Cherokee Country Club v. City of Knoxville
| Decision Date | 22 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. E2002-01156-SC-R11-CV.,E2002-01156-SC-R11-CV. |
| Citation | 152 S.W.3d 466 |
| Parties | CHEROKEE COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v. CITY OF KNOXVILLE, et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Charles A. Wagner, III, and W. Turner Boone, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Cherokee Country Club, Inc.
Ronald E. Mills, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, City of Knoxville.
Charles W. Swanson, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellees, Members of the City Council.
E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., and J.S. DANIEL, Sp.J., joined.
We granted this appeal to determine the validity of a permanent city ordinance that prohibited the issuance of all demolition permits for property under consideration for designation as a historical overlay district. After finding that the ordinance was an invalid zoning ordinance because the City of Knoxville failed to comply with statutory planning, notice, and hearing requirements, see Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 13-7-201-211 (1999 & Supp.2004), the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the issuance of a demolition permit to the appellant, Cherokee Country Club, Inc. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the ordinance was a building regulation not subject to the statutory zoning requirements. After reviewing the record and authority, we hold that the ordinance was a zoning regulation that was not enacted in accordance with statutory zoning requirements or the Tennessee Historic Zoning Act. We also conclude that there was no error in failing to join necessary parties, that there was no error in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and that there was no error in issuing a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstate the trial court's judgment.
In July of 1999, the appellant, Cherokee Country Club, Inc. ("Cherokee"), purchased from the Coughlin family improved real property at 5305 Lyons View Pike in Knoxville, Tennessee, which included an unoccupied house known as the "Smith/Coughlin House" or the "Smith House." Cherokee Country Club bought the property intending to demolish the Smith House, as it was surrounded on three sides by Cherokee's recreational facilities, and further intended to utilize the property within its current residential zoning.
In 1999, at the time of Cherokee's purchase, the property was not in, nor had it been proposed for inclusion in, a historic district. On April 4, 2000, however, the Knoxville City Council ("City") enacted emergency demolition ordinance No. 0-119-00, which stated:
No demolition permit shall be issued, for a period of 180 days, for any property under review and consideration for an H-1 overlay or NC-1 overlay designation after the application process has been initiated in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article IV, § 14 and § 22, respectively, of the Knoxville Zoning Code. The 180 day period can be extended by Knoxville City Council, as necessary.
Rather than enact the demolition ordinance as an amendment to its zoning code, the City elected to pass the demolition ordinance as an emergency ordinance. The effect of the City's action was to avoid the notice, hearing, and review requirements of the traditional zoning statute, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-201 (Supp.2004), and the notice, hearing, and review requirements of the Historical Zoning Statute, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-401 (1999). As a result, Cherokee was unaware that the ordinance was enacted.
On January 17, 2002, Knoxville Mayor Victor Ashe filed an application with the Knoxville/Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission to re-zone the "Smith House" purchased by Cherokee two and one-half years earlier as an H-1 historic district. On February 20, 2002, Cherokee, which was unaware of both the emergency demolition ordinance and the pending re-zoning application filed by the Mayor,1 applied for a demolition permit to demolish the Smith House. The City of Knoxville Building Official ("Building Official") denied Cherokee's application for a demolition permit based on the application for historic re-zoning that had been filed by Mayor Ashe and the language of the emergency demolition ordinance.
On March 8, 2002, after the governmental action denying demolition, Cherokee filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Knox County, Tennessee, seeking a declaratory judgment and a Writ of Mandamus. The complaint alleged that the emergency demolition ordinance was enacted in violation of statutory procedures that require Planning Commission approval, notice, and a public hearing prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 13-7-201-211. The complaint also alleged that the ordinance was enacted in violation of a separate set of statutory procedures that require Historic Zoning Commission approval, notice, and a public hearing before the creation and regulation of a historic district or zone. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 13-7-401-410 (1999 & Supp.2004). The complaint requested a writ of mandamus directing the Building Official to issue a demolition permit.
The City filed an answer asserting that the emergency demolition ordinance was properly enacted as a building regulation and, therefore, the statutory zoning procedures were not applicable. The answer also alleged that Cherokee failed to join indispensable parties and that a writ of mandamus was not appropriate since Cherokee had not exhausted administrative review of the Building Official's action.
On April 12, 2002, the trial court granted Cherokee's motion for judgment on the pleadings after concluding that the emergency demolition ordinance was invalid because it had not been enacted in compliance with 1) statutory provisions that require Planning Commission approval, notice, and a public hearing for the enactment of a zoning ordinance, see Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 13-7-201-211, and 2) statutory provisions that require planning approval, notice, and a public hearing for the creation and regulation of an historic district, see Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 13-7-401-410. The trial court ordered that a writ of mandamus be issued requiring that the Building Official issue a demolition permit to Cherokee.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the emergency demolition ordinance was not invalid because it was a building regulation not subject to the statutory zoning requirements. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 13-7-201-211. The court reasoned that the ordinance affected how Cherokee could undertake the use of its property but that the ordinance did not affect what uses were permissible. The court also held that the Tennessee Historic Zoning Statute was not applicable because the emergency demolition ordinance did not apply to an existing historic district. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 13-7-401-410. (1999 & Supp.2004).
We granted Cherokee's application for permission to appeal.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be filed "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we must accept as true "all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" alleged by the party opposing the motion. McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tenn.1991). In addition, "[c]onclusions of law are not admitted nor should judgment on the pleadings be granted unless the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment." Id.
Cherokee argues that the emergency demolition ordinance was passed by the City of Knoxville in violation of state statutes requiring that zoning regulations be enacted after written notice, a public hearing, and approval by the local planning commission. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 13-7-201-211 (1999 & Supp.2004). The City of Knoxville responds that the statutory zoning requirements were inapplicable because the emergency demolition ordinance was a building regulation enacted pursuant to the City's general police powers that did not require notice, hearings, or approval prior to its enactment.
Although not addressed by the Court of Appeals, the City also argues that the ordinance was proper under the so-called "pending ordinance" doctrine discussed in State ex rel. SCA Chemical Waste Services Inc. v. Konigsberg, 636 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.1982). In Konigsberg, this Court upheld a county resolution prohibiting the issuance of construction permits. Id. at 433. The Court explained that the resolution was an "interim ordinance" that preserved the status quo pending the effective date of a comprehensive zoning ordinance that had already been properly enacted by the county. Id. at 436. Unlike Konigsberg, however, emergency demolition ordinance No. 0-119-00 does not seek to impose a temporary moratorium, nor does it seek to preserve the status quo pending the implementation or consideration of a comprehensive zoning plan. As a result, Konigsberg is not applicable.
We must determine whether the emergency demolition ordinance was a zoning ordinance or a building regulation. Accordingly, we will first examine Tennessee's statutory provisions regarding zoning.
Local governments, including cities, have no power to control the use of land unless the State of Tennessee delegates this power to them. Accordingly, a municipality has the power to enact or to amend zoning regulations "[f]or the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity and general welfare." Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-201(a)(1). This power is delegated to local governments by the Tennessee legislature and includes the power to
regulate the location, height, bulk, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of the lot which may be occupied, the sizes of yards, courts and other...
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