Cheevers v. Clark
Decision Date | 06 October 1994 |
Docket Number | No. A94A1023,A94A1023 |
Citation | 449 S.E.2d 528,214 Ga.App. 866 |
Parties | CHEEVERS v. CLARK. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Simpson, Gray & Carter, Ralph F. Simpson, Melanie B. Cross, Elizabeth B. Gibbs, Tifton, for appellant.
Norman J. Crowe, Jr., Sylvester, B.T. Edmonds, Jr., Albany, for appellee.
Frederick L. Clark (plaintiff) brought this tort action against Tracy L. Cheevers (defendant) seeking to recover for injuries allegedly sustained when plaintiff's vehicle collided with defendant's truck. According to the complaint, defendant was "parked improperly on a highway while under the influence of alcohol...." Consequently, as plaintiff "proceeded east [on Highway 256], he drove around a curve and crashed into the rear of [defendant's] vehicle which was parked on the highway." In a separate count for punitive damages, plaintiff alleged that defendant was aware that "the automobile collision should have been reported to the local law enforcement agency[; and that defendant] should remain at the scene until the reporting officer arrived." Nevertheless, defendant "did not contact any law enforcement agency[ ... and] left the scene of the wreck before a law enforcement officer arrived." The evidence adduced at a jury trial in support of these allegations included defendant's admission that he had been consuming alcohol throughout the day and that he had a blood-alcohol content of .28 grams percent when he was arrested at his home approximately one hour after the collision.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury first awarded plaintiff $1,500 in compensatory damages and then returned a verdict against defendant awarding plaintiff $60,000 in punitive damages. Defendant appeals from the judgment entered on these verdicts. Held:
1. In his third enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the results of the intoximeter test performed on him because the arresting officer could not recall the precise wording in which he gave defendant his implied consent warnings.
Gene Jones, Chief of Police for the City of Poulon, testified that he gave defendant the following implied consent warning: " " Under cross-examination, Chief Jones affirmed that he did not know "whether this was the revision that was in effect on July 21, 1991, [ ... and] if it was a different revision and the wording changed [he did not] know[.]" When the officer who administered the intoximeter test was asked to state the results, defendant interposed an objection "upon the grounds that the proper foundation has not been laid."
"Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person in violation of Code Section 40-6-391, evidence of the amount of alcohol or drug in a person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance at the alleged time, as determined by a chemical analysis ... shall be admissible." O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(a). In order for such chemical analysis to be admissible in evidence, (Emphasis in original.) Pryor v. State, 182 Ga.App. 79, 80(2), 354 S.E.2d 690. In the case sub judice, the warning given by Chief Jones advised defendant that independent testing of "blood, breath, urine or other bodily substances ..." was available. Compare Hulsey v. State, 138 Ga.App. 221, 225 S.E.2d 752. The trial court did not err in admitting this evidence over defendant's objection as to foundation.
2. In his second enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in charging the jury on the presumptions of intoxication at various blood-alcohol levels established by O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(b). He argues that the charge was not adjusted to the evidence because there was no testimony indicating his blood-alcohol level at the time of the collision. However, given that chemical analysis of defendant's blood at the time of his arrest approximately one hour after the collision showed a blood-alcohol level of .30 grams percent, the jury was authorized to infer that defendant's blood-alcohol at the time of the collision was .08 grams percent or greater. The absence of testimony about the metabolic rate of alcohol in the blood so as to permit a calculation of blood-alcohol content at the actual time of the collision does not render the evidence insufficient to support the desired inference. Simon v. State, 182 Ga.App. 210, 211(3), 212, 355 S.E.2d 120; Morris v. State, 172 Ga.App. 832, 833(1), 324 S.E.2d 793. Consequently, the trial court did not err in charging the jury on the presumptions of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(b).
3. Defendant contends in his first enumeration the trial court erred in giving jury instructions on negligence per se arising out of defendant's leaving the scene of an accident and his failure to report the accident. He argues that any evidence of his departure from the scene of the accident or his failure to report the accident to authorities was irrelevant to the issue of liability or any other issue properly raised during the first phase of the trial. However, this issue has been determined adversely to defendant's contentions.
Battle v. Kilcrease, 54 Ga.App. 808(1), 189 S.E. 573. In the case sub judice, even though defendant is not a "hit-and-run" driver, the trial court did not err in charging the jury on negligence per se arising out of defendant's leaving the scene of an accident and in failing to report the accident to the proper authorities.
4. In his fourth and fifth enumerations, defendant contends the trial court erred during the second phase of the trial in admitting evidence of "defendant's arrest for unrelated...
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