Tucker v. Sas Institute, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-1520-G. |
| Citation | 462 F.Supp.2d 715 |
| Parties | Helen TUCKER, Plaintiff, v. SAS INSTITUTE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Mellannise Henderson-Love, Law Office of Mellannise Henderson-Love, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Nancy Patterson, C. Dean Terms, Jr., Baker & Hostetler,. Houston, TX, William P. Finegan, Fulbright & Jaworski, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.
Before the court are the motion of the defendant, SAS Institute, Inc. ("the defendant" or "SAS"), for summary judgment ("the defendant's motion"), the motion of the plaintiff, Helen Tucker ("the plaintiff' or "Tucker"), to strike portions of the defendant's summary judgment evidence ("the plaintiffs motion to strike"), and the defendant's objections to the plaintiff's summary judgment response evidence ("the defendant's objections"). For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs motion to strike is denied, the defendant's objections are overruled, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
This case arises out of the defendant's termination of Tucker's employment with SAS. The defendant, a large, privately owned software company, laid off twenty-three employees, including the plaintiff, in March 2005. See Defendant's Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion") at 1.
Employees at SAS are grouped into "divisions" and then into smaller "business units." Id. at 4. Susan Carroll ("Carroll") was the "Operations Manager" for the "Retail Business Unit" of the "Sales Division," and Tucker was an employee within that business unit and division. Id. In 200.4, SAS determined the revenues of the Sales Division were inadequate to support its staff; thus, managers in the Sales Division were required to eliminate jobs. Id. at 6.
In preparation for the lay off, managers within the Sales Division, including Carroll, were instructed to evaluate their respective business units and determine which positions under their control could be eliminated in order to reduce costs. Id. at 1. Managers were instructed to use three criteria in deciding which positions should be eliminated: (1) whether there were any redundant functions in their subdivision that were being supported by employees outside the subdivision; (2) the economic factors that contributed to the success of the business unit; and (3) whether all support positions under the manager were absolutely critical to the business unit's ability to conduct business. Id. at 6. Using these criteria, Carroll selected two employees under her supervisory authority to be laid off. Id. at 7.
On or about March 24, 2005,1 Tucker was advised that she was being laid off effective May 23, 2005. Id. Tucker also received ten weeks severance pay. Id. Upon receiving notice of her impending termination, Tucker filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at 8. Because the EEOC was unable to determine that SAS had violated the relevant statutes, it sent Tucker a right to sue letter on May 5, 2005. See Defendant's Appendix at 56.
While her charge was pending before the EEOC, Tucker applied for three other positions with SAS. See Plaintiffs Complaint ¶ 16. However, SAS did not hire Tucker for any of those positions, and Tucker has alleged that SAS decided not to hire her for any of the positions in retaliation for her decision to file a charge with the EEOC. Id. SAS has moved for summary judgment on both of Tucker's claims — for disparate treatment in her termination, and for retaliation.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence before the court show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The disposition of a case through summary judgment "reinforces the purpose of the Rules, to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions, and, when appropriate, affords a merciful end to litigation that would otherwise be lengthy and expensive." Fontenot v. Upjohn Company, 780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir.1986).
While all of the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)), neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy the nonmovant's summary judgment burden. Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721, 725 (5th Cir.2002) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc)). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The movant makes the necessary showing by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists. FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c).
If the movant makes the required showing, the nonmovant must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To carry this burden, the "opponent must do more than simply show ... some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When conflicting evidence is presented, the court is not permitted to make credibility determinations regarding the evidence. See Lindsey v. Prive Corporation, 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir.1993). The nonmovant cannot survive a motion for summary judgment, however, by merely resting on the allegations in her pleadings. Isquith for and on Behalf of Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926, 109 S.Ct. 310, 102 L.Ed.2d 329 (1988); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
To the extent the nonmovant bears the burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant need not present evidence meeting the admissibility requirements for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Rather, the nonmovant may rely on any form of evidence listed in Rule 56(c). See id. (). While the form of the nonmovant's evidence need not be admissible, the content of the evidence must meet evidentiary requirements. See Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 186 (5th Cir.1997) (). That is, while an affidavit has limited admissibility at trial, it is sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment, but inadmissible statements in the affidavit, such as hearsay statements, may not be considered by the court. See id.
The plaintiff has asked the court to strike portions of a number of affidavits which the defendant submitted along with its motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff challenges paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Carroll's affidavit on the grounds that they are based on hearsay and that they contain conclusory statements. See Plaintiff's Motion to Strike at 2. The plaintiff challenges paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Marc Witorsch's affidavit and the exhibits to the affidavit on hearsay grounds. Id. at 2-3. The plaintiff challenges paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 13 of Janet Stone's affidavit on the grounds that they are based on hearsay and that they contain conclusory statements. Id. at 3. The plaintiff challenges paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Angela Pettus's affidavit on the grounds that they are based on hearsay and that they contain conclusory statements. Id. The plaintiff challenges paragraphs 2 and 3 of Shelly McClanahan's affidavit on the grounds that they are based on hearsay and that they contain conclusory statements. Id. Finally, the plaintiff challenges paragraphs 2 and 3 of Kelly Levens's affidavit on the grounds that they are based on hearsay and that they contain conclusory statements. Id.
It is unclear which specific sentences or statements in any of the affidavits the plaintiff believes should be stricken. See Plaintiff's Motion to Strike at 2-4. The plaintiff simply provides a list of the paragraphs she wishes to challenge and the vague assertion that the information contained in those paragraphs is "base:: on inadmissible hearsay" and the paragraphs "are laced with conclusory, self-serving statements that are inadmissible." Id.
The court is not required to review large quanta of evidence to ferret out inadmissible statements. Rather, Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) requires an objecting party to make specific objections detailing the specific evidence the party wishes to have stricken and stating the specific grounds upon which each piece of evidence should be stricken. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445 (5th Cir.2004). Objections lacking specificity do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 103. United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878,...
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