Chemmarappally v. State
| Decision Date | 17 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | HHDCV176075204S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Abraham Chemmarappally et al. v. State of Connecticut et al |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Three motions are currently pending before the court: (1) a motion to intervene that was filed by the Hartford Courant and its reporter, Vinny Vella (collectively, the Courant); (2) a motion to intervene that was filed by the Freedom of Information Commission (commission); and (3) a motion to seal a ten-second segment of a video (videotape)-which is in the possession of the University of Connecticut (UConn)-that was filed by the plaintiffs, Abraham and Shinymol Chemmarappally as coadministrators of the estate of Jeffny Pally (decedent). For the reasons set forth subsequently in this memorandum the court (I) grants the motions to intervene of the Courant and the commission, respectively, and (II) denies the plaintiffs' motion to seal the videotape without prejudice.
The present action arises from a dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the state of Connecticut (state) and Dana Barrow, Jr., regarding the alleged death of the decedent. On February 2, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a complaint-which is the operative complaint-against the defendants. The complaint consists of three counts. Count one, which is asserted against the state, sounds in negligence pursuant to General Statutes § 52-556.[1] Counts two and three, which are asserted against Barrow, sound in recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295[2] and common-law recklessness, respectively.
In counts one, two, and three of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege the following facts. On or about October 16, 2016, the decedent was on the premises of UConn. Early that morning, at approximately 1:14 a.m., the decedent approached UConn's public safety complex (complex) and took a seat on the ground, directly in front of the complex's seventh parking bay (parking bay). The parking bay was enclosed by a garage door. Around this time, UConn's fire department which was housed in the complex, received a request for emergency assistance. Barrow, an employee of the state, proceeded to respond to the call.
In so doing, Barrow entered a fire department Chevrolet Tahoe (truck) that was parked in the parking bay. The fire department's staff opened the garage door, and, as Barrow exited the parking bay, he drove the truck forward. Consequently, the truck drove over the decedent, and she died. Thus, the plaintiffs claim, inter alia, " monetary and compensatory" damages, " double and treble" damages as to count two, and " exemplary and punitive" damages as to count three.
The plaintiffs have filed a motion for a protective order pursuant to Practice Book § 13-5.[3] In the motion, the plaintiffs first represent that the videotape depicts the decedent's death, and it is in UConn's possession. Second, the plaintiffs assert that " any disclosure of this [videotape] would be highly offensive, distressing and cause severe emotional anguish to the plaintiffs and to the close family members of the decedent." The plaintiffs further assert that " such disclosure may also impair the abilities of the parties to empanel a fair and impartial jury at the time of trial." Thus, the plaintiffs urge the court to enter a protective order with respect to the videotape.
The commission has filed a motion to intervene in the present case. It asserts that it " seeks to intervene for the purpose of objecting to those aspects of the [plaintiffs'] proposed protective order that would impermissibly supersede the FOI [a]ct and the authority of the [commission]." Similarly, the Courant has filed a motion to intervene, which is coupled with an objection to the motion for a protective order.
The plaintiffs filed an objection to the commission's motion to intervene, as well as a motion to seal the videotape pursuant to Practice Book § 11-20A.[4] In doing so, the plaintiffs assert that (1) disclosing the videotape to the public serves " no legitimate public interest"; (2) the commission cannot intervene because it lacks an adequate interest in the present case; (3) the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., does not support the commission's intervention; (4) the videotape falls within the act's " invasion of personal privacy" exemption; and (5) the videotape is subject to the act's " Sandy Hook" exemption. In a subsequent pleading, the plaintiffs advanced a Constitutional argument in support of their position and modified their position with respect to the relief requested.[5]
" [I]ntervention is defined, inter alia, as the proceeding by which one not originally a party to an action is permitted, on his own application, to appear therein and join one of the original parties in maintaining the action or defense . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hyllen-Davey v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 57 Conn.App. 589, 595-96, 749 A.2d 682, cert. denied, 253 Conn 926, 754 A.2d 796 (2000). " It is well established that there are two forms of intervention: (1) intervention as of right and (2) permissive intervention." Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Litchfield Housing Authority, 117 Conn.App. 30, 43, 978 A.2d 136 (2009) appeal dismissed, 302 Conn. 158, 24 A.3d 596 (2011). BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 204 n.8, 990 A.2d 853 (2010).
" General Statutes § § 52-102[6] and 52-107[7] govern the intervention of nonparties to an action and provide for both permissive intervention and intervention as a matter of right." (Footnotes in original.) Id., 203-04. In ruling on a motion to intervene, the court must " look to the pleadings, that is, to the motion . . . to intervene and to the proposed complaint or defense in intervention . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Austin-Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 640, 648, 81 A.3d 200 (2013). " [T]he pleadings are accepted as correct, and the interest of an intervenor does not have to be proved by testimony or evidence." Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 60 Conn.App. 134, 142, 758 A.2d 916 (2000). " Further, the rules for intervention should be construed liberally to avoid multiplicity of suits." Id.
The Courant claims that the court should permit it to intervene in the present action. In support of this claim, the Courant argues that several factors weigh in favor of permissive intervention. Specifically, the Courant argues that its motion to intervene is timely and it has a legitimate interest in the present case because, " [a]s the publisher of Connecticut's most widely-circulated daily and Sunday newspaper, [its] job is to write about and publish news of interest to the public, and to do so in a timely manner ." (Emphasis in original.) The Courant further argues that its interest is not represented adequately by the plaintiffs and defendants. Also, the Courant argues that its intervention will not cause delay and it is necessary and valuable to the resolution of the present case.
In opposition, the plaintiffs argue that the Courant has not satisfied the standard the governs intervention under the rules of practice. With respect to this point, the plaintiffs argue that the Courant lacks a direct and immediate interest in the subject matter of the present case, i.e., the alleged tortious conduct of the defendants. In other words,
" [Questions of permissive intervention are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . ." In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 277, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). " A trial court exercising its discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for permissive intervention balances several factors [including]: the timeliness of the intervention, the proposed intervenor's interest in the controversy, the adequacy of representation of such interests by other parties, the delay in the proceedings or other prejudice to the existing parties the intervention may cause, and the necessity for or value of the intervention in resolving the controversy [before the court]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 461, 904 A.2d 137 (2006). " With respect to the propriety of the trial court's balancing of these factors, [our Supreme Court] [has] stated that [a] ruling on a motion for permissive intervention would be erroneous only in the rare case {in which] such factors weigh so heavily against the ruling that it would amount to an abuse of the trial court's discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 226, 884 A.2d 981 (2005).[8]
In the present case, the foregoing factors weigh in favor of permitting the Courant to intervene for the purpose of objecting to the plaintiffs' motion to seal. See Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic...
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