Mitchell v. Reeves

• Decision Date: 05 January 1938
• Citation: 123 Conn. 549,196 A. 785
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MITCHELL v. REEVES et al.

196 A. 785

123 Conn. 549

MITCHELL v. REEVES et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 5, 1938

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Hartford County; John A Cornell, Judge.

Action by Mary Alice Mitchell against William H. Reeves and others for the construction of a will brought to the Superior Court and reserved by the court for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors.

Question stated, and reservation answered in accordance with opinion.

Cyril Coleman, of Hartford, for plaintiff.

Robert P. Anderson, of New London, for defendant Jesse B. Stinson administrator.

William H. Comley and William Reeves, both of Bridgeport, for defendants, executors.

Wallace W. Brown and Charles Welles Gross, both of Hartford, for defendant Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co., trustee.

Richard F. Corkey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant Attorney General.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, JENNINGS, and CORNELL, JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

Virginia Palmer, late of New London, in her last will gave the residue of her estate, amounting to approximately $2,000,000, to a trustee to be held by it without limitation as to time, the income, after the payment of taxes and the expenses of administration, to be distributed ‘ semi-annually as near as may be, to corporations, organizations, societies, institutions and trusts located or operating in the City of New London, Connecticut, which are devoted exclusively to religious, charitable, scientific, literary, historical or educational purposes, including the encouragement of art, and which under the federal and state succession, transfer and inheritance estate tax laws at the time of my death or at the time they are assessed are exempt from taxation; and I direct that the selection of beneficiaries and the respective amounts payable to them for distribution be made in the discretion of the trustee, its successor or successors, of this trust.’ The questions stated in the reservation raise the issue of the validity of the trust, more specifically, whether or not it is sufficiently definite and certain and whether or not it is so restricted to charitable uses as to be valid.

If, under the will, the trustee can distribute the income only to corporations, organizations, and trusts which are exclusively devoted to charitable purposes, the power of selection given to the trustee is sufficient to sustain the trust against the claim that it is too indefinite and uncertain. General Statutes, § 4825. Under the provisions of this statute a testator is not required to designate the particular charitable purpose for which the property is to be used. ‘ The gift is valid if the testator gives the trustee power to select such purpose, and no gift accompanied by such power of selection is void for uncertainty.’ Cheshire Bank & Trust Co. v. Doolittle, 113 Conn. 231, 235, 155 A. 82, 84; Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 83, 179 A. 479; Gossett v. Swinney, 8 Cir., 53 F.2d 772, 778. On the other hand, if, under the general description of the organizations or trusts to which the income is directed to be distributed, the trustee may select as beneficiaries organizations or trusts not devoted exclusively to charitable purposes, the entire gift must be treated as void. Adye v. Smith, 44 Conn. 60, 68, 26 Am.Rep. 424; Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352, 383, 50 Am.Rep. 29; Chamberlain v. Stearns, 111 Mass. 267, 269; Matter of Durbrow's Estate, 245 N.Y. 469, 474, 157 N.E. 747; Restatement, Trusts, vol. 2, p. 1207; Zollman, Charities, § 394.

At least ever since the Statute of Elizabeth (43 Elizabeth, Chap. 4), gifts for religious purposes have been regarded as charitable. Mack's Appeal, 71 Conn. 122, 135, 41 A. 242; First Congregational Soc. v. Bridgeport, 99 Conn. 22, 30, 121 A. 77; Cheshire Bank & Trust Co. v. Doolittle, supra, 113 Conn. 231, 232, 155 A. 82. This is also true of gifts for educational purposes. Hoyt v. Bliss, 93 Conn. 344, 350, 105 A. 699; Lyme High School Ass'n v. Alling, Attorney General, 113 Conn. 200, 204, 154 A. 439. The word ‘ charitable,’ as used in the will, was evidently inteded to refer to gifts for the relief of the needy, Town of Hamden v. Rice, 24 Conn. 350, 355; see Potter v. Bowers, 2 Cir., 89 F.2d 687; Montgomery, Federal Income Tax Handbook, p. 830; and such gifts are also for a charitable use. Strong's Appeal, 68 Conn. 527, 530, 37 A. 395.

