Cheschi v. Boston Edison Co.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-P-737,94-P-737
• Citation: 654 N.E.2d 48,39 Mass.App.Ct. 133
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts
• Parties: Louis J. CHESCHI, Jr. v. BOSTON EDISON COMPANY; Bechtel Construction, Inc., third-party defendant.

Page 48

654 N.E.2d 48

39 Mass.App.Ct. 133

Louis J. CHESCHI, Jr. v. BOSTON EDISON COMPANY Bechtel Construction, Inc., third-party defendant.

No. 94-P-737.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued May 18, 1995.

Decided Aug. 21, 1995.

Further Appellate Review Denied

Sept. 26, 1995 and Oct. 31, 1995.

Edward Greer, Brookline (Frank J. Ciano, Cambridge, with him), for plaintiff.

Mark E. Cohen, Boston (Brian C. Duffey, with him), for Bechtel Const., Inc.

Thomas D. Burns, Boston, for Boston Edison Co.

Before: WARNER, IRELAND and GREENBERG, JJ.

WARNER, Chief Justice.

On May 18, 1984, Louis Cheschi, Jr., an ironworker employed by Bechtel Construction, Inc. (Bechtel), was injured while working on a construction project at the Plymouth Pilgrim I Nuclear Power Plant, owned by Boston Edison Company (Edison). As he walked along a catwalk inside a suppression chamber known as the "torus" section of the nuclear reactor, he tripped on a piece of angle iron and fell a considerable distance. Cheschi filed a negligence action against Edison in the Superior Court on July 9, 1985. Edison filed a third-party complaint against Bechtel ¹ on December 28, 1987, seeking indemnification under a provision of their contract for construction services. (Cheschi had filed two workers' compensation claims against Bechtel; Bechtel was never named as a direct defendant.) Cheschi's and Edison's actions were tried together before a jury. Answering special questions, the jury found that Edison was not negligent. They found Bechtel fifty-eight percent negligent, Cheschi forty-two percent contributorily negligent, and Bechtel's and Cheschi's negligence to have proximately caused Cheschi's injuries.

Edison moved for entry of judgment on its claim for indemnification, seeking its legal fees and costs. Following a hearing, the judge ordered Bechtel to pay Edison $82,989.90 in attorneys' fees and costs, plus interest, from July 2, 1985.

Cheschi appeals from the judgment for Edison on his negligence claim, contending that the trial judge improperly refused to give his requested jury instruction on vicarious liability and ruled erroneously on several other matters during the jury trial. Bechtel appeals from the indemnification judgment on the ground that Edison failed promptly to notify Bechtel of Cheschi's claim, as their contract required.

Cheschi's appeal.

1. Jury instructions. Cheschi requested a jury instruction characterizing Edison and Bechtel as master and servant and imputing Bechtel's negligence to Edison under an agency theory. ² Instead, the judge characterized Edison's and Bechtel's relationship as that of employer and independent contractor. He instructed that Edison could be held liable for injuries Cheschi incurred in the course of working for Bechtel only if Edison retained control over some part of the work and if it exercised that control negligently. The plaintiff renewed his request following the charge, referring to the instruction by number only. This request was insufficiently explicit to preserve the plaintiff's objection. See Flood v. Southland Corp., 416 Mass. 62, 66-67, 616 N.E.2d 1068 (1993) ("[A] postcharge objection to the failure to give an instruction, made simply by reference to the number of the requested charge, normally will not satisfy rule 51 unless the judge requests that counsel follow such a procedure and assures counsel that the objection is understood"); Mass.R.Civ.P. 51(b), 365 Mass. 816 (1974). In any event, the judge's instructions accurately reflected the theory of recovery raised by the evidence, as summarized below.

The contract governing Bechtel's construction services, the Maintenance Services Agreement, states explicitly that Bechtel is an independent contractor. It authorizes Bechtel to hire subcontractors, to subcontract services to a particular contractor without Edison's prior approval, and to exercise control over its employees. It requires Bechtel to prepare a manual describing its organization, division of responsibility and administration, and holds Bechtel to performance standards of "recognized professional engineering and construction firms." The agreement provides that Edison will issue Bechtel work orders specifying the "scope" of the services, a performance schedule, and the estimated cost, and that Edison will have general oversight and give "overall direction." ³

A section of the contract entitled "Safety Procedures for Contractors and Subcontractors Working on Boston Edison Facilities" outlines Edison's safety requirements. It specifies that each work project will be subject to Edison's instructions and prior approval concerning safety issues and that uncorrected safety violations could result in Edison's shutting down a contractor's work. Contractors are given responsibility for enforcing the safety requirements.

