Commission v. Litchfield Housing Auth.

• Decision Date: 15 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 29269.,29269.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES v. LITCHFIELD HOUSING AUTHORITY Et Al.

978 A.2d 136

117 Conn.App. 30

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES v. LITCHFIELD HOUSING AUTHORITY Et Al.

No. 29269.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 10, 2009.

Decided September 15, 2009.

Kevin J. Brophy, with whom, on the brief, was David S. Stowe, for the appellant (proposed intervenor Letitia Kilby).

Michelle Dumas Keuler, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Joshua A. Hawks-Ladds, with whom, on the brief, was, Christine Collyer, Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).

Michelle H. Seagull, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Fair Housing Center et al. as amici curiae.

FLYNN, C.J., and LAVINE and BORDEN, Js.

BORDEN, J.

In this housing discrimination case, the original complainant, Letitia Kilby (complainant), appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to intervene in an action brought in the Superior Court by the plaintiff, the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission). That action was brought on the request of the defendants, the Litchfield housing authority (authority) and D & H Property Management, LLC (property management company), pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-83(d)(2).¹ The complainant claims that the court (1) improperly denied her right to intervene and, in the alternative, (2) abused its discretion in denying her permissive intervention. The defendants claim that (1) there is no final judgment for purposes of appeal because the complainant has no colorable claim for intervention as of right and (2) on the merits, the court properly denied her claim for intervention as of right and did not abuse its discretion in denying her permissive intervention. The commission claims that the complainant should be allowed permissive intervention. We conclude that (1) there is a final judgment for purposes of appeal and (2) on the merits, the court improperly denied the complainant's claim for intervention as of right. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The complainant filed an administrative complaint with the commission against the defendants, claiming unlawful discrimination regarding her housing. After settlement discussions failed, the commission completed its investigation and found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination had occurred. The defendants requested, pursuant to § 46a-83(d)(2), that the commission file this civil action in the trial court, and the commission complied. The complainant moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The court denied the complainant's motion. This appeal followed.

The following facts and procedural history are not in dispute for purposes of the complainant's appeal.² Since May, 2001 the complainant has been a tenant in a housing complex located in Bantam, which is owned by the authority and managed by the property management company. The complainant has several disabilities, namely, difficulty walking, sleep apnea, chronic pain and respiratory ailments, all of which contribute to her need for reasonable accommodation.

The complainant's unit is on the second floor of her building. A light pole is located outside of her bedroom window and contains a lightbulb, which is positioned at eye level to the window. In December, 2003, the complainant made the first of several requests to the defendants that, as an accommodation to her disabilities, the light outside of her bedroom window be turned off at night so that her sleep would not be disturbed. These requests were supported by letters from health care providers detailing her medical need for such accommodation. Her requests went unanswered until the end of June, 2004, when the lightbulb apparently burned out; it was replaced, however, in September, 2005, and remained on at night. In February, 2006, the complainant again requested that the light be turned off at night, and in March, 2006, the defendants denied this request in writing, stating that it was necessary to keep the light on for safety reasons.

Because of her impaired physical mobility, the complainant must use the elevator, which is located in the front of the building. In the front of the building, there are six parking spaces, four of which are designated as handicapped spaces and two of which are open to any resident or visitor. The closest door to these spaces leads directly to the elevator. Several physically impaired residents customarily use these six spaces, rendering them unavailable to the complainant. There is another parking space directly across the lot from the six spaces, located in front of a garage. The complainant often used this space because it was the next closest to the front door and elevator, but, because it was not reserved for her, she could not rely on its being available to her.

In January, 2005, the complainant made the first of several requests to the defendants that, as an accommodation to her physical disabilities, the parking space near the garage be reserved for her. These requests were supported by a letter from her medical provider detailing her need for a reserved space as a reasonable accommodation for her disability and by a letter from a center for advocacy for disabled persons. In November, 2005, the authority denied her request in writing, on the ground that there were sufficient handicapped parking spaces for her use.

On May 12, 2006, the complainant, represented by attorneys Kevin J. Brophy and David S. Stowe of Connecticut Legal Services, Inc., filed an administrative complaint with the commission, alleging discriminatory housing practices on the basis of the defendants' alleged failure to grant her reasonable accommodations in violation of various provisions of the General Statutes³ and the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 through 3631. On November 21, 2006, during the investigation phase of the administrative proceedings, the defendants granted the complainant both accommodations. The light outside her unit is turned off at 8 p.m. and remains off until the morning, and she has been provided a suitable reserved parking space.

Although the complainant had been provided the reasonable accommodations that she had sought, she and the defendants could not agree on damages and attorney's fees. On March 30, 2007, the commission found reasonable cause to believe that the defendants had discriminated against the complainant. See General Statutes § 46a-83(d)(2). On April 5, 2007, the defendants requested that the commission institute a civil action pursuant to § 46a-83(d)(2). The commission complied, alleging specifically that it brought "this civil action on behalf of [the complainant] pursuant to [General Statutes] § § 46a-83(d) and 46a-89(b)," and referred specifically to the complainant's previous administrative complaint invoking, not only the state statutory scheme, but also the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. The commission alleged further in the complaint that, although the defendants had instituted the requested accommodations, as a result of the defendants' discrimination, the complainant "has and will continue to suffer damages including, but not limited to, financial loss associated with remedies to alleviate the failure of [the] [d]efendants to grant her reasonable accommodations, mental and emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and attorney's fees." As a result, the commission sought an award of damages pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46a-86 and 46a-89(b)(2), an award of a civil penalty, equitable relief and punitive damages pursuant to § 46a-89(b), an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to § 46a-86 (c), interest on amounts owed pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a and "such other relief as is just and proper."

The complainant, represented by her two attorneys of Connecticut Legal Services, Inc., moved to intervene in the action, alleging that the court's judgment in the matter "will substantially impact [the complainant's] rights." She claimed that she had the right to intervene or, in the alternative, that she should be permitted to intervene. The defendants objected to the motion. Without deciding whether the complainant was entitled to intervention as of right or should be afforded permissive intervention,⁴ the court denied the motion.⁵

I

Before addressing the merits of the complainant's appeal, we provide a brief overview of the relevant parts of the general statutory schemes—state and federal —governing the process for housing discrimination complaints such as those of the complainant in the present case. General Statutes §§ 46a-64b and 46a-64c set out in broad terms the prohibition against discrimination in housing on the basis, inter alia, of physical disability. Pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-82, a complainant may, either pro se or through an attorney, file with the commission a complaint of such discriminatory treatment. After service on the respondents and the filing of an answer by them, the commission determines the most appropriate method of processing the complaint, which may include mediation, fact-finding conferences, a complete investigation or any combination thereof. General Statutes § 46a-83(a), (b) and (c). The aims of these procedures are "promoting the voluntary resolution of complaints or determining if there is reasonable cause for believing that a discriminatory practice has been or is being committed as alleged in the complaint. . . ." General Statutes § 46a-83(c). In this context, "reasonable cause means a bona fide belief that the material issues of fact are such that a person of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment could believe the facts alleged in the complaint. . . ." General Statutes § 46a-83(c). Upon a finding of reasonable cause, two alternative procedures become available, namely, administrative and judicial procedures. See General Statutes § 46a-83(d)(2).

The administrative route is governed by General Statutes § 46a-84....