Our own statute of charitable uses, General Statutes, § 5000, was first enacted in 1684. 3 Col. Records, 158. It is a substitute for the Statute of Elizabeth, Adye v. Smith, supra, 44 Conn. 60, 69, 26 Am.Rep. 424, but it specifically includes the uses we have mentioned and certain others. The enumeration in it of these uses is not, however, intended to include all charitable uses to which it applies, for it contains a broad phrase covering gifts ‘ for any other public and charitable use.’ The scope of the statute is illustrated by our decision in Shannon v. Eno, supra, 120 Conn. 77, 82, 179 A. 479, where we sustained a gift made to afford care and protection to and alleviate the suffering of that class of animals which by domestication contribute to the comfort, pleasure, and well-being of man. The breadth of the uses which may be held properly to be charitable is seen in the wellknown definition of such uses in the opinion written by Gray, J., in Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 556,14 Allen 539, 556: ‘ A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.’ ‘ The enforcement of charitable uses cannot be limited to any narrow and stated formula. As has been well said, it must expand with the advancement of civilization and the daily increasing needs of men. New discoveries in science, new fields and opportunities for human action, the differing condition, character and wants of communities and nations, change and enlarge the scope of charity, and where new necessities are created new charitable uses must be established. The underlying principle is the same; its application is as varying as the wants of humanity.’ 5 R.C.L. 323; Restatement, Trusts, vol. 2, p. 1141.

Upon this broad background of possible charitable uses we consider the will before us. The word ‘ literary,’ as commonly used in such a connection as it occurs here, is naturally to be associated with the word ‘ society,’ rather than with the other organizations or trusts referred to. It by no means necessarily signifies an organization which is in whole or in part devoted to the production of works of literature for commercial profit. It signifies rather an organization the purpose of which is to foster and encourage an interest in worth-while literature. An historical organization is one, as ordinarily understood, the purpose of which is to preserve historical records and mementoes and to arouse an interest in history and the realization of its significance. The encouragement of art serves to awaken an appreciation of esthetic values; and trusts to establish museums of art and the like are recognized charitable uses. McLyman v. Art Association of Newport, 51 R.I. 273, 279, 154 A. 117; Simmons v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., 8 Cir., 64 F.2d 602. All of these purposes are essentially educational. Matter of Mergentime's Estate, 129 A.D. 367, 113 N.Y.S. 948, affirmed 195 N.Y. 572, 88 N.E. 1125; Irwin v. Swinney, D. C., 44 F.2d 172, 175. They form a part of ‘ the process of developing and training the powers and capabilities of human beings; ’ Lyme High School Ass'n v. Alling, Attorney General, supra, 113 Conn. 200, 207, 154 A. 439, 442; education ‘ comprehends in its broadest significance the acquisition of all knowledge tending to develop and train the individual, and when used in this sense is not [to be] limited to the years of adolescence or to instruction in the schools.’ New Britain Trust Co. v. Stoddard, 120 Conn. 123, 127, 179 A. 642, 643.

An organization or trust devoted to scientific purposes may well serve to make available the results of scientific study and research which are capable of ministering to the well-being of society, and are often of a nature which cannot be carried on with a view to any financial return upon the necessary expenditure. A fund devoted to such purposes falls within the field of charitable uses. Matter of Frasch's Will, 245 N.Y. 174, 156 N.E. 656; Irwin v. Swinney, supra. ‘ That a gift designed to promote the public good, by the encouragement of learning, science and the useful arts, without any particular reference to the poor, is regarded as a charity, is settled by a series of judicial decisions, and regarded as the settled practice of a court of equity.’ Shaw, C.J., in American Academy of Arts & Sciences v. Harvard College, 78 Mass. 582, 594,12 Gray 582, 594. All these objects, when divorced from the profit motive and so conducted as to serve not the interests of a particular group who may comprise an organization, but those of the public at large, are within the field of proper charitable uses.

That there are corporations, organizations, and trusts within the general meaning of the language used in the will which could not be regarded as exclusively devoted to charitable uses may be true. So the question remains whether the trustee under this will could devote any part of the income of the fund to such corporations or organizations. That depends upon the meaning of the provision in the will before us...