Chesapeake Club of Annapolis City v. State

• Citation: 63 Md. 446
• Parties: THE CHESAPEAKE CLUB OF ANNAPOLIS CITY v. THE STATE OF MARYLAND.
• Decision Date: 23 April 1885
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

63 Md. 446

THE CHESAPEAKE CLUB OF ANNAPOLIS CITY v. THE STATE OF MARYLAND.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

April 23, 1885

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

The case is stated in the opinions delivered.

The cause was argued before ALVEY, C.J., YELLOTT, STONE ROBINSON, IRVING and BRYAN, JJ.

John Ireland and S. Thomas McCullough, for the appellant.

James M. Munroe, State's Attorney for Anne Arundel County, and Charles B. Roberts Attorney-General, for the appellee.

Alvey C.J., delivered the following opinion, in which Judges Stone and Irving concurred:

The indictment in this case is for the alleged violation of the provisions of the Act of 1882, ch. 112, known as the "Local Option Law" of Anne Arundel County, and which was duly submitted to and adopted by the popular vote of that county in December, 1882. It has been in force since the 30th of April, 1883.

The Act first provides for submitting the question of its adoption to popular vote, and in the event of its having a majority of votes in its favor, it then declares, by sec. 3, that it "shall not be lawful for any person or persons, house, corporation, company or association, to sell, directly or indirectly, at any place, or to give away at his, her, their, or its place of business, any spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors, of whatever origin, or alcoholic bitters," after the 30th of April, 1883. By sec. 4, it is declared "that if any person or persons, house, company, corporation or association, or body corporate, shall sell, directly or indirectly, at any place, or give away at his, her, their or its place of business, any spirituous or fermented liquors or alcoholic bitters, or intoxicating drinks of any kind, within the limits of Anne Arundel County, after the 30th of April, 1883, he, she, or they shall, on conviction thereof, forfeit and pay," etc. And in the conclusion of this section it is provided that "in case of any violation of any provisions of this Act by any company, corporation or association, each or any member of such company, corporation or association shall be liable, and shall suffer imprisonment as prescribed in this Act for persons violating the same."

Then follows, by sec. 5, what is most material in this case. It is provided "that no person or persons, company, corporation or association, shall deposit or have in his, her, their or its possession, any spirituous or fermented liquors, or alcoholic bitters, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, with intent to sell, or give away the same at his, her, their, or its place of business, in violation of law, or with intent that the same shall be sold or given away by any person, in violation of law, or in aid of any person or persons for such purposes;" any such offender to be subject to like punishment as that prescribed by sec. 4 of the Act.

The appellant is a body corporate, incorporated under the general incorporation laws of the State, on the 15th of November, 1884. The objects of the incorporation professedly are for literary, dramatic, musical and for other public social and literary purposes. What these other public social purposes are the articles of association do not disclose. By the articles of association and certificate of incorporation the appellant is declared to have power "to adopt a constitution, and to make by-laws, rules and regulations, not contrary to the laws of the State. It appears that a constitution and set of by-laws have been adopted by the association, and thereby provision has been made, as it was competent to do, for the admission of new members, (Angell & Ames on Corp., secs. 113, 114, 118;) and that a considerable number of members, in addition to those originally incorporated, have been introduced into the association. The association is denominated a club, and has its regular place of meeting and for the transaction of its business, and that place is in Annapolis.

This corporation, thus formed, was indicted, tried, and convicted at the October Term, 1884, of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, upon the charge of violating the provisions of the "Local Option Law;" and the case has been brought to this court by an appeal, under the Act of 1872, ch. 316, from certain rulings of the Circuit Court upon questions of evidence that arose in the course of the trial.

The indictment contains eight counts, but the State having abandoned all but the two last, it is only necessary to refer to these latter counts in connection with the questions of evidence to be decided.

The seventh count charges that the appellant "unlawfully did have in its possession certain spirituous and fermented liquors, to wit, whiskey and lager beer, with intent unlawfully to sell the same at the county aforesaid." And the eighth count charges that the appellant "unlawfully did have in its possession certain fermented and spirituous liquors, to wit, whiskey and lager beer, with intent unlawfully to give away the same at its place of business, at the county aforesaid." It was upon these two counts that the appellant was convicted.

There was a demurrer entered to the indictment, and sought to be sustained, upon the ground that such an indictment would not lie against a body corporate. And while the question raised on the demurrer is not properly before the court on this appeal, yet it is not improper to say that the court below was entirely right in overruling the demurrer, as the statute in terms expressly declares that all corporations or associations violating the law shall be liable to indictment and punishment.

There are several bills of exception, but at the foundation of all the questions raised by them, except the questions raised by the first and second, is the broad general question, whether or not it be a violation of the provisions of the statute under which the indictment was found for the incorporated association, the present appellant, to provide and keep in its possession, at its clubrooms, spirituous and fermented liquors, with the intent and for the purpose of supplying the same to its own members, as such liquors may be called for or desired, either on checks or otherwise, as the association may provide. If this question be resolved in the negative, many of the questions raised on the offers of evidence become quite immaterial to the final determination of the case. That general question, therefore, will be first considered.

In the construction of a statute the court should always keep in view the great and leading objects sought to be accomplished by its enactment. Where the objects are apparent, no reason can possibly justify a court in having recourse to refined and subtle distinctions in order to take a particular case out of the operation of the statute. Here, as we have seen by the recital of the terms of the statute, the language is as broad and comprehensive as could well be employed. In express terms, it applies as well to all corporations and associations as to all persons; and the great object in view is the absolute prohibition of all dispensing of intoxicating drinks, either by sale or gift, except under special conditions that do not exist here. Intoxicating liquors cannot be sold directly or indirectly, nor can they be given away at the place of business of the donor. The place, and only place, of business of the appellant is the clubroom where the liquors are kept and dispensed to the members upon application. It is not pretended that the liquors were bought by any individual member of the club on his own account and kept by him, nor by all the members jointly in their personal capacities; but the appellant, by its constitution and by-laws, has provided the ways and means by which to raise funds, that is, by entrance fees and by assessments, and these funds when paid over are the funds of the corporation in the hands of its treasurer. The liquors and other articles purchased for the benefit of the club with the funds thus raised, are dealt out by a steward or janitor regularly appointed by the corporation, and who is its agent for that purpose. Therefore, whatever is done by him, within the scope of his authority, is the act of the corporation, and for which it is liable. This being the case, why is not the liquor, thus supplied, disposed of, either by sale or a gift, according to the conditions of its delivery, to the particular member receiving it from the agent of the corporation? It is supposed that because the members are joined in an association for social and other purposes, no matter how numerous and indiscriminate their membership may be, that they may do as among themselves with entire impunity what individuals in their relations and dealings with their fellow-members of the community may not do under the statute. But is there any substantial ground, discoverable either in the letter or policy of the statute, for any such distinction? The reason and good sense of the distinction is not perceived, and, in view of the manifest object and policy of the statute, such distinction is wholly inadmissible. If the liquors, being the property of the corporation, be kept to be given to the members at the clubroom, it is in violation of the letter and spirit of the Act; and if it be sold to the members, either for money or for checks previously purchased, it is equally a violation of the law, for by its terms the statute declares that liquors shall not be sold either directly or indirectly. The framers of the statute would seem to have been studious to avoid the possibility of allowing any combination or contrivance whereby the objects of the law could be defeated. All means, whether direct or indirect, tending to defeat or evade the provisions of the Act, are prohibited; and to say that a corporation or any association,...