Chelf v. State

• Decision Date: 23 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 103,450.,103,450.
• Citation: 46 Kan.App.2d 522,263 P.3d 852
• Parties: James CHELF, Appellant,v.STATE of Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

46 Kan.App.2d 522

263 P.3d 852

James CHELF, Appellant,

v.STATE of Kansas, Appellee.

No. 103,450.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Sept. 23, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. K.S.A. 75–52,138 provides that any inmate in the custody of the Secretary of Corrections must exhaust all administrative remedies provided by the Secretary of Corrections before filing a civil lawsuit against the State of Kansas.

2. K.A.R. 44–16–104a provides that any claim for personal injury must be submitted by the inmate to the facility within 10 calendar days of the claimed personal injury.

3. Subject matter jurisdiction is vested by statute or constitution and establishes the court's authority to hear and decide a particular type of action. Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the courts by consent, waiver, or estoppel. Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by failing to object to the court's lack of jurisdiction. If a trial court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it has absolutely no authority to reach the merits of the case and is required as a matter of law to dismiss it.

4. The exhaustion requirement set forth in K.S.A. 75–52,138 is a mandatory, but nonjurisdictional, prerequisite to filing suit that must be strictly enforced by the court. Because it is not jurisdictional, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by this particular statute may be subject to certain defenses such as waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling.

5. Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right and the expression of an intention not to insist upon what the law affords.

6. A party asserting equitable estoppel bears the burden to establish the party was induced to believe certain facts as a result of another person's acts, representations, admissions, or silence when that person was under a duty to speak, the party relied and acted upon those facts, and the party would be prejudiced if the other person were allowed to deny the existence of those facts.

7. The equitable doctrine of quasi-estoppel involves an assertion of rights inconsistent with past conduct, silence by those who ought to speak, or situations wherein it would be unconscionable to permit a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one to which the person has acquiesced.

8. Kansas courts recognize a judicially created equitable exception to exhaustion when the administrative remedies available are inadequate or compliance with them would serve no purpose.

9. The basic elements of procedural due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

William J. Pauzauskie, of Topeka, for appellant.Matthew J. Donnelly, legal counsel, of Lansing Correctional Facility, for appellee.Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., McANANY, J., and KNUDSON, S.J.

STANDRIDGE, J.

James Chelf appeals from the district court's decision to summarily dismiss his personal injury claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because he failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. For the reasons stated below, we find the district court erred in summarily dismissing Chelf's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, although it is a mandatory prerequisite to filing a civil suit that must be strictly enforced by the court, the exhaustion requirement set forth in K.S.A. 75–52,138 is not jurisdictional. Nevertheless, we affirm the district court's decision to summarily dismiss Chelf's claim because the undisputed facts in the record do not support either the equitable defenses he advanced or the constitutional violations he alleged in district court.

Facts

Chelf, an inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility, was seriously injured while working in a chemical plant. Another inmate “was moving [a] big paint mixer machine” with a forklift when that machine slid off and fell on top of Chelf. Chelf suffered a crushed right knee and tibia, and his left arm, bicep, shoulder, thigh, ear, and face were “smashed.” His lower back “hurts all the time” from the accident. Chelf estimated his medical expenses, loss of earning capacity, economic loss, and pain and suffering at $2 million.

Chelf's injury occurred on June 18, 2007. Chelf filed a claim for damages with the Kansas Department of Corrections (DOC) on February 14, 2008. Upon review of Chelf's claim, Lansing Property Claims Officer James K. Jones sent Chelf the following response:

“Your Property Claim (Personal Injury) is being returned to you with no action taken. It has been determined that your claim exceeds $500.00. Therefore, in accordance with IMPP [Internal Management Policies and Procedures] 01–117 & 01–118 Property damage/loss or personal injury exceeding $500.00 that cannot be resolved [for] $500.00 or less shall be filed with the Joint Committee on Special Claims against the State.”

