Cherry Hills Resort Development Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village

• Decision Date: 06 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86SC156,86SC156
• Citation: 757 P.2d 622
• Parties: CHERRY HILLS RESORT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A Colorado limited partnership, Temple H. Buell, as Trustee and Beneficiary under the Temple H. Buell Trust, and Richard L. Nathan, as Trustee under the Temple H. Buell Trust, Petitioners, v. The CITY OF CHERRY HILLS VILLAGE; the City of Cherry Hills Village City Council; Robert St. Clair, Roy A. Watts, Theodore B. Washburne, George Anderman, Ann M. Polumbus, Donald J. Egan and Merle Chambers, as present members of the City of Cherry Hills Village City Council, Respondents, and Gary A. Agron and Thomas J. Hilb, Intervenors-Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 622

757 P.2d 622

CHERRY HILLS RESORT DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A Colorado limited partnership, Temple H. Buell, as Trustee and Beneficiary under the Temple H. Buell Trust, and Richard L. Nathan, as Trustee under the Temple H. Buell Trust, Petitioners, v. The CITY OF CHERRY HILLS VILLAGE; the City of Cherry Hills Village City Council; Robert St. Clair, Roy A. Watts Theodore B. Washburne, George Anderman, Ann M. Polumbus Donald J. Egan and Merle Chambers, as present members of the City of Cherry Hills Village City Council, Respondents and Gary A. Agron and Thomas J. Hilb, Intervenors-Respondents.

No. 86SC156.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

June 6, 1988.

Holme Roberts & Owen, Lawrence L. Levin, Pamela J. Strauss, Englewood, for petitioner, Cherry Hills Resort Development Co.

Greengard, Blackman & Senter, Richard D. Greengard, Denver, for petitioners, Temple H. Buell and Richard L. Nathan.

Morris & Lower, Robert L. Morris, P. Kathleen Lower, Denver, for respondents.

QUINN, Chief Justice.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in Cherry Hills Resort Development Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 720 P.2d 992 (Colo.App.1986), dismissing an appeal by the City of Cherry Hills Village and its City Council to review a judgment entered in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding and remanding the case to the district court with directions to dismiss the complaint. The court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the City Council's resolution approving but also imposing various restrictions on Cherry Hills Resort Development Company's development plan for a residential and resort hotel complex in the City of Cherry Hills Village because, in the court of appeals' view, the City Council was not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity in adopting the resolution. We conclude that the City Council exercised a quasi-judicial function in adopting the resolution and that, therefore, the district court had jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) to review the City Council's decision. We accordingly reverse the judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings on the merits of the appeal.

I.

In October 1980 Temple H. Buell and Richard L. Nathan, as trustees of the Temple H. Buell Trust, leased 68.8 acres of land in the City of Cherry Hills Village to Cherry Hills Resort Development Company, which intended to develop a residential and resort hotel complex on the land. The land is zoned RA-1 Resort Area District, the only land in the city so designated. Under section 6-11-1 of the City Code of Cherry Hills Village, a permitted use in an RA-1 zoned area is a residential and resort hotel. ¹ Section 6-11-4 of the City Code requires the City Council's approval of a development plan in an RA-1 zoned area by providing as follows:

No building permit shall be issued for any construction within an RA-1 Resort Area District until complete plans are approved (which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld) by the City Council, with the advice of the Planning and Zoning Commission, after consideration of the compatibility of the proposed plans with the City's Master Plan, this Title, a traffic impact study, and existing structures and uses in the neighboring area. These plans must include the location, height and area of all proposed structures, outdoor signs and lighting, as well as the location and details of recreational areas and all accessory structures and roadways.

City of Cherry Hills Village, Colo., City Code, § 6-11-4 (1970).

On August 3, 1982, Cherry Hills Resort Development Company submitted to the City Council a request for approval of a plan that called for the construction of 600 hotel units and 200 residential units on the RA-1 zoned land. The proposed development plan generated a great deal of community interest. The Planning and Zoning Commission and the City Council held numerous meetings with Cherry Hills Resort Development Company and also, although not required to do so by statute or ordinance, gave notice to the developer and to the public and conducted several hearings to allow both the developer and other interested persons to present their views on the plan. On September 21, 1982, the City Council adopted a resolution approving the general concept of the proposed residential and resort hotel complex but imposing twenty restrictions on the development plan.

