Chessman, Application of

• Decision Date: 01 February 1955
• Docket Number: S,Cr. 5591
• Citation: 44 Cal.2d 1,279 P.2d 24
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Matter of the Appllcation of Caryl CHESSMAN for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. PEOPLE of the State of California, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT and Caryl Chessman, Real Party in Interest, Respondents. F. 19158.

Page 24

279 P.2d 24

44 Cal.2d 1

Matter of the Appllcation of Caryl CHESSMAN for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

PEOPLE of the State of California, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT and Caryl Chessman, Real Party in Interest, Respondents.

Cr. 5591, S. F. 19158.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 1, 1955.

Rehearing Denied March 3, 1955.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles E. McClung, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for appellant and petitioner.

Caryl Chessman, in pro. per.

Rosalie Asher, Sacramento, for respondent and real party in interest.

SCHAUER, Justice.

By a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on October 17, 1951, Caryl Chessman, an inmate of San Quentin State Prison whose appeal from 17 judgments of conviction was pending, sought relief from allegedly illegal conditions of imprisonment which assertedly interfered with his representation of himself. ¹ On December 18, 1951 this court affirmed the judgments, two of which imposed the death penalty. (People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001.) The subject matter of Chessman's petition for habeas corpus has no relevancy whatsoever to the proceedings at the trial which resulted in his conviction or to the legality of the judgments which were imposed and affirmed and under which he is now confined and awaiting execution; it relates solely to a matter of prison administration. After the judgments had been affirmed the superior court, in the habeas corpus proceeding, ordered that Chessman 'continue to be allowed the free exercise' of asserted rights in connection with his representation of himself. The attorney general filed with the District Court of Appeal a notice of appeal from the superior court order; also, uncertain whether the People could appeal from the order, the attorney general filed with the District Court of Appeal a petition for a writ of review. The District Court of Appeal issued the writ of review. The matters have been transferred to this court, and Chessman has filed notices of motion to dismiss the review proceeding and the appeal. We have concluded, for reasons hereinafter stated, that the order appealed from should be reversed with directions to the superior court to dismiss the habeas corpus proceeding, and that the review proceeding should be dismissed.

Appealability of the Habeas Corpus Order

The principal ground of Chessman's motion to dismiss the appeal is that the superior court order is not appealable. The People have asked that this court pass on the question whether they can appeal from an order on habeas corpus which directs that a petitioner be granted relief but which does not order his release from custody.

In accord with the view that 'The right of appeal is derived from our constitution or statutes' (Gale v. Tuolumne County Water Co. (1914), 169 Cal. 46, 52, 145 P. 532), prior to the enactment of section 1506 of the Penal Code in 1927 it was held that no orders on habeas corpus were appealable. (Matter of Perkins (1852), 2 Cal. 424, 430; People v. Schuster (1871), 40 Cal. 627; Matter of Hughes (1911), 159 Cal. 360, 363, 113 P. 684; Matter of Zany (1913), 164 Cal. 724, 727, 130 P. 710; France v. Superior Court (1927), 201 Cal. 122, 127, 255 P. 815, 52 A.L.R. 869; Ex parte White (1906), 2 Cal.App. 726, 727, 84 P. 242.) Section 1506 of the Penal Code, as enacted in 1927, provided insofar as is here material that 'An appeal may be taken * * * by the people from a final order of a superior court made upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction, in all criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or information in a court of record * * *.' There followed a series of cases which announced that the People could appeal only in those cases which came within the precise wording of the statute and refused to allow an appeal where the habeas corpus order was not made after conviction in a criminal case prosecuted by indictment or information. (In re Alpine (1928), 203 Cal. 731, 745, 265 P. 947, 58 A.L.R. 1500; In re Bruegger (1928), 204 Cal. 169, 170, 267 P. 101; Thuesen v. Superior Court (1932), 215 Cal. 572, 576, 12 P.2d 8; Loustalot v. Superior Court (1947), 30 Cal.2d 905, 913, 186 P.2d 673; In re Merwin (1930), 108 Cal.App. 31, 32, 290 P. 1076; In re Dutton (1931), 119 Cal.App. 447, 448, 6 P.2d 558.)

