Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cass Cnty.

• Decision Date: 20 October 1904
• Citation: 101 N.W. 11,72 Neb. 489
• Parties: CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. ET AL. v. CASS COUNTY ET AL.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

72 Neb. 489

101 N.W. 11

CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. ET AL.

v.CASS COUNTY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Oct. 20, 1904.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. “A ‘right, question, or fact’ distinctly put in issue, and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and this even though the second suit is for a different cause of action.” State v. Broatch (Neb.) 94 N. W. 1016.

2. A claim for taxes under the assessment for one year is not the same cause of action as a claim for taxes on the same property under an assessment for a prior year.

3. If the liability of property to taxation depends upon the existence of a specific fact, and that fact is necessarily determined in one litigation, it cannot be controverted by the same parties in a subsequent litigation.

4. The west half of the railroad bridge over the Missouri river owned by the company which operates through passenger and freight trains continuously through different counties of this state to and over said bridge, and thence through adjoining states, is “a part of the continuous line of road” with the meaning of sections 39 and 40 of the revenue act in force in 1901 (Comp. St. 1899, p. 954, c. 77, art. 1), and is assessable for taxation by the State Board, and not by local assessors, and a prior adjudication that such bridge so used is not “part of the continuous line of road” is not an adjudication of fact, and will not operate as an estoppel against the parties to such prior litigation.

5. The question whether such bridge so owned and used is “part of the continuous line of road,” within the meaning of said statute, is a question of law, and not a question of fact upon which an estoppel can be predicated.

Appeal from District Court, Cass County; Jessen, Judge.

Action by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company and others against the county of Cass and others. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

J. W. Deweese, Byron Clark, and Frank E. Bishop, for appellants.

Jesse L. Root, for appellees.

C. C. Wright and W. H. Herdman, amici curiæ.

SEDGWICK, J.

The principal questions involved in this case are identical with those stated and discussed in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Richardson County (Neb.) 100 N. W. 950, which follows and approves Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Richardson County, 61 Neb. 519, 85 N. W. 533, and also in state ex rel. Morton v. Back (Neb.) 100 N. W. 952.

There is another question presented in this case which has been thoroughly discussed in the briefs and in the oral argument upon the rehearing. The bridge in question in this case was assessed by the local officers for taxation for the years 1881 to 1885, inclusive, and in the year 1886 the railroad company, having paid those taxes under protest, brought an action in the district court of Cass county to recover the amounts so paid. Afterwards that action was brought to this court, and was determined against the company. Cass County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 25 Neb. 348, 41 N. W. 246, 2 L. R. A. 188. It is contended that by the judgment in that case the questions involved in the case at bar are res judicata. The local authorities assessed this bridge for taxation for the year 1901, and the company brought this action to restrain the collection of the taxes. The district court enjoined the collection of the taxes as prayed, and the case was brought to this court by appeal. The subject-matter of the former litigation was the taxes assessed against this property for the respective years therein named, and the subject-matter here is the taxes assessed for the year 1901, so that it cannot be said that the two cases involved the same subject-matter, and, strictly speaking, the judgment in the one case could not have been res judicata of the subject-matter involved in the other. State v. Savage, 64 Neb. 684, 703, 90 N. W. 898;State v. Broatch (Neb.) 94 N. W. 1016.

The real question in dispute between the parties is whether in the former action the rights of the parties and questions of fact then in dispute between them have by that case been adjudicated so as to estop the parties to that litigation from now questioning the facts so determined. It was said by this court in State ex rel. Kennedy et al. v. Broatch (Neb.) 94 N. W. 1016: “A judgment, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, determining the rights of the litigants on a cause of action or defense, is an effectual bar against future litigation over the same right determined by such judgment, and is for all time, unless reversed or modified, binding on the parties and their privies in estate or in law. A ‘right, question, or fact’ distinctly put in issue, and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and this even though the second suit is for a different cause of action.” Of course, the propositions of law that were advanced by the court as requiring the disposition made of the issues in the former case, if afterwards found to be erroneous, would not be binding upon the court in subsequent litigation between the parties involving a different cause of action. State v. Savage, supra; State v. Broatch, supra.

Many authorities are cited and ably discussed in the respective briefs of counsel. Our labors have been much lightened by those discussions and by the oral arguments at the bar. There is substantially no difference of opinion upon the controlling legal principle involved. Specific facts that are so involved in a litigation that the result of the litigation depends upon the determination of these facts are necessarily settled by that litigation, and the authorities substantially agree that such facts so determined cannot afterwards be controverted by the parties to the former litigation. To determine, then, the question before us, it is necessary to ascertain what facts controlling the rights of the parties in the former case were adjudicated, and how far those facts so ascertained are involved in and necessarily control the decision in this case. The petition in that action alleged that the plaintiff “owns the line of railroad extending from Pacific Junction, in Mills county, Iowa, westwardly across the Missouri river, and through the counties of Cass, Lancaster, and other counties farther west in the state of Nebraska; and that it has owned and operated said line of railroad since the 1st day of January, 1880; and that said line of road and property thus owned by the plaintiff is situated in more than one county in the state of Nebraska.” The answer alleged “that the said railroad bridge, which spans the Missouri river at Plattsmouth,Nebraska, is a separate and independent structure from the ‘roadbed and right of way’ of said railroad company”; and further alleged “that said railroad bridge has never been operated and controlled by said plaintiff, either in the states of Iowa or Nebraska, as a continuous part of its roadbed and main track; on the contrary, defendant avers and charges that said bridge has been maintained and operated by said corporation plaintiffs always since its construction as a separate and independent structure from its main line.” In the brief for the county in the case at bar it is said: “The real controversy between the railway company and the county of Cass is the right of the local officers to assess and tax the west half of the bridge across the Missouri river near Plattsmouth, in said county;” and again, “We now ask this court to say whether, in the district...