Chi., R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Allfree
| Decision Date | 09 October 1884 |
| Citation | 64 Iowa 500,20 N.W. 779 |
| Parties | CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO. v. ALLFREE. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Jasper circuit court.
Action in chancery to quiet the title to certain land in plaintiff. There was a decree entered in the circuit court granting the relief prayed for in plaintiff's petition, and awarding to it possession of the land, from which defendant appeals. The controlling facts of the case appear in the opinion.Alanson Clark, for appellant.
T. S. Wright and Winslow & Varnum, for appellee.
1. The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: (1) The land in controversy was entered at the proper United States land-office, in 1854, by one Easley, and in 1856 this entry was set aside by the action of the proper department of the government. (2) In 1858 the register of the landoffice for the district in which the land is situated certified to the county of Jasper, wherein the land is located, its entry. (3) The land was taxed by the county for the year 1857 and subsequent years continuously, and was sold for taxes in 1858 and in 1862, and separate tax deeds were made to the respective purchasers at these sales. There was an action prosecuted against the unknown owners of the land under the statute then in force, wherein the right of the owner was foreclosed by a decree of the court in which the proceeding was had. (4) By quitclaim deeds successively issued defendant acquired title under these tax sales and deeds. (5) Defendant's grantor, subsequent to his purchase, entered into the possession of the land, and made improvements thereon by digging a well, breaking part of the land, and fencing portions of it. The defendant continued the improvement of the land. Prior to March 10, 1871, 30 or 35 acres were unbroken, a part of the plowing having been done upon each “forty,” the land being a fractional one-eighth of a section, containing 87 66-100 acres. (6) March 10, 1871, the land in question was certified to plaintiff upon selections before made under the acts of congress granting lands to plaintiff. It becomes unnecessary to state more particularly the facts upon which plaintiff's title is based, or to refer more specifically to the legislation upon which the title rests, as we assume, for the purpose of this case, that plaintiff acquired a valid title under the grants from the government. We assume, too, that plaintiff did not acquire title prior to the certification of the land under the grants, which was, as we have just stated, on the tenth day of March, 1871. (7) The regularity of the proceedings under which the tax deeds to defendant's grantors were made, and of the foreclosure proceedings prosecuted upon one of them, above referred to, are not the subject of dispute further than is involved in the claim of plaintiff that they are void for the reason that at the time of the levy of the taxes, the sales of the land, and execution of the tax deeds, the land was not subject to taxation because the title thereof was in the United States. The sufficiency of the form of the proceedings is not disputed.
2. The defendant interposes the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiff's right to recover the land. Replying to this defense, the plaintiff insists that, as the title to the land was in the United States at the time of the inception and consummation of defendant's title, defendant cannot invoke the statute to protect his possession of the land. In support of this position, it is insisted that, as the government held the title, the tax proceedings and tax deeds were utterly void, and do not give color of title to defendant; and that he and his grantors held possession of the land as mere trespassers, and the law will presume that their possession was under and in subordination of the title, and not adverse thereto.
We will proceed to examine the questions thus raised by plaintiff. A claim of color of title may be based upon void acts, proceedings, and deeds. They may have in law no effect; yet, being in the form which, in the absence of matters invalidating them, would render them of effect, they have the semblance of regularity which is sufficient to support the pretense that they confer title or right. The term “color” means “semblance,” “show,” “pretense,” “appearance,” and implies, in the language of the law, that the thing to which it is applied has not the real character imputed to it. Hence, to give “color of title,” in pleading, is to allege a fictitious matter which gives the appearance of title, and is avoided by allegations setting up the real and valid title. So, in criminal law, the term “color of title” implies “a wrong committed by an officer under the pretended authority of his office.” Bouv. Dict.
The term “color of title,” used to designate a claim of title under which lands are held that will support the defense based upon the statute of limitations, implies that the title thus described is not valid, but is claimed to be by the party holding under it. Invalid titles are not distinguished by the consideration of the sources of reasons of their invalidity. If a title fails to confer the right of property upon the claimant it is invalid. If it be invalid because the grantor in the instrument had no title, or had no authority to convey the title, or for any other reason, it is void. In the case before us the tax deeds pretend to convey the title to the land in question; they fail to do so because the title of the land was in the United States. They are no more invalid, they are no more completely void, than tax deeds issued under any other circumstances which would be the ground of failure to pass the title. There are no degrees of invalidity of deeds. If they fail to convey title for any reason, they are all equally void as to their effect. It is true that a deed may be invalid because not of sufficient form, or because it was issued without authority, while another instrument may be invalid for the reason that the grantor did not hold the title.
Here are different reasons for invalidity; not different degrees of invalidity. In neither case would the deed convey title, but in each would it constitute color of title. The cause...
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