Chesebro v. Town of Guilderland
| Decision Date | 19 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | 1:18-CV-01294 (MAD/CFH) |
| Parties | RICHARD CHESEBRO, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF GUILDERLAND, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
RICHARD CHESEBRO
7 Wilber Avenue, #3
Schenectady, New York 12304
Plaintiff pro se
SOLOMON & SOLOMON, P.C.
NORINA A. MELITA, ESQ.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
On November 5, 2018, pro se plaintiff Richard Chesebro ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against Defendant Town of Guilderland ("Defendant") by alleging that Defendant had discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). See Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of Plaintiff's "age [and] injurys [sic]" by refusing to assign Plaintiff to "light duty" after he returned from workers' compensation, ultimately leading to his termination. Id. at 3-5. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant terminated him in retaliation for cooperating with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and with the New York Public Employee Safety and Health Bureau ("PESH"). See id. at 4. Plaintiff seeks "[j]udgment against the defendents [sic][,] compenatory [sic], statutory and punitive damages, back pay and any further relief." Id. at 9. Plaintiff also seeks "[h]ealth insurance[,] [a]ll my [i]ncome for [four] years[,] and [damages for] pain and suffering[.]" Id. at 13. Because Defendant failed to timely answer Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff applied for entry of default, which the Clerk of the Court entered on March 8, 2019. See Dkt. No. 14. On April 30, 2019, Plaintiff moved for entry of default judgment. See Dkt. No. 16. On May 17, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to vacate the entry of default and moved to dismiss the complaint. See Dkt. No. 17.
Currently before the Court are Defendant's motions to vacate the entry of default an to dismiss the complaint, and Plaintiff's motion for default judgment.
On February 22, 2018, Defendant terminated Plaintiff from his employment with Defendant's Water and Wastewater Department. See Dkt. No. 17-1 at ¶ 29. Plaintiff's complaint, construed liberally, presents five claims related to his termination. See Dkt. No. 1 at 3-6. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the ADEA by terminating Plaintiff because of Plaintiff's age. See id. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the ADA by terminating Plaintiff because of his neck injury. See id. at 3, 5. Third, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant violated the ADA by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his neck injury. See id. at 3. Fourth, Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant's failure to accommodate his neck injury constituted disparate treatment and discrimination under the ADA. See id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the ADA by terminating him in retaliation for his cooperation with the EEOCand with PESH. See id. at 4. Defendant, however, claims that it terminated Plaintiff because he endangered coworkers when he left his post as a traffic flagger "during a project on a busy Town road" and also because he had "an extensive history of disciplinary action." Dkt. No. 17-4 at ¶¶ 11, 16.
On February 28, 2018, six days after Plaintiff's termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint for both his ADEA and ADA claims with the EEOC. See Dkt. No. 1 at 4. On March 15, 2018, the EEOC dismissed Plaintiff's ADEA claim and "forwarded [the ADA claim] to the [United States] Department of Justice (DOJ) for review to determine whether the DOJ will bring suit in Federal District Court against [Defendant] regarding [Plaintiff's] ADA allegations." Dkt. No. 17-2 at 19-20. The EEOC's dismissal letter included a "Notice of Suit Rights" section informing Plaintiff that Id. at 20. On August 17, 2018, the DOJ dismissed Plaintiff's ADA claims and informed Plaintiff that "conciliation on [Plaintiff's ADA] case was unsuccessful by the EEOC." Dkt. No. 20 at 17. This letter also notified Plaintiff that he must file his ADA suit within ninety days of receipt. See id.
Plaintiff filed his ADEA and ADA claims together on November 5, 2018, eighty days after the DOJ mailed its right-to-sue notice and 232 days after the EEOC mailed its right-to-sue notice. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Defendant was served with a summons and complaint on December 3, 2018, and forwarded the complaint to its risk management servicer for insurance coverage on December 6, 2018. See Dkt. No. 17-3 at 1. However, Plaintiff's "claim [was never] forwarded to the insurance company through an error on [the risk management servicer's] side." Id. Because of this error, Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff's complaint, and the Clerk of the Court entereddefault against Defendant on May 1, 2019. See Dkt. No. 16. Defendant claims that it "was under the reasonable impression that its insurance carrier was handling the defense of the matter and had no notification of the entry of default by the Clerk." Dkt. No. 17-3 at 1. Upon receiving Plaintiff's motion to enter default judgment, Defendant contacted its risk management servicer, who uncovered its error, and Defendant promptly filed a motion to vacate the entry of default on May 17, 2019. See id.
Defendant has moved to vacate default pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for relief from an order or judgment. In this case, the Clerk has entered default, but there is no default judgment. Where there has been a certificate of default, but not default judgment, the Court decides the motion to vacate the entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(c), which is more lenient than the standard to set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b). See Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1981).
The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause shown. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). While vacating entry of default is in the discretion of the district court, there is a "'preference for resolving disputes on the merits.'" Powerserve Int'l, Inc. v. Lavi, 239 F.3d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993)). Defaults generally are disfavored and are reserved for rare occasions. See Enron Oil Corp., 10 F.3d at 96. Accordingly, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from the default in order to ensure that, to the extent possible, disputes are resolved on their merits. See Powerserve Int'l, Inc., 239 F.3d at 514.
When determining whether there is "good cause" to vacate entry of default under Rule 55(c), a district court must consider three factors: (1) the willfulness of the default; (2) the existence of a meritorious defense to the defaulted claims; and (3) prejudice to the non-defaulting party should relief be granted. See Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com, Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2001). "[N]o single factor is dispositive." FedEx TechConnect, Inc. v. OTI, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 1674, 2013 WL 5405699, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013); see also Wagstaff-El v. Carlton Press Co., 913 F.2d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 1990) (). "When doubt exists as to whether a default should be granted or vacated, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the defaulting party." Enron Oil Corp., 10 F.3d at 96. "Good cause" should be construed generously. Id. "While courts are entitled to enforce compliance with the time limits of the Rules by various means, the extreme sanction of a default judgment must remain a weapon of last, rather than first, resort." Meehan, 652 F.2d at 277.
In the present matter, the Court finds that Defendant has established good cause to vacate the entry of default. Three days after Defendant was served with the summons and complaint in this matter, it forwarded those documents to Arthur Gallagher, its risk management service for insurance coverage. See Dkt. No. 17-1 at ¶ 4. At this point, Defendant was under the impression that its insurance carrier was handling the defense of this matter and had no notification of the entry of default. See id. at ¶ 5. When Defendant received Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, it immediately contacted its risk management service, who advised that the claim had not been forwarded to the insurance company through an error on the part of the risk management service.See id. at ¶ 6. Based on these representations, it is clear that Defendant did not willfully fail to respond to Plaintiff's complaint.
Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, Defendant has a meritorious defense to some, if not all of the claims asserted. Finally, Plaintiff has not identified any prejudice he will suffer should the Court vacate the entry of default.
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant's motion to vacate the entry of default.
"A disability-discrimination claimant must exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC before filing ADA claims in district court." Carmichael v. Morrison Mgmt. Specialists, No. 13-CV-00692-A, 2014 WL 1270042, *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e),(f); D'Lima v. Cuba Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388 (W.D.N.Y.2011)). "The administrative process begins when the claimant files a charge of discrimination with the EEOC." Id. at *2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). Once the...
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