Chellis v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 13 January 1891
• Citation: 26 N.E. 308,125 N.Y. 214
• Parties: CHELLIS v. CHAPMAN.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

125 N.Y. 214

26 N.E. 308

CHELLIS

v.CHAPMAN.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 13, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, fourth department.

Watson M. Rogers, for appellant.

Hannibal Smith, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

This plaintiff has recovered a verdict for $8,000, as damages for the breach by defendant of his promise to marry her. The proofs abundantly justified the jury in finding as they did, but the defendant insists that the trial judge erred in his rulings upon the evidence, and in his charge. He does not raise any question about the fact of his agreement to marry the plaintiff, and, indeed, he could not well do so, as it was established out of his own mouth; but he thinks his case was prejudiced by the admission of certain evidence, and by the way in which the trial judge submitted the question of the damages to the consideration of the jury, and that he should, therefore, have a new trial. The general term, in affirming the judgment, have passed upon various points raised by the appellant, and we might well remit the case without further expression of opinion; but some of the questions still insisted upon seem to deserve further consideration from us. Evidence of the defendant's general reputation as to wealth, at the time of the agreement of marriage, was admitted against the objection to its competency upon the subject of damages in such an action. The exception to its admission presents an interesting question, and one which may be deemed not altogether free from difficulty. Such evidence, on first consideration, seems to conflict with the general rule that in actions for a breach of contract evidence as to the defendant's wealth is inadmissible. The plaintiff, in such actions, is entitled to recover only those damages which she may prove that she has suffered in consequence of the defendant's failure to perform on his part. The defendant's solvency, or insolvency, has nothing to do with the issue, and furnishes no measure for the computation of damages. And this rule of exclusion as to such evidence has been also applied to cases where damages are sought to be recovered for seduction, or for criminal conversation. James v. Biddington, 6 Car. & P. 589; Dain v. Wycoff, 7 N. Y. 191. Baron ALDERSON, in James v. Biddington, an action by a husband for criminal conversation with his wife, assigned as the reason for holding such evidence to be improper that ‘the plaintiff is entitled to as much damages as a jury think is a compensation for the injury he has sustained, and the amount of the defendant's property is not a question in the case.’ Judge GARDINER, in Dain v. Wycoff, an action by a father for the seduction of his daughter, reasoned, upon the exclusion of proof of what defendant was worth, that the jury should not be allowed ‘to go beyond the issue between the parties litigating, and, after indemnifying the plaintiff for the injury sustained by him, proceed as conservators of the public morals to punish the defendant in a private action for an offense against society.’ The principle underlying the exclusion of this kind of evidence, in the latter class of cases, is that vindictive or punitive damages would be improper, as the recovery in them should be confined to what the jury may deem to be a sufficient compensation for the injury sustained by the plaintiff. But the present action is quite other in its nature, and constitutes an exception to that general rule upon the subject of damages for violation of contract obligations which has been assented to by the judges of the courts in this country and in England. It is apparent that, in such an action as this, there can be no hard and fast rule of damages, and that they must be left to the discretion of the jury. Of course, that discretion is not so absolute as to be independent of a consideration of the evidence. It is one which is to be exercised with regard to all the circumstances of the particular case, and, as it has frequently been said, where the verdict has not been influenced by prejudice, passion, or corruption, the verdict will not be distrubed by the court. That the amount of the suitor's pecuniary means is a factor of some importance in the case of a demand of marriage cannot fairly be denied. It is a circumstance which very frequently must have its particular influence upon the mind of the woman in determining the question of consent or of refusal; and, as I think, in a proper case, very naturally and properly so. The ability of the man to support her in comfort, and the station in life which marriage with him holds forth, are matters which may be weighed in connection with an agreement to marry.

In the case at bar the plaintiff was 47 years of age, and the defendant 74. Six years previously he had sought her acquaintance, unsolicited by her, and with matrimonial views on his part. He had visited her more or less frequently, and had twice proposed marriage before their engagement in 1886. She was and had been supporting herself as a teacher and superintendent in city schools. He had never been married, and had lived in the country as a farmer. He was possessed of pecuniary means, considerable in amount in the general estimation of his neighbors, and not inconsiderable if we take his own estimate. Though pretending to some cultivation of mind, which, among other ways, if we may judge from this record, he seemed to delight in displaying by a versification of the homely though not very inspiring or romantic topics and events of his farm life and surroundings, he yet was seemingly lacking in those outward graces of the person which are not infrequently deemed a substitute for more solid possessions. Nor does he seem to have had recourse to the adventitious aids of the wardrobe to adorn his exterior person, and thereby to compensate for personal shortcomings. I think that the jury should be made aware of all the circumstances which in this case, and in every such case, might be supposed to have presented themselves to the mind of the plaintiff when asked to change her position by marriage. Of these circumstances, the home offered, which for its comforts and ease would depend upon the more or less ample pecuniary means of the defendant, the freedom from the personal exertions for daily support, the social position accompanying the marriage, all these are facts which have their proper bearing upon the question of marriage. The wealth and the reputation for wealth of a man are matters which, as this world is constituted, often aid in determining his social position, notwithstanding he may have other and more intelligible rights to it, and despite objectionable characteristics or traits. Where, therefore, the defendant has demanded an...