Chester v. Mustang Mfg. Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. C97-3011-MWB.,C97-3011-MWB.
• Citation: 998 F.Supp. 1039
• Parties: Cheryl K. CHESTER, Personally and as Administrator of the Estate of Kevin B. Chester, Plaintiff, v. MUSTANG MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

998 F.Supp. 1039

Cheryl K. CHESTER, Personally and as Administrator of the Estate of Kevin B. Chester, Plaintiff, v. MUSTANG MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., Defendant.

No. C97-3011-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Central Division.

March 17, 1998.

Oral Arguments by Thomas L. Staack and Chad A. Swanson of Dutton, Braun, Staack & Hellman P.L.C., Waterloo, IA, for Plaintiff.

A. Roger Witke of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, District Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I.   INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .............................. 1041
                II.  FINDINGS OF FACT ......................................... 1041
                A. Uncontested Facts ..................................... 1041
                B. Contested Facts ....................................... 1042
                III. LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................... 1043
                A. Standards For Summary Judgment ........................ 1043
                B. Pain And Suffering Damages ............................ 1043
                C. Chester's Bystander Liability Claim ................... 1044
                1. General principles of bystander liability .......... 1044
                

                2. Application of contemporaneous perception prong ..... 
                IV. CONCLUSION ................................................. 1050
                

A tragic farm accident forms the backdrop for this lawsuit. The court is called upon by defendant's motions for partial summary judgment to determine the macabre question of whether a genuine issue of material fact has been generated regarding the nature of the decedent's fatal injuries. Specifically, the court must ascertain whether a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the question of whether, as a result of the accident, the decedent's death or unconsciousness was instantaneous. Assuming that plaintiff is able to generate a genuine issue of material fact that the accident was still ongoing at the time of her arrival at the scene, the court is further called upon to determine whether the Iowa Supreme Court would recognize a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by a bystander where the individual is not present at the time an incident commences but arrives while it was still ongoing.¹

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Cheryl K. Chester, personally and as the administrator of the estate of Kevin B. Chester, filed her complaint in this action on February 7, 1997, against defendant Mustang Manufacturing Company, Inc. ("Mustang"). Subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and sufficient amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Cheryl Chester alleges that her husband, Kevin B. Chester, suffered fatal injuries when the bucket on a skid loader unexpectedly dropped, pinning Kevin between the bucket and the skid loader's frame. Cheryl Chester alleges claims for strict liability, negligence, implied warranty, and bystander liability.

Mustang filed a motion for partial summary judgment on December 18, 1997, seeking dismissal of Cheryl Chester's bystander liability claim on the ground that Cheryl Chester cannot establish a viable cause of action for emotional distress under Iowa law because she was not present at the scene of the accident at the time of its occurrence. Cheryl Chester filed a timely resistance to the motion for partial summary judgment. In essence, Cheryl Chester argues that she arrived at the scene of the accident while it was ongoing and therefore she may recover, as a bystander, for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On January 2, 1998, Mustang filed a supplemental motion for partial summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law on Cheryl Chester's claim for damages for the pain and suffering of Kevin Chester. Mustang contends that Cheryl Chester cannot create a genuine issue of material fact that Kevin Chester was not rendered unconscious or died instantaneously during the accident. Cheryl Chester resisted Mustang's supplemental motion and asserts that she has generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kevin Chester was rendered unconscious or died instantaneously during the accident.

The court held oral arguments on Mustang's motions for partial summary judgment on March 12, 1998. At the oral arguments, Cheryl Chester was represented by counsel Thomas L. Staack and Chad A. Swanson of Dutton, Braun, Staack & Hellman, P.L.C., in Waterloo, Iowa. Defendant Mustang was represented by counsel A. Roger Witke of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., in Des Moines, Iowa. Counsel were exceptionally well prepared and argued ably the very close questions presented in Mustang's motions for partial summary judgment.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Uncontested Facts

The record reveals that the following facts are undisputed. Defendant Mustang is incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota, with its principal place of business located in Owatonna, Minnesota. Mustang is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling Mustang 930A skid steer loaders. On February 7, 1995, the deceased, Kevin B. Chester, was at his farm in Butler County, Iowa, working on or near his Mustang 930A skid loader. He left his house on the farmstead at approximately 10:50 a.m., telling his wife Cheryl Chester that he was going with a bucket of hot water to defrost a frozen hog waterer. Kevin had a doctor's appointment that day at 11:30 a.m. or 12:00 p.m. The doctor's office was located in Waverly, approximately twenty minutes from the Chester's farm.

