Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Wolfe

• Decision Date: 20 March 1901
• Citation: 61 Neb. 502,86 N.W. 441
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
• Parties: CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. v. WOLFE.

61 Neb. 502

86 N.W. 441

CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.

v.WOLFE.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

March 20, 1901.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. At a special session of the legislature no business can be transacted, except such as is included in the objects of legislation stated in the proclamation of the executive convening the law making body.

2. Section 3, art. 1, c. 72, Comp. St., was passed at a special session of the legislature held in 1867, and is within the scope of the third object designated by the governor in his proclamation convening the legislature.

3. The entire proclamation of the governor convening the legislature in special session should be considered in determining whether any given act at such session is germane to the objects stated in the call of the executive.

4. When one is injured while a passenger on a railroad train, the presumption is that such injury was caused by the negligence of the carrier.

5. A carrier is liable for damages resulting from injuries sustained by a passenger, unless the latter was guilty of criminal negligence.

6. Section 3, art. 1, c. 72, Comp. St., does not contravene the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.

Error to district court, Phelps county; Beall, Judge.

Action by John F. Wolfe against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.W. S. Morlan, W. P. Hall, J. W. Deweeso, and F. E. Bishop, for plaintiff in error.

S. A. Dravo and T. J. Mahoney, for defendant in error.

NORVAL, C. J.

In 1894, John F. Wolfe was injured while a passenger on one of the trains of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, and for such injury recovered judgment against defendant under section 3, art. 1, c. 72, Comp. St., from which said company brings error to this court. The brief of defendant is devoted almost wholly to a discussion of the validity of this statute. All arguments presented, save one, have been repeatedly passed upon by this court adversely to the contention of defendant, and we are convinced that the rulings mentioned are right. To the one new point we purpose to devote the principal part of this opinion. The law attacked, entitled “An act to define the duties and liabilities of railroad companies” (Sess. Laws 1867, p. 88), was passed at a special session of the legislature, which met, pursuant to a proclamation of the governor, on May 16, 1867. The constitution of 1866 contains the following limitation on the power of the legislature when convened in special session (Gen. St. 1873, p. 55, art. 2, § 12): “But the legislature may, on extraordinary occasions, be convened by proclamation of the governor, and when so convened shall transact no business except such as relates to the objects for which they were so convened, to be stated in the proclamation of the governor.” Section 3 of the act whose title is above quoted is the present section 3, art. 1, c. 72, Comp. St., and it is contended that this section is in contravention of said constitutional limitation, in that it is foreign to any of the objects for which that legislature was convened, as stated in said proclamation. The latter is too long to admit of insertion in full here, but we think the law attacked is clearly included in one, if not more, of the objects stated in the proclamation. Among the objects therein specified is one numbered 3, as follows: “(3) The revision or amendment of the general incorporation law.” Senate Journal 1867, 3d Sess. p. 42. At that time the general incorporation law of the state comprised chapter 25, Rev. St. 1866, p. 187 et seq., and included in its scope regulations for the incorporation, control, regulation, and government of a large number of corporations, including railroad companies; the laws governing the latter being sections 72-122, inclusive, of that chapter. This portion of the general incorporation laws of the state includes many provisions regulating the formation, government, and control of railroad corporations, defines their rights and duties, and is as much a part of the general incorporation laws of the state as any other portion of the chapter. There is no doubt that the act of 1867 had an effect to amend the general incorporation laws of the state, and for that reason was germane to point 3 of the call above quoted. Being an act complete in itself, it was not necessary that it refer to any particular portion of the laws to be amended. Jones v. Davis, 6 Neb. 36;State v. Page, 12 Neb. 386, 11 N. W. 495;Herold v. State, 21 Neb. 52, 31 N. W. 258.

It is contended, however, that section 3, with the remainder of the act, was enacted pursuant to section 21 of the proclamation, which provided that the legislature take action relating to “the responsibility of railroad companies for damages done to stock by their employés.” It is argued that from an investigation of the origin and progress of the bill through the legislature it appears that, as first introduced, it related wholly to damages to live stock, but that, as it progressed, it was amended by the insertion of section 3, and that this is evidence that that body construed its power in passing the act and incorporating this section into it as being derived solely from section 21 of the call; and that, therefore, the court is not at liberty to infer that it obtained its authority from any other portion of the proclamation. We do not think that the history of this section is evidence that the legislature construed its authority as contended for. On the contrary, to give full force and effect to the controlling presumption that acts of the legislature are within the limitations of the constitution, unless the contrary clearly appears, we are bound to assume that the legislature looked to the proclamation as a whole, with a view to determine whether this amendment to an act which originally was wholly within the purview of one object of the call was not germane to some other portion of the call. The fact that one section of the act may be consonant to one portion of the call, while another section may be authorized by another, does not in any wise militate against the power of the legislature to enact the law. Such an interpretation of the fundamental law would leave out of sight the rule we have already mentioned, and turn the presumptions against the validity of a law, once it is shown that a portion of a bill is not consonant to one portion of a proclamation, though others may be. It is the duty of this court to uphold. rather than to tear down, legislation, and we strain no rule of interpretation in holding that the legislature had ample authority under sections 3 and 21 of the call to pass the bill. A wide scope for legislation relative to corporations is given by section 3 of the call, for it authorizes the revision or amendment of the general incorporation laws of the state, of which those relating to railroad companies are a part. To sustain its argument that the legislature transcended the limitations of its power in the respect stated, defendant cites the court to decisions, some of which we will review, with a view to ascertaining whether they are in point here. The principal case relied upon is Wells v. Railway Co., 110 Mo. 286, 19 S. W. 530. The constitutional limitation placed upon legislatures convened in special session may be assumed to be similar in the two states. The constitution of Missouri also contains the following provision: “The general assembly shall pass laws to correct abuses, and prevent unjust discriminations and extortion in the rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the different railroads in this state, and shall from time to time pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight on said railroads and enforce all such laws by adequate penalties.” Const. §§ 4, 7, art. 11. The governor of that state called the legislature to meet in special session for the purpose, among others: “To provide the legislative enactments necessary or expedient to enforce and execute those laws and principles with reference to railways and railroad companies which the people themselves have enacted and declared in their constitution.” The legislature met, and enacted a law entitled “An act to provide for the prevention of accidents to railroad employés and others, by requiring that switches, frogs and guard rails be properly blocked” (Sess. Laws Ex. Sess. 1887, p. 14), and the supreme court of that state very properly held the act not within the scope of the proclamation, and for that reason unconstitutional. A very cursory examination of the act is sufficient to convince the reader that a law which requires railroad companies to properly block their switches, frogs, and guard rails in order to protect persons from injury is extremely foreign to the authority given the legislature to enact laws, correct abuses of, and to prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in freight and passenger rates, and...