Chi., I. & D. Ry. Co. v. Estes

• Citation: 71 Iowa 603,33 N.W. 124
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decision Date: 08 June 1887
• Parties: CHICAGO, I. & D. RY. CO. v. ESTES AND OTHERS.

71 Iowa 603

33 N.W. 124

CHICAGO, I. & D. RY. CO.

v.ESTES AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 8, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Hardin county.

This action was brought by the Chicago, Iowa & Dakota Railway Company, appellant, for an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's alleged right of way, and also to restrain them from prosecuting proceedings for the assessment of damages under the statute. The court dismissed the plaintiff's petition, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants for costs. The plaintiff appeals.John Porter and Weaver & Baker, for appellant.

M. W. Anderson and Nagle & Birdsall, for appellees.

ADAMS, C. J.

The defendant, Sarah M. Estes, was the owner of certain land adjacent to the town of Iowa Falls, through which the plaintiff desired to construct its road. Other land-owners in the neighborhood, mostly citizens of Iowa Falls, felt disposed to donate to the company a right of way through their lands. Some of them felt anxious that the defendant, Mrs. Estes, should donate a right of way through her land. Two of the citizens, acting for themselves, and claiming to act as a committee of others, visited Mrs. Estes to ascertain what she would do. According to their testimony, she said that she would donate a right of way, but greatly wished that the company would run north of her barn. According to her testimony, she said that she would donate a right of way if the company would run north of her barn. The fact seems to be that the company ran south of her barn. We do not feel called upon to determine what she said. The persons who visited her were neither her agents, nor those of the company. It is not, indeed, we think, claimed that any contract arose at the time they visited her. One of them, however, testified that he afterwards called upon the company, and tendered the ground in question to the company. This, we understand, is relied upon as constituting the contract; but we do not think that it can be so considered. The alleged tender could at most be a mere communication to the company of what had been said by Mrs. Estes. But that was not a communication to the company having the force of an offer, unless the person making the communication was authorized to represent Mrs. Estes in the matter, and there is no evidence that he was. It may be that Mrs. Estes presumed that her words would be communicated to the company. But she had a right to assume that no contract...