Chesser v. Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons
| Decision Date | 06 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-cv-01939-NYW |
| Parties | ZACHARY A. CHESSER, Plaintiff, v. DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This matter comes before the court on Defendant Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons' ("Defendant" or the "BOP") Motion for Summary Judgment (or "BOP's Motion") [#180]1 and Plaintiff Zachary Chesser's ("Plaintiff" or "Mr. Chesser") Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (or "Mr. Chesser's Motion") [#193]. This civil action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge to fully preside over for all purposes. See [#37]; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73; D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.2(d). The court concludes that oral argument will not materially assist in the resolution of these matters. Having reviewed the Motions and associated briefing, the applicable case law, and the entire docket, the court GRANTS the BOP's Motion and DENIES Mr. Chesser's Motion.
Plaintiff initiated this civil action on December 22, 2014 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. [#1-1]. Plaintiff, a Muslim, alleges that the BOP has substantially burdened his exercise of religion in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 et seq. See generally [id.; #3; #58]. The District Court for the District of Columbia transferred this matter to this District on September 8, 2015. See [#1]. Upon his transfer to this District, the court directed Mr. Chesser to file an Amended and Second Amended Complaint. See [#4; #20]. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleged four claims against Defendant. See [#22]. The Honorable Lewis T. Babcock dismissed two of those claims as duplicative of claims in a separate federal lawsuit pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Chesser v. Walton, 3:12-cv-01198-JPG-PMF (S.D. Ill.) ("Chesser I"), but directed that the two remaining claims be drawn to a presiding judge. See [#24 at 4]. This action was then drawn to the undersigned Magistrate Judge and the Parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. See [#25, #33].
On March 25, 2016, the court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider the dismissal of two of his four claims, but granted in part his Motion for Leave to Amend [#46]. See [#53]. Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), the operative pleading in this matter, on June 9, 2016. [#58]. The TAC asserted two claims against Defendant for violations of RFRA: the BOP's policy of "holding inmates in solitary confinement due to their ties to terrorism" ("Claim III"), and its conditions of confinement at the ADMAX United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado ("ADX") substantially burdens the exercise of Mr. Chesser's sincerely held religious beliefs ("Claim IV"). See [id.].
Defendant moved to dismiss the TAC on August 3, 2016. See [#67]. In ruling on the Motion to Dismiss the court limited Claim III to its purported challenge to the BOP's consideration of Mr. Chesser's ties to terrorism, including his purported association with Jama'ah Ad-Da'wah As-Sahihah and his participation in religious activities—both allegedly deemed terrorist-related by the BOP—as the primary justification for his transfer to ADX, but allowed Claim IV to remain in its entirety. See [#86]; see also [#159 at 2 & n.1; #163].
The court then entered a Scheduling Order setting, among others, September 25, 2017 as the deadline for discovery and October 27, 2017 as the deadline for dispositive motions. See [#100]. Following several impasses with discovery the court granted the Parties' request for a 120-day extension of the discovery and dispositive motions deadline, extending those deadlines to January 23 and February 26, 2018, respectively. See [#159]. Each party received an additional extension of time to file their respective dispositive motions. See [#174; #179]. The BOP filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 2, 2018 [#180] and Plaintiff his Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 2, 2018 [#193]. The Motions are now ripe for resolution.
A party may be entitled to summary judgment prior to trial if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). "A 'judge's function' at summary judgment is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014)(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000); Carey v. U.S. Postal Service, 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Com, 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists is borne by the moving party. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party will bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by his own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-movant "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of [the] pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The court must resolve all doubts in favor of the existence of triable issues of fact. Boren v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 891, 892 (10th Cir. 1991).
Cross motions for summary judgment are treated separately, and the denial of one does not require the grant of another. Buell Cabinet v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1979). Rather, the court may enter summary judgment only if the moving party carries its burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2002). And because Mr. Chesser proceeds pro se the court liberally construes his pleadings, Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), but does not act as his advocate and applies the same procedural rules and substantive law to Plaintiff as to a represented party, Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008).
At summary judgment, credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. But it is well-settled that a court may consider only admissible evidence at summary judgment. Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1541 (10th Cir. 1995); accord Johnson v. Weld County Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1209 (10th Cir. 2010) (). The evidence need not be in a form that is admissible at trial, e.g., affidavits are often inadmissible at trial on hearsay grounds, but the substance must be admissible at trial. See Brown v. Perez, 835 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2016). The court, however, "is not required to review large quanta of evidence to ferret out inadmissible statements"—the "objecting party [must] make specific objections detailing the specific evidence [he] wishes to have stricken and stating the specific grounds upon which each piece of evidence should be stricken." Tucker v. SAS Inst., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 715, 722 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
Mr. Chesser levies several challenges to the admissibility of Defendant's summary judgment evidence. See [#191 at 3-4; #191-1 at 1-2, 23-29]. I consider those objections below.
Mr. Chesser lodges three challenges to the use of his own statements. First, he asserts that his views on perjury and a lie he told the FBI during his underlying criminal conviction are irrelevant. [#191-1 at 24 (citing [#181-1 at 20:23-21:25,2 80:8-15, 85:14-21, 87:8-18, 89:2-24])]. "The standard for relevancy is particularly loose under rule 401, because any more stringent requirement is unworkable and unrealistic." Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., 323 F.R.D. 360, 395 (D.N.M. 2018) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). I find this testimony relevant because it concerns Mr. Chesser's beliefs—ones he falsely disclaimed—and resulting behavior, which bear on the issues raised by the BOP's Motion. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 ().
Mr. Chesser next objects to the use of his deposition testimony and his discovery responses concerning his...
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