Krick v. Singh
| Decision Date | 21 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 356763 |
| Parties | RONALD LEE KRICK, Plaintiff, and MARY LUCILLE KRICK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. H. PAUL SINGH, M.D., F.A.C.C., and WEST MICHIGAN CARDIOLOGY, PC, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Kent Circuit Court LC No. 19-003120-NH.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and LETICA and PATEL, JJ.
Defendants H. Paul Singh, M.D., F.A.C.C. (Dr. Singh), and West Michigan Cardiology, PC, appeal by leave granted the trial court order granting in part and denying in part their motion for summary disposition of the claims raised by plaintiff Mary Lucille Krick (Mary).[1] We affirm.
On numerous occasions in 2001, plaintiff Ronald Lee Krick (Ronald) passed out. In 2002, doctors at the Mayo Clinic determined that Ronald's condition was caused by swallow syncope.[2] The doctors implanted a pacemaker into Ronald to remedy the syncope. After the pacemaker was implanted, Ronald did not pass out again until November 13 2016.
In the fall of 2016, Ronald started to have episodes of dizziness and lightheadedness about once a day when he got up and out of bed. The episodes did not occur if Ronald sat or stood still, throughout the day, or when he swallowed liquids. On October 19, 2016, Ronald, who was accompanied by Mary, was seen by Nicole Gibbons, a nurse practitioner, and Spencer Nagle, an internal medical resident, at West Michigan Cardiology. At the appointment, Nagle physically examined Ronald and took a history. The progress report of the appointment indicated that Ronald received a pacemaker in 2002, but it made no mention of why the pacemaker was implanted. Nagle testified that it would have been good to know why Ronald had the pacemaker.
Gibbons testified that she requested an interrogation of Ronald's pacemaker in order to see how much Ronald "was pacing if he was pacing" and to see if Ronald had experienced any arrhythmias that could have contributed to his episodes. Gibbons received the Medtronic report of the interrogation which showed that Ronald had not experienced any arrhythmias and that the pacemaker's right ventricular lead was not being used to pace Ronald's heart. Gibbons was aware that the report showed an "elevated number" for impedance of the pacemaker's right ventricular lead. Gibbons attempted to determine whether Ronald's dizzy episodes were related to the impedance. In light of Ronald's report that the dizziness lasted minutes to hours, occurred when he moved his head, and that the medication Meclizine lessened his symptoms, Gibbons believed that Ronald's dizziness was caused by an inner ear problem and referred him to an ear, nose and throat specialist. She also instructed Ronald to stop taking his blood pressure medications and to follow up in six months. Gibbons did not place any restrictions on Ronald's driving because he did not report experiencing a syncopal episode.
Dr. Singh, a cardiologist employed by West Michigan Cardiology, did not personally treat Ronald when he was seen by Gibbons and Nagle. However, he signed off on the progress report of the appointment as prepared by Gibbons. From his review of the Medtronic report, Dr. Singh opined that Ronald's pacemaker was functioning normally, but acknowledged that the right ventricular lead was "borderline high." Nonetheless, Dr. Singh did not believe that it was unsafe for Ronald to drive.
In November 2016, Ronald drove his truck with Mary as his passenger. Ronald took a sip of coffee and then had a feeling similar to his prior experiences before passing out. Ronald drove the truck to the side of the road, but he was unable to stop it and crashed into a tree. Following the accident, Ronald was hospitalized and underwent a right ventricular lead revision. In January 2017, Dr. Singh signed a letter indicating that Ronald suffered a syncopal episode caused by "malfunction of his right ventricular lead of his previously placed pacemaker" while driving that led to an automobile accident. The letter advised that the malfunction was corrected, and Ronald was able to resume driving without restrictions. Although Dr. Singh testified that he did not prepare the letter, he signed it.
In April 2019, plaintiffs sued defendants for medical malpractice. They alleged that Dr. Singh owed a duty to Ronald as well as Mary, as a foreseeable passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Ronald, to properly care for and treat Ronald. Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Singh breached his duty of care when he failed to take a specific history from Ronald, to determine the pattern, frequency, and duration of his episodes, failed to determine whether there was a correlation between Ronald's episodes and the pacing of the right ventricular lead in the pacemaker, failed to implement a plan of care to repair or replace the right ventricular lead, and failed to restrict Ronald from driving a motor vehicle. Mary also sued defendants for ordinary negligence.
In November 2020, defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) as to Mary's claims, citing her lack of a physician-patient relationship with Dr. Singh. It was further submitted that the narrow exception to the rule that a physician has no duty to a third party was inapplicable. Defendants claimed it was not foreseeable that Ronald would have a syncopal episode while driving in November 2016 because he had not experienced any syncopal episodes between 2002 and November 2016. At the time of Ronald's October 2016 appointment, he did not report any episodes of passing out, and Ronald did not have any episodes of dizziness while driving. Additionally, although the interrogation of Ronald's pacemaker showed that there was a slight issue with the pacemaker, it did not indicate that Ronald was having arrhythmias, such that his pacemaker was regularly being used to steady his heart beat. Thus, defendants alleged that Ronald's complaints of dizziness were unrelated to his pacemaker.
Mary responded that there was a question of fact whether defendants should have foreseen that Ronald would experience a syncopal episode. According to plaintiffs' experts, the interrogation of Ronald's pacemaker showed that the right ventricular lead was not working properly. Given the symptoms that Ronald reported in October 2016, it was entirely foreseeable that Ronald would have a syncopal episode if his pacemaker was not functioning properly. It did not even appear that Dr. Singh knew why Ronald originally had the pacemaker implanted.
The trial court granted defendants' motion as to Mary's claim for negligence, but denied the motion as to Mary's claim for medical malpractice. It concluded a factual issue was presented for resolution by the jury in light of the prior diagnosis and the danger associated with driving. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order denying in part and granting in part defendants' motion for summary disposition. From this ruling, defendants appeal the order denying summary disposition of Mary's claim for medical malpractice.
A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Houston v Mint Group, LLC, 335 Mich.App. 545, 557; 968 N.W.2d 9 (2021). Summary disposition is appropriate pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." MCR 2.116(C)(10). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition challenged under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the appellate court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other admissible documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. MCR 2.116(G)(4), (G)(5); Buhl v City of Oak Park, 507 Mich. 236, 242; 968 N.W.2d 348 (2021).
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that there was a question of fact regarding whether defendants owed a duty of care to Mary, as a third-party, because it presented a question of law, and it was not reasonably foreseeable that Ronald would suffer a swallow syncope episode while driving. We disagree.
"A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must establish (1) the applicable standard of care, (2) breach of that standard of care by the defendant, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury." Elher v Misra, 499 Mich. 11, 21; 878 N.W.2d 790 (2016). In this context, the duty owed by the healthcare professional arises from the healthcare professional's relationship with the patient. Roberts v Salmi, 308 Mich.App. 605, 614; 866 N.W.2d 460 (2014). However, it does not follow that only a patient may bring a malpractice claim or that a physician never owes a duty to third parties. Id. at 615. To the contrary, "[c]ourts have recognized that a professional may be liable in malpractice to a third party for harms caused by his or her breach of the applicable standard of care notwithstanding the lack of a professional-client relationship with the third-party." Id.
To maintain a claim, a third party must establish that the physician owed a duty to the third party. See id. at 615-616. "Duty is actually a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff and concerns the problem of the relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other." Marcelletti v Bathani, 198 Mich.App. 655, 663; 500 N.W.2d 124 (1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he ultimate inquiry in determining whether a legal duty should be imposed is whether the social benefits of imposing a duty outweigh the social costs of imposing a duty." In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist...
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