Uncontroverted trial testimony attested to Bechtel's control of the manner in which it conducted its work. Edison's Construction Management Group, charged with ensuring that work under the contract was completed, did not include Bechtel personnel in its daily informational meetings with Edison personnel. A member of that group could not remember ever overseeing Bechtel's work in the torus.

Testimony was elicited regarding both Bechtel's and Edison's responsibilities for safety procedures. Bechtel had a comprehensive safety program for its work in the torus, produced a safety manual, had safety personnel on site, and held weekly safety meetings. Edison's safety inspector did not inspect the torus area because no Edison people worked there. Radiation safety procedures were under Edison's control. Edison gave seminars on the subject, provided and coordinated the wearing of radiation protective clothing, and monitored the plant's radiation levels. ⁴

The evidence showed that Bechtel controlled the details of its construction work, that Edison maintained general oversight to be sure that the work was done, and that both Bechtel and Edison had responsibility for safety procedures. The judge correctly instructed the jury that Bechtel was an independent contractor. See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1, 5-9, 483 N.E.2d 793 (1985), and cases cited at 9. See also Khoury v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 265 Mass. 236, 238-239, 164 N.E. 77 (1928); Chase v. Independent Practice Assn., 31 Mass.App.Ct. 661, 665, 583 N.E.2d 251 (1991).

He further instructed the jury under the "retained control" theory set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965), and adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court in Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. at 9-11, 483 N.E.2d 793. See also McNamara v. Massachusetts Port Authy., 30 Mass.App.Ct. 716, 718-720, 573 N.E.2d 510 (1991). Section 414 provides: "One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care." ⁵

The facts of this case, like those in Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. at 5-12, 483 N.E.2d 793, raised a jury question as to whether Edison's involvement in safety procedures resulted in its retaining control over certain aspects of the work and, if so, whether such control was exercised with reasonable care. Compare Foley v. Rust Intl., 901 F.2d 183, 184-185 (1st Cir.1990), discussing Corsetti and related cases. The judge's instructions were correct.

2. Other issues. a. Cheschi makes a confused argument that Edison was a general contractor, that this designation is material to Edison's liability for Bechtel's negligence, and that Cheschi was improperly prevented from making this case. ⁶ He contends that Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations prohibited Edison, as a general contractor, from shifting certain safety responsibilities to Bechtel. Cheschi, however, did not offer OSHA standards or regulations in evidence to support this theory. ⁷ See Roberts v. Southwick, 415 Mass. 465, 468-469, 614 N.E.2d 659 (1993).

In the course of his argument, Cheschi makes a passing reference to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 424 (1965), which provides: "One who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions." Section 424 was not raised as a theory of liability at trial, and it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Trustees of Stigmatine Fathers, Inc. v. Secretary of Admn. & Fin., 369 Mass. 562, 565, 341 N.E.2d 662 (1976); Dominick v. Dominick, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 85, 93, 463 N.E.2d 564 (1984). The judge properly instructed the jury that they could consider violations of applicable statutes and codes by the defendant as evidence of negligence. See Perry v. Medeiros, 369 Mass. at 841, 343 N.E.2d 859, quoting from Follansbee v. Ohse, 293 Mass. 48, 52, 199 N.E. 387 (1935).

b. Cheschi claims that the judge permitted defense counsel to denigrate Cheschi's expert witness and that the judge ridiculed Cheschi's counsel when he objected, thereby denying Cheschi a fair trial. The defense counsel's alleged misconduct occurred while he was cross-examining Cheschi's expert witness. The witness was not answering questions directly. At one point, defense counsel asked "How long have you been an engineer, anyway?" Cheschi's counsel objected to the tone of the question, and the judge responded: "Counsel, I suggest to you that I have been doing this for thirty-five years and I know when something is not right and when something is right. And, [if] I need help from counsel, I will ask for it."

The judge's remark, though better left unsaid, "did not reflect on the merits of [Cheschi's] case, and, taken...