Chelik v. Capitol Transp., LLC.

• Decision Date: 27 October 2015
• Docket Number: Docket No. 322349.
• Citation: 880 N.W.2d 350,313 Mich.App. 83
• Parties: CHELIK v. CAPITOL TRANSPORT, LLC.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

313 Mich.App. 83

880 N.W.2d 350

CHELIK

v.CAPITOL TRANSPORT, LLC.

Docket No. 322349.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 6, 2015, at Lansing.

Decided Oct. 27, 2015, at 9:05 a.m.

McCarthy Law Group PC, Portage (by Timothy H. McCarthy Jr. ) for Michael Chelik.

Kitch Drutchas Wagner Valitutti & Sherbrook (by Susan Healy Zitterman, Detroit and Richard J. Suhrheinrich, Okemos) for Sparrow Hospital.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and SAAD and HOEKSTRA, JJ.

SAAD

, J.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

After plaintiff broke his arm in a fall and after defendant Sparrow Hospital¹ administered medical treatment, Sparrow advised plaintiff that it could do no more for him, recommended that he see a specialist the next day, and discharged plaintiff from the hospital. Though plaintiff preferred to stay the night at the hospital, a doctor advised him that the hospital facilities could not be used for mere overnight rest and therefore a cab was called to take him back to his hotel. Hospital personnel took plaintiff by wheelchair to the waiting room, where plaintiff waited for his cab, by himself. Upon arrival at the hospital, the cab driver assisted plaintiff out of the wheelchair and attempted to help plaintiff into the cab whereupon plaintiff fell once again and injured his other arm. Thereafter, plaintiff saw doctors for his broken arms. Plaintiff sued Sparrow for his injuries. Notably, however, plaintiff did not sue Sparrow for medical malpractice either for Sparrow's treatment or discharge of him. Rather, plaintiff claimed that Sparrow had breached a common-law duty to assist plaintiff with his transportation after Sparrow discharged him from the hospital. After the close of plaintiff's proofs, the trial court granted Sparrow's motion for directed verdict on the grounds that Sparrow had no common-law duty to assist a discharged patient, such as plaintiff, with transportation from the hospital and that, were the court to find such a duty, there was no evidence that Sparrow's alleged breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff's damages.

For reasons that we explain below, we hold that Michigan law does not impose a duty on a hospital to assist a discharged patient with transportation. And, because there is no duty, we need not address the causation issue, but we note that, were we to decide this issue, we would hold that plaintiff failed to prove that any of his damages were caused by Sparrow.

II. BASIC FACTS

In November 2010, plaintiff lived in New Jersey, worked for Disney in its Broadway musical touring division, and, as a member of the touring production, performed at the Wharton Center on the campus of Michigan State University in East Lansing. After an evening performance, plaintiff, who weighed 345 pounds, fell while walking to his car. The fall broke plaintiff's left elbow and left forearm.

It was near midnight by the time plaintiff was admitted into the emergency department at Sparrow. Unable to do anything for plaintiff immediately, the Sparrow staff molded a splint for his left arm and told him to see an orthopedic surgeon the following day. Plaintiff testified that he did not want to be discharged because he was tired; he did not want to travel the 20 or 25 minutes to his hotel and preferred to sleep at the hospital. The doctor responded that the hospital could not use a bed as a place to spend the night and ultimately discharged plaintiff at 5:55 a.m. The medical records show that the doctor's decision to discharge plaintiff was based on the following findings: plaintiff's condition had improved, plaintiff's pain was controlled, an exam of plaintiff showed him to be “stable,” and a repeat exam also showed that plaintiff was “stable.” Furthermore, the nurse in charge conducted a “fall risk assessment” and, after watching plaintiff stand up by himself and walk across the room, concluded that plaintiff passed the assessment. When discharged, plaintiff was offered a wheelchair, which he used.

