Cheshire Land Trust, LLC v. Casey

• Citation: 115 A.3d 497,156 Conn.App. 833
• Decision Date: 28 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 36311.,36311.
• Parties: CHESHIRE LAND TRUST, LLC v. Timothy CASEY et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

156 Conn.App. 833

115 A.3d 497

CHESHIRE LAND TRUST, LLC

v.Timothy CASEY et al.

No. 36311.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 13, 2015.

Decided April 28, 2015.

James M. Miele, Cheshire, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Andrew S. Knott, for the appellee (plaintiff).

SHELDON, PRESCOTT and HARPER, Js.

Opinion

PRESCOTT, J.

In this summary process action, the defendants Timothy Casey and Ives Farm, LLC,¹ were ordered evicted from farmland owned by the plaintiff, Cheshire Land Trust, LLC. On appeal, the defendants advance two principal claims.² First, they claim that the trial court improperly found that the plaintiff had unequivocally notified them that it was terminating their leases. Second, they claim that the court improperly determined that Casey was not, as the result of an easement by implication, entitled to continue using the farmland. We disagree with each of these claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment of possession rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff.

The following facts, as found by the court, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Betty Ives owned a large farm, which included a residence, located at 1585 Cheshire Street in Cheshire. In 1986, Casey approached her about leasing some of her farmland. The two of them entered into an oral agreement that provided, among other things, that Casey could work the land on the property and use the farm's only greenhouse. Ives, in turn, agreed to fund the costs of seed, soil, tools, utilities, tractors, and any overhead associated with farming the land. Both of them would split the profits, after expenses, from the sale of any farm produce.

In the twenty years that followed the formation of their agreement, six additional greenhouses were constructed on the property. Of these six additional greenhouses, two were constructed using funds provided by Casey. Ives funded the construction of the remaining four. Ives additionally paid for the site preparation, underground electrical power, water, plumbing, irrigation systems, ventilating fans, and oil powered furnaces necessary to operate the greenhouses.

Casey and Ives' contractual arrangement continued until Ives' death in 2006. In her will, she “[gave] and bequeath[ed]” to Casey “all of the greenhouses located on [her] property, two of which he already owns, and all farm machinery and equipment including the generator, tractor and trucks, to be his absolutely.” Ives further “[gave], devis[ed] and bequeath[ed]” in her will all of her real property, “together with any sheds, barns and other out buildings located on said property, but exclusive of any greenhouses located thereon,” to the “Cheshire Land Trust, Inc.,” “subject to any easements which may have been imposed upon said property prior to [Ives'] death.”

Shortly thereafter, in 2007, the defendants began leasing portions of the farm from the plaintiff. Specifically, Casey leased part of the farm for use as his residence. Ives Farm, LLC, a limited liability company of which Casey is the sole member, leased approximately forty-seven acres of tilled farmland, which included agricultural buildings, as well as acreage for the seven greenhouses. The defendants remained the plaintiff's tenants for approximately four years. At that time, the plaintiff, citing nonpayment of rent and termination of tenancy by lapse of time, served the defendants with notices to quit possession of the property. When the defendants failed to leave the property, the plaintiff initiated this summary process action against them seeking an eviction.

At trial, the defendants admitted that they had failed to pay rent in accordance with the terms of the leases and that their respective tenancies had expired by lapse of time. They contended, however, that they were entitled to continue using the property for at least two reasons. First, they claimed that the plaintiff had failed to provide them unequivocal notice that it was terminating their leases.³ Second, they claimed that Casey was entitled to an easement by implication as a result of, inter alia, his need to access and use the greenhouses on the property.

In a comprehensive and well reasoned memorandum of decision, the trial court rejected both of the defendants' arguments. Specifically, the court determined that the plaintiff had unequivocally notified the defendants, in a letter dated October 22, 2010, that it was terminating their lease agreements, and that it had not subsequently equivocated about its intent to proceed with evicting them. The court additionally rejected Casey's claim to an easement by implication after concluding that the basis on which he predicated his need for the easement—to access the greenhouses on the property—lacked factual support. Particularly, the court concluded that the farm's greenhouses were not fixtures, but were instead removable personal property. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff on the basis of both claims asserted in its complaint, and this appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The defendants raise two principal claims on appeal. First, they claim that the court improperly determined that the plaintiff had unequivocally notified them that it was terminating their leases. Second, they claim that the court improperly determined that Casey was not entitled to an easement by implication. We disagree with both of these claims.

I

The defendants first claim that the court improperly determined that the plaintiff had unequivocally notified them that it was terminating their leases. Specifically, they contend that the plaintiff's October 22, 2010 letter to the defendants, in which the plaintiff directed them to vacate the property by the end of the following month, did not constitute unequivocal notice because it described an avenue through which the defendants could potentially continue to use the property.⁴ The defendants further contend that even if the plaintiff had provided them with unequivocal notice of its intent to terminate their leases, its subsequent actions called that intent into question and thereby rendered its prior notice equivocal. We do not agree.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the standard of review. “Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy.... It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms.... Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.... Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Getty Properties Corp. v. ATKR, LLC, 315 Conn. 387, 405–406, 107 A.3d 931 (2015).

“Service of a valid notice to quit, which terminates the lease and creates a tenancy at sufferance ... is a condition precedent to a summary process action.... It is well settled that breach of a covenant to pay rent does not automatically result in the termination of a lease ... rather, it gives the lessor a right to terminate the lease which he may or may not exercise.... In order to effect a termination, the lessor must perform some unequivocal act which clearly demonstrates his intent to terminate the lease.... [T]here is almost no limit to the possible words or deeds which might constitute the unequivocal act necessary to terminate the lease.... Whether there has been a termination or voluntary surrender of a lease is to be determined by the intention of the parties, and thus, it is usually a question of fact for the [trier].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 407, 107 A.3d 931.

“Questions of fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.... Because it is the trial court's function to weigh the evidence ... we give great deference to its findings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cornfield Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Cummings, 148 Conn.App. 70, 76, 84 A.3d 929 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 929, 110 A.3d 433 (2015).

The following additional facts found by the trial court are relevant to our resolution of the defendants' claim. The plaintiff advised the defendants in a letter dated October 22, 2010, that their leases would terminate on November 30, 2010. The relevant text of the letter provides: “Both the lease on the Ives farm house and the lease on the Ives farm agricultural lands between the [plaintiff] and yourself ha[ve] expired and been on a month to month basis. You have not made the lease payments for an extended period of time. Therefore, this is to notify you that the business relationship between yourself and the [plaintiff] is terminated. We are requesting immediate payment of all past due amounts. We are in the process of contracting with another entity for the use of the house, agricultural buildings and agricultural lands (including the land under the existing greenhouses). To make an effective transition we are providing the summary below and the options available to you. You have until 5:00 o'clock p.m. Friday October 22, 2010 to inform us if you have selected the alternative option. If you have not selected it by that time, the default option is to be implemented.”

Immediately below this language appeared three boxes. The first box, labeled “[s]tatus,” contained the following text: “The Land Lease and Residence Lease has expired and will not be renewed. Significant back payments are owed.” (Emphasis added.) Adjacent to this box were two additional boxes appearing under the heading, “[o]ptions.” The first of these two boxes, labeled “...