in the city of St. Louis.

"Plaintiff states that he has for the last 14 years been engaged in the business of soliciting applications and collecting premiums, and assisting in superintending the business of industrial life insurance, and during most of that time has been in the employ of said defendant. Plaintiff states that he is now 50 years old, and bus no other means of earning a livelihood, except in the business in which he has been engaged for the period aforesaid, and during the said period his carnings have ranged from $ 100 to $ 130 per month.

"Plaintiff states that heretofore, to wit, on or about December 7, 1911, he resigned from the service of the defendant and sought employment in the same line of business from other corporations engaged in the business of industrial life insurance in the said city of St. Louis, particularly the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. Plaintiff states that he was unable to obtain employment with any of the said companies because of an agreement between them that neither would, for a period of 2 years from an employe leaving the employ of any other, employ any man who had, for any reason, left the service of, or been discharged by, either of the other of said companies. Plaintiff states that he could have found employment in his line of business with some one of the other companies, as aforesaid, if it were not for the said unlawful agreement between the said companies, and plaintiff charges that the said agreement entered into by the said defendant and said other companies was unlawful, for the reason that it amounted to a practical blacklisting of such employe who had left the service of such company. Plaintiff states that, not only has he been unable to obtain employment because of said agreement, but in bringing this suit this plaintiff has precluded himself from obtaining employment with either of said companies, or any other engaged in a similar business, because be has been and will be blacklisted by the said defendant.

"Plaintiff states that because of said unlawful conspiracy and agreement on the part of defendant and said other two companies, he has suffered damage by being unable to secure employment, in the sum of $ 3,000.

"Plaintiff further states that said action of defendant in entering into said agreement, whereby he was prevented from obtaining employment because of the unlawful agreement aforesaid was willful. Wherefore plaintiff asks judgment for the sums of $ 3,000 actual damages and for $ 5,000 punitive damages."

Edward H. Robinson, of St. Louis (F. II. Bacon, of St. Louis, of counsel), for appellant. Fordyce, Holliday & White, of St. Louis (Edward D. Duffield and Jumes Guest, both of Newark, N. J., of counsel), for respondent.

WOODSON, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] I. Counsel for plaintiff insist that the action of the circuit court in sustaining the demurrer to the first count of the petition was erroneous. This insistence is predicated upon the contention that said action of the court was violative of the provisions of section 3020, R. S. 1909, which reads as follows:

"Letter of Dismissal to be Given Employes Quitting Service.--Whenever any employe of any corporation doing business in this state shall be discharged or voluntarily quit the service of such corporation. It shall be the duty of the superintendent or manager of said corporation, upon the request of such employe (if such employe shall have been in the service of said corporation for a period of at least ninety days), to issue to such employe a letter, duly signed by such superintendent or manager, setting forth the nature and character of service rendered by such employe to such corporation and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such employe has quit such service; and if any such superintendent or manager shall fail or refuse to issue such letter to such employe when so requested by such employe, such superintendent or manager shall be deemed guilty of a...