On February 26, 2008, Chelf filed his claim with the joint committee on special claims (joint committee) as directed by Officer Jones. On August 27, 2008, the joint committee denied Chelf's claim without prejudice. Chelf thereafter filed a petition for damages sounding in tort against the State of Kansas in Shawnee County District Court. Shawnee County transferred the case to Leavenworth County on November 7, 2008.

About a month after the case was transferred, the State filed a motion to dismiss based on Chelf's failure to timely exhaust his administrative remedies. The district court denied the motion, finding insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether Chelf timely exhausted his administrative remedies. The State filed a motion to reconsider, to which it attached an exhibit establishing the date Chelf filed his administrative claim. Upon reconsideration, the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss on grounds that Chelf had “filed [his claim] out of time” and therefore failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies.

Analysis

The Kansas Tort Claims Act

In October 2008, Chelf filed this lawsuit seeking money damages from the State of Kansas for personal injuries sustained as a result of the State's negligence. At common law, a state—as the sovereign—is immune from suit unless it consents. Woodruff v. City of Ottawa, 263 Kan. 557, 561, 951 P.2d 953 (1997). The Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA) provides this consent, subject to certain exceptions. The general rule of liability for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions by state employees who are acting within the scope of their employment is set forth in K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75–6103. Although various exceptions to the general rule of liability are set forth in K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75–6104, the KTCA makes liability the rule and immunity the exception, and the burden is on the State to establish it is entitled to any of the stated exceptions. C.J.W. v. State, 253 Kan. 1, 13, 853 P.2d 4 (1993).

The Kansas Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to actions within the scope of the KTCA. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75–6103(b). Under the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, “[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract,” shall be brought within 2 years. K.S.A. 60–513(a)(4). For purposes of filing a timely KTCA claim, Chelf had to file his civil lawsuit for negligence against the State of Kansas within 2 years of June 18, 2007, the date of the accident. Chelf filed his petition with the district court in October 2008; thus, the lawsuit was filed in a timely manner for purposes of the KTCA.

Inmate Exhaustion Requirements

Because Chelf was an inmate at the time of the accident, however, we must consider the viability of Chelf's claim of negligence not only in the context of the KTCA, but also in the context of a separate and distinct statutory scheme relating to the DOC. To that end, K.S.A. 75–52,138 requires any inmate in the custody of the Secretary of Corrections to exhaust all administrative remedies provided by the Secretary of Corrections before filing a civil lawsuit against the State of Kansas. At issue here is K.A.R. 44–16–104a, the administrative regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Corrections governing inmate claims for personal injury. In order to provide the necessary context for our analysis of the issue presented in this first claim of error, we find it helpful to briefly review the history of this regulation.

The prior regulation, K.A.R. 44–16–104, became effective on May 1, 1980, and was revoked in its entirety on February 15, 2002. Before it was revoked, the regulation stated as follows:

“(a) Claims for property loss or damage or personal injury may be submitted to the institution and secretary of corrections. If the loss is greater than $500.00, the claim may be filed with the joint legislative committee on claims against the state.” K.A.R. 44–16–104 (2000).

A panel of this court was required to interpret this provision of K.A.R. 44–16–104 in Bates v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 31 Kan.App.2d 513, 514–15, 67 P.3d 168 (2003). In Bates, an inmate sued the State for more than $75,000 based on serious personal injuries (crushed pelvis, crushed back, and a severed urethra) received while operating a road grader at a correctional institution. Because he did not file a grievance or claim form with the prison prior to filing suit, the district court dismissed the lawsuit based on Bates' failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Bates then filed a claim with the legislature's joint committee on special claims against the State (joint committee). After the joint committee denied him relief, Bates refiled his claim in district court. The State moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. In support of this decision, the court again found Bates had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under K.A.R. 44–16–104, which required him to file a grievance or claim with the institution prior to seeking relief from the joint committee.

On appeal, a panel of this court reversed. In its analysis, the Bates court...