Cheshire Bank & Trust Co. v. Doolittle

• Decision Date: 01 June 1931
• Citation: 155 A. 82,113 Conn. 231
• Parties: CHESHIRE BANK & TRUST CO. v. DOOLITTLE et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

155 A. 82

113 Conn. 231

CHESHIRE BANK & TRUST CO. v. DOOLITTLE et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 1, 1931

Case Reserved from Superior Court, New Haven County; Earnest C Simpson, Judge.

Suit for the construction of the will of Mary Doolittle, late of Cheshire, deceased, by the Cheshire Bank & Trust Company administrator against Margaret Doolittle and others, brought to the Superior Court, in New Haven county, and reserved by the court, Simpson, J., upon an agreed statement of facts for the advice of this court.

Disposition in accordance with opinion.

Carl F. Bollmann, of New Haven, for plaintiff.

Harrison Hewitt and Mary E. Manchester, both of New Haven, for defendant Margaret Doolittle.

Louis B. Zacher, of New Haven, for defendant Graham A. Hitchcock.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.

BANKS, J.

The only question presented upon this reservation is whether a valid and enforceable trust for charitable purposes was created by the eleventh article of the will of Mary L Doolittle, which reads as follows: " All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, I give to Margaret Doolittle to be used by her for either Home or Foreign Missions, trusting she will see that it goes where the need is greatest."

The testatrix died a resident of Cheshire, was a member and attendant of the Congregational Church in that town, and had contributed to the missionary societies of the Congregational Church for many years. Margaret Doolittle is a daughter of a first cousin of the testatrix and has spent one and one-half years doing home missionary work in this country and over ten years doing foreign missionary work in Syria both under organized boards of the Presbyterian Church, the work being similar to that done by the corresponding societies of the Congregational Church, and the testatrix knew of these activities of Margaret Doolittle.

There can be no question as to the intention of the testatrix to create a trust as to the entire residue of her estate, nor that the trust is one for charitable purposes. Our statute of Charitable Uses. Gen. Stat. § 5000, makes it clear that in this state there is no distinction in legal effect between a charitable and a religious use, and in this gift of her residuary estate to be used " for either Home or Foreign Missions" the testatrix clearly indicated her intention to devote the bulk of her estate to the propagation of the Christian religion. Trust for the support of religion are charitable trusts, and our law " favors them, and construes them with the utmost liberality." First Cong. Soc. v. Bridgeport, 99 Conn. 22.30, 121 A. 77, 80. In Brinsmade v. Beach, 98 Conn. 322. 119 A. 233, we held that a bequest of a sum of money, the interest upon which was to be used yearly " to fit missionary boxes," designated a charitable purpose, and that, it being found that this was the usual mode of assisting missionaries and missionary societies, the bequest expressed a charitable purpose with sufficient definiteness to be carried out.

It is the contention of the representative of the heir at law that the trust here established is not valid on the grounds that it is uncertain as to beneficiaries and as to purpose, and may conceivably be for private as well as public purposes. As to the latter claim no attempt has been made to point out how the trust fund could be devoted to any private purpose as in the New York case, Matter of Shattuck, 193 N.Y. 446, 86 N.E. 455, cited in the brief and referred to later nor are we able to conceive how such could possibly be the case. As to the contention that the bequest is uncertain as to beneficiaries, it is sufficient to say that one of the principal characteristics of a charitable trust is uncertainty as to the ultimate beneficiaries of the trust. While the law generally requires that the general object and purpose of the testator's bounty must be sufficiently indicated to bind the conscience of the trustees, the particular beneficiaries of the trust are in the very nature of the case indefinite and uncertain. Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352, 377, 50 Am.Rep. 29: Going v. Emery, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 107, 26 Am.Dec. 645; Simpson v. Welcome, 72 Me. 496, 39 Am.Rep. 349; Zollman, American Law of Charities, § 354.

The remaining claim of the heirs at law is that the will does not designate with sufficient certainty the particular charitable purpose for which the fund is to be used. It has been held that a trust may be so indefinite and uncertain in its purposes, as distinguished from its beneficiaries, as not to admit of judicial administration and therefore invalid. In Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, page 256, 5 A. 687, 692, it was said that the gift must be " to some particular object or purpose that the law recognizes as charitable. It is enough if the object be mentioned, and the law can see that it is a charitable one; but it is not enough that the gift be merely ‘ to charitable uses,’ or ‘ to be used in charity.’ so long as no selection is made from the long list of recognized charitable objects." In that case the will authorized the widow of the testator to dispose of a certain portion of his estate " for such charitable purposes as she may deem proper." The bequest was held invalid since the power given the widow was, not to select the particular...