A technician in the emergency department pushed plaintiff in the wheelchair to the emergency room waiting area and then left. Soon thereafter, the cab driver arrived and pushed plaintiff to the vehicle. Plaintiff was concerned with the driver's ability to effectively assist, but the driver reassured him that he had done this before and “don't worry about it.” After clearing out room in the front passenger seat, plaintiff asked the driver if the wheelchair was locked, and the driver replied that “Yeah, it's locked” and “I got you.” With the assistance of the driver, plaintiff pushed himself to a standing position, but he immediately felt wobbly and went back to sit down. But plaintiff felt that the chair was no longer in place because the driver had already moved it away, so instead of falling back, plaintiff pushed himself into the front of the vehicle and fell into the passenger compartment's foot well on his right side. This fall resulted in injuries to plaintiff's right elbow. X-rays taken later that day revealed that plaintiff's right elbow was now broken and his left arm had the same injuries as before.

A few days later, plaintiff underwent surgery for his left arm, and two days after that, surgery was performed on his right elbow. These surgeries left plaintiff in a precarious state because he could not use either of his arms. After returning to his home in New Jersey, plaintiff saw an orthopedic surgeon, who prescribed six weeks of physical therapy for the right arm. After that six-week session was complete, the plan was for therapy to focus on the more severely injured left arm. After the therapy on the right arm, plaintiff was able to do “normal” things with it, but he nevertheless could not work anymore because of his inability to use his left arm.

In his suit, plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of Sparrow in failing to assist him into the taxi cab. Notably, he did not claim malpractice regarding his treatment or discharge at Sparrow. At the close of plaintiff's proofs, Sparrow moved for directed verdict on two grounds. First, Sparrow argued that it had no duty to assist a discharged patient into a waiting vehicle. Second, Sparrow argued that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of causation. Specifically, the evidence indicated that plaintiff could no longer work because he could no longer use his left arm and elbow. But Sparrow claimed that plaintiff never produced any medical testimony explaining how plaintiff's right elbow injury—the injury at issue from the cab incident—contributed to his inability to work. After hearing arguments from both sides, the trial court granted Sparrow's motion based on a lack of causation evidence.

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion but stated that “[a]lthough the Court did give a detailed rationale as to why a directed verdict would have been appropriate regarding causation and damages, the primary issue and determining factor in this case was that Sparrow did not owe Plaintiff a duty.” The court noted that the evidence established that Sparrow did not have a policy requiring employees to assist discharged patients into awaiting vehicles and there also was no evidence that Sparrow assumed the responsibility of assisting such patients into vehicles.

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, plaintiff's sole argument is that the trial court erred in its determination that Sparrow did not have a duty to assist plaintiff into the taxi cab. We disagree.

In a negligence analysis, the question of whether a duty exists is a question of law that we review de novo. Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co., LLC, 489 Mich. 157, 162, 809 N.W.2d 553 (2011)

. Additionally, decisions on a motion for directed verdict are reviewed de novo as well. Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 469 Mich. 124, 131, 666 N.W.2d 186 (2003). When deciding a motion for directed verdict, the evidence and all legitimate inferences are reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Such a motion “should be granted only if the evidence viewed in this light fails to establish a claim as a matter of law.” Id.

To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the legal duty, (3) the plaintiff suffered damages, and (4) the defendant's breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. [Loweke, 489 Mich. at 162, 809 N.W.2d 553

.]

Regarding the element of duty, “[a] negligence action may only be maintained if a legal duty exists which requires the defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm.” Riddle v. McLouth Steel Prod. Corp., 440 Mich. 85, 96, 485 N.W.2d 676 (1992)

(emphasis added); see also Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed.), § 53, p. 356 (defining “duty” as “an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another”) (emphasis added). Because the question of whether the common law, as a matter of public policy, ought to impose a duty on one for the benefit of another necessarily involves a balancing of interests and societal costs and prudence calls for consistency in application, this is a question of law, which courts, not juries decide. See In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Texas, 479 Mich. 498, 505, 740 N.W.2d 206 (2007) ; Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich. 56, 66–67, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002) ; Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 444 Mich. 579, 601, 513 N.W.2d 773 (1994) (opinion by Riley , J.); Prosser & Keeton, § 37, p. 236 (stating that deciding on the existence of a duty requires “reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only by the court”). As explained by our Supreme Court:

Because the ultimate inquiry in determining whether a duty should be imposed involves balancing the social benefits of imposing a

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