Cherry v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency
| Decision Date | 25 May 1994 |
| Citation | 642 A.2d 463,537 Pa. 186 |
| Parties | , 91 Ed. Law Rep. 622 Nancy D. CHERRY, Lou Ann (Brutz) Gray, Amanda L. Kyle, Holly A. Merryman, Tiffany H. Montgomery, Amy J. Power, Kathryn U. Sanida, and Lori Ann Skripek, Appellants, v. PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert B. Hoffman, Harrisburg, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE, and MONTEMURO, JJ.
This case presents a narrow issue of statutory construction pertaining to the Urban and Rural Teacher Loan Forgiveness Act. The question is whether the word "teacher" means teacher or whether it includes nurses, guidance counselors, and psychologists in addition to teachers, as it does in the School Code.
The Urban and Rural Teacher Loan Forgiveness Act, Act of 1988, Dec. 6, P.L. 1259, No. 155, 24 P.S. § 5191 et seq., authorizes the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA) to forgive portions of student debt incurred by borrowers engaged in "full-time teaching" in specified school districts in the Commonwealth. The eight appellants--employed as school nurses, guidance counsellors, and school psychologists--were denied loan forgiveness benefits by PHEAA on the basis that they were not engaged in full-time teaching under the loan forgiveness act. PHEAA's actions were upheld by the Commonwealth Court, which correctly applied a "clearly erroneous" standard of review to an agency's interpretation of a statute, as we must do as well. An interpretation by the agency charged with a statute's implementation is accorded great weight and will be overturned only if such a construction is clearly erroneous. See Wiley House v. Scanlon, 502 Pa. 228, 238, 465 A.2d 995, 1000 (1983); Masland v. Bachman, 473 Pa. 280, 290-91 n. 25, 374 A.2d 517, 522 n. 25 (1977).
The language at issue appears in the loan forgiveness act in 24 P.S. § 5194. The statute states:
§ 5194. Urban and Rural Teacher Loan Forgiveness Program
... For each academic year that the applicant is a full-time teacher in an approved Commonwealth urban or rural public school district, the agency may forgive a proportional part of the applicant's loan so that the loan may be entirely forgiven over four years of full-time teaching....
(Emphasis added.) PHEAA interpreted the criterion to require applicants to engage in classroom teaching for more than 50% of their time. Appellants do not contend that they satisfy this requirement, but dispute the interpretation of the word "teacher." Appellants argue that "teacher" in the statute has a broader meaning than classroom teacher, and should be defined as it is in the School Code, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, No. 14, § 1141, 24 P.S. § 11-1141:
For the purposes of this subdivision,
(1) "Teacher" shall include all professional employes and temporary professional employes, who devote fifty per centum (50%) of their time, or more, to teaching or other direct educational activities, such as class room teachers, demonstration teachers, museum teachers, counsellors, librarians, school nurses, dental hygienists, home and school visitors, and other similar professional employes and temporary professional employes, certificated in accordance with the qualifications established by the State Board of Education.
(Emphasis added.) If the school code definition of "teacher" were applied to the loan forgiveness act, appellants would qualify for forgiveness of their educational loans.
PHEAA interpreted "teachers" to mean classroom teachers, excluding nurses, guidance counsellors, and psychologists. The Commonwealth Court, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 210, 620 A.2d 687, affirmed because PHEAA's interpretation coincided with the common and approved usage of the term "teacher," rejecting a host of statutory construction arguments raised by appellants, primarily the contention that the school code definition of "teacher" should be incorporated in the loan forgiveness act.
The legislature has made legislative intent the lodestar of statutory construction: "The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Hard upon the heels of this standard is the rule: "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Closely related is the instruction:
Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in this part, shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a) (emphasis added).
In applying these guidelines to the word "teacher" in the loan forgiveness act, the common and approved usage of the term is to refer to a classroom instructor. Clearly, the common usage does not encompass nurses, guidance counselors, and psychologists. There is no ambiguity in the term which justifies disregarding the words of the legislature on the pretext of pursuing the spirit of the law. Nor is there anything in the legislative history of the loan forgiveness act which gives special insight into the intent of the General Assembly beyond the preamble of the act, which states:
§ 5192. Findings and declaration of intent
The General Assembly finds and declares that:
(1) The number of college students planning to enter the teaching profession appears to be inadequate to meet the need for teachers in our public schools.
(2) Demand from industry and other opportunities attract existing and potential teachers away from the profession.
(3) The pool of qualified teachers, especially those in math and science, has diminished.
(4) Economically hard-pressed rural and urban school districts find it difficult to attract qualified teachers from the diminished pool.
(5) Payment of a portion of student loans for certified teachers serves the important public purpose of...
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