Although in the last cited cases the court would not allow an appeal by the People except where there was literal compliance with statutory requirements that there be 'conviction' in a case prosecuted 'by indictment or information,' a liberal view as to the meaning of the word 'discharging' in section 1506 was taken in In re Larabee (1933), 131 Cal.App. 261, 264, 21 P.2d 132. There an inmate of San Quentin, confined pursuant to a judgment of conviction in Los Angeles County, sought habeas corpus in Marin County. By the superior court order in the habeas corpus proceeding petitioner was 'remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Los Angeles County.' The People appealed. Petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order was not, in the language of section 1506 of the Penal Code, one 'discharging' him. In denying the motion to dismiss, the appellate court said that the effect of the order was to discharge the petitioner from the custody of the warden, and the fact that the superior court also ordered petitioner remanded to the custody of the sheriff 'did not have the effect of depriving the state of its right of appeal, for the reason that in the face of a valid commitment the trial court was without power to make such order.'

In 1951 section 1506 of the Penal Code was amended to provide that 'An appeal may be taken * * * by the people from a final order of a superior court made upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction in all criminal cases * * *.' It is Chessman's position that the order here is not appealable because it is not one 'discharging' him. The People argue that as the uses of habeas corpus have been extended by judicial decision to the granting to prisoners of rights short of effecting their release from illegal custody, there should be a concomitant extension of appealability to orders effecting these new uses of the writ. The function of a writ of habeas corpus is solely to effect 'discharge' from unlawful restraint, though the illegality in respect to which the discharge from restraint is sought may not go to the fact of continued detention but may be simply as to the circumstances under which the prisoner is held, as, for example, where he questions the propriety of his detention as an habitual criminal (In re McVickers (1946), 29 Cal.2d 264, 176 P.2d 40; In re Seeley (1946), 29 Cal.2d 294, 299, 176 P.2d 24; In re Harincar (1946), 29 Cal.2d 403, 176 P.2d 58; In re Wolfson (1947), 30 Cal.2d 20, 180 P.2d 326; In re Pearson (1947), 30 Cal.2d 871, 186 P.2d 401) or where he questions the construction of the judgment of conviction under which he is held (In re Bramble (1947), 31 Cal.2d 43, 46, 51, 187 P.2d 411). 'Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.' (Pen.Code, § 1473.) The scope of inquiry at the hearing on the writ includes consideration of 'any fact to show either that his imprisonment or detention is unlawful, or that he is entitled to his discharge' (Pen.Code, § 1484) and 'If no legal cause is shown for such imprisonment or restraint, or for the continuation thereof, * * * (the) court or judge must discharge such party from the custody or restraing under which he is held' (Pen.Code, § 1485), which means that the prisoner may be discharged from illegal conditions of restraint although not from all restraint. Since this is the function and scope of habeas corpus, we conclude that it is proper and desirable to interpret section 1506 of the Penal Code in its use of the word 'discharging' as being fully as broad as the scope of the writ itself.

The People as Parties to the Appeal

It is Chessman's position that the appeal should be dismissed because the People are not parties who can maintain such appeal. The People are not named as respondents in the petition for habeas corpus; the respondents there named are the warden, two assistant wardens, and the chief custody officer of San Quentin. However, authority for an appeal in the name of the People is found in section 1506 of the Penal Code which since its enactment has provided that an appeal may be taken 'by the people' from certain orders on habeas corpus.

Availability of Certiorari to Review Superior Court Habeas Corpus Order

In support of his motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari Chessman contends that such writ will not lie to annul an order of the Superior court on habeas corpus, no matter how erroneous it may be, if the superior court had 'jurisdiction,' citing Matter of Hughes (1911) supra, 159 Cal. 360, 363, 113 P. 684. (See also Rose v. Superior Court (1948), 86 Cal.App.2d 173, 176, 194 P.2d 568.) However, we need not at this time re-examine the rationale of the Hughes case, or otherwise consider the grounds of dismissal urged by Chessman, because it follows as a matter of law from our conclusion that the remedy of appeal is available, that the writ of certiorari will not lie (Code Civ.Proc. § 1068), and, having been inadvertently issued, it will be discharged and the proceeding will be dismissed (see Matter of Hughes (1911), supra, 159 Cal. 360, 366, 113 P. 684; Rose v. Superior Court (1948), supra, 86 Cal.App.2d 173, 178, 194 P.2d 568).

The Merits of the Superior Court Order

The original petition for habeas corpus dated October 3, 1951, alleges in pertinent part that Chessman has appeared and desires to continue to appear in his own behalf in his then pending appeal, and that he anticipates unjustifiable punishment, 'depriving him of...