At approximately 11:00 or 11:10 a.m., Cheryl attempted to reach Kevin by radio twice regarding his doctor's appointment. When Cheryl could not reach Kevin by radio, she went out of the house to look for him. She began searching the driveway and then drove the family's van to some buildings on the north edge of the farmstead without finding him. She returned to the driveway, parked, and noticed that the bucket of hot water was sitting near a shed just off the driveway. At approximately 11:30 a.m., Cheryl discovered Kevin entangled in the skid loader by the shed. He was caught between the skid loader and the boom, facing towards the skid loader with his chest caught between the two.

Cheryl knew immediately that Kevin was trapped by the skid loader, that the bucket was pressing down on him, and that she needed to get the bucket off of him. Kevin Chester was unconscious and unresponsive when she found him. Because of his gloves and hooded coat, Cheryl could not see his hands or face. When Cheryl reached the skid loader, the machine was off and the key was in the off position. Cheryl started the machine and attempted to get the bucket off Kevin by operating the machine and raising the bucket, but the floor pedals would not operate. When Cheryl could not get the bucket to raise, she climbed out of the skid loader, ran to the house, and called 911 immediately. At that same time, Cheryl also called Kevin's father, but he did not answer, so she called for another relative to come. After Cheryl had reached the other relative, she ran out of the house and found Raymond Vandeventer, the hired hand. After Cheryl located Raymond, they both ran to the shed and began working in an effort to get the bucket off of Kevin. They saw a hand-operated utility jack sitting nearby and tried sticking that under the bucket to raise it, but it would not lift the bucket enough to free Kevin.

Raymond and Cheryl were in the process of trying to lift the bucket when the rescue crew arrived. Approximately fifteen minutes had elapsed from the time Cheryl found Kevin until the rescue crew arrived. The rescue crew used the Jaws of Life to pry the bucket up from the skid loader and free Kevin. When he was freed, the rescue crew began efforts to resuscitate him and then put him in the ambulance. CPR was begun by the Clarksville Ambulance Service personnel at 11:48 a.m. Kevin was freed from the skid loader by the rescue crew and was removed from the farmstead by ambulance approximately ten minutes after the rescue crew had arrived, shortly before 12:00 p.m.

While the CPR was in process at the scene, a blood pressure reading of 90/palp was found in Kevin Chester's left arm. The Waverly Ambulance Service transported Kevin Chester from the farmstead to the hospital at 11:56 a.m., and arrived at the hospital at 12:07 p.m. After Kevin Chester was intubated by Waverly Ambulance Service personnel, he did exhibit some diminished lung sounds on the right side. Kevin Chester was admitted to the Waverly Municipal Hospital emergency room at 12:08 p.m. He was pronounced dead by Daniel Eggers at 12:10 p.m. due to the crash injury sustained to his chest. Kevin Chester had no sign of injury to his head, such as a skull fracture or brain hemorrhage, that is typically associated with a loss of consciousness.

B. Contested Facts

1. Whether the injury sustained by Kevin Chester rendered him instantaneously unconscious or caused his instantaneous death; and

2. The time of Kevin Chester's death.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standards For Summary Judgment

This court has considered in some detail the standards applicable to motions for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 in a number of recent decisions. See, e.g., Swanson v. Van Otterloo, 993 F.Supp. 1224, 1230 (N.D.Iowa 1998); Dirks v. J.C. Robinson Seed Co., 980 F.Supp. 1303, 1305-06 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Laird v. Stilwill, 969 F.Supp. 1167, 1172-1174 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Rural Water Sys. No. 1 v. City of Sioux Ctr., 967 F.Supp. 1483, 1499-1501 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Tralon Corp. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 812, 817-18 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Security State Bank v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A., 965 F.Supp. 1237, 1239-40 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 963 F.Supp. 805 (N.D.Iowa 1997). Thus, the court will not reiterate those standards in detail here. Suffice it to say that Rule 56 itself provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Rule 56. Summary Judgment

(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,...