On October 20, 1982, Buell, Nathan, and Cherry Hills Resort Development Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as "developer") filed a complaint in the district court seeking judicial review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) of the resolution. The district court concluded that the City Council had abused its discretion in imposing twelve of the restrictions on the development plan as either contrary to or unsupported by the zoning requirements of the City Code, contrary to a controlling state statute, or an invalid imposition on the developer of a duty that was the exclusive responsibility of the City Council. ² The court accordingly remanded the case to the City Council with directions to delete the twelve restrictions from the resolution.

The City of Cherry Hills Village and its City Council (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the city") appealed from the judgment to the court of appeals, claiming that the district court had erred in concluding that the city had abused its discretion. The court of appeals, on its own motion, issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. After submission of briefs, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the district court with directions to dismiss the developer's C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) complaint. Drawing on this court's decision in Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975), the court of appeals stated:

The three factors which must exist in order to find that an inferior tribunal has acted in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are:

"1) A state or local law requiring that the body give adequate notice to the community before acting; 2) a state or local law requiring that the body conduct a public hearing, pursuant to notice, at which time concerned citizens must be given an opportunity to be heard and present evidence; and 3) a state or local law requiring the body to make a determination by applying the facts of a specific case to certain criteria established by law."

Cherry Hills Resort, 720 P.2d at 993 (quoting Snyder, 189 Colo. at 425, 542 P.2d at 374). After concluding that the last Snyder factor had been satisfied in this case, the court of appeals held that although the city had given notice of and had conducted public hearings prior to the adoption of the resolution, "such notice and hearing were not required by state or local law." Id. at 993-94. In the court of appeals' view, therefore, the first two Snyder criteria for quasi-judicial action were not established, with the result that the district court lacked jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) to review the city's resolution.

We granted certiorari to consider whether the city's resolution approving but also imposing various restrictions on the development plan constituted quasi-judicial action for the purpose of a judicial review proceeding initiated in the district court pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). ³

II.

In urging reversal of the judgment of dismissal, the developer argues that the court of appeals applied an excessively restricted standard in concluding that the city's resolution did not qualify as quasi-judicial action for the purpose of a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding in the district court. At all times during the pendency of the proceedings in the district court, C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) provided in pertinent part as follows:

In the following cases relief may be obtained in the district court by appropriate action under the practice prescribed in these rules:

* * *

(4) Where an inferior tribunal (whether court, board, commission or officer) exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy.... Review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion.

Before resolving the merits of the developer's claim, it is necessary to consider the nature of quasi-judicial action and to delineate, to the extent practicable, the essential characteristics of this type of governmental decision-making.

A.

Municipal governing bodies, such as a city council, not only perform legislative functions but also engage in activities of a quasi-judicial nature. It is important to distinguish a legislative from a quasi-judicial function because the exercise of quasi-judicial authority, unlike legislative authority, is conditioned upon the observance of traditional procedural safeguards against arbitrary governmental action. These safeguards basically consist of providing adequate notice to those individuals whose protected interests are likely to be adversely affected by the governmental action, and giving to such persons a fair opportunity to be heard prior to the governmental decision. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Department of Labor, 184 Colo. 334, 338, 520 P.2d 586, 588 (1974); Schoenberg Farms, Inc. v. People, 166 Colo. 199, 209, 444 P.2d 277, 282 (1968); South View Cemetery Association v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863, 866 (1945); Buechele v. Ray, 219 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Iowa 1974); City of Albany v. McMorran, 34 Misc.2d 316, 230 N.Y.S.2d 434, 436-37 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1962).

Legislative action is usually reflective of some public policy relating to matters of a permanent or general character, is not normally restricted to identifiable persons or groups, and is usually prospective in nature. Witcher v. Canon City, 716 P.2d 445, 449-50 (Colo.1986); Margolis v. District Court, 638...