Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. City of Davenport

Decision Date14 June 1879
CourtIowa Supreme Court
PartiesTHE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., APPELLEE, v. THE CITY OF DAVENPORT ET AL., APPELLANTS.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Scott district court.

Action in chancery to restrain the collection of a tax. A demurrer to defendant's answer to the petition was sustained, and from the decision defendant's appeal. The facts of the case fully appear in the opinion.H. M. Martin, for appellant.

Cook & Richman, for appellee.

BECK, C. J.

--I. The petition shows that the city of Davenport caused an assessment for taxation of plaintiff to be entered upon its assessment list for the year 1877, in the following words:

“The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company. The estate, interest or leasehold of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company, in and to the so called Government bridge, from the north pier on the Iowa side of the Mississippi river, to the center of the draw, said point being the middle of the main channel, in all a distance of

+---------------------------------------------------------+
                ¦about 1200 feet, more or less,                 ¦$125,000 ¦
                +-----------------------------------------------+---------¦
                ¦Railroad track on above described track bridge,¦2,500    ¦
                +-----------------------------------------------+---------¦
                ¦                                               ¦$127,500”¦
                +---------------------------------------------------------+
                

The total amount of taxes levied upon this assessment is $1,785.70.

The petition avers that the bridge described in the assessment is the property of the United States, and that plaintiff has no taxable interest in it. It sets out fully the acts of congress under which the bridge was built, and the contract entered into by plaintiff with the United States government, under which the plaintiff uses the bridge. It will be sufficient to state their effect without more particularity. It appears that the bridge was built and is owned by the government, and that the plaintiff is secured in its use as a railroad bridge in consideration of having contributed one-half of the cost of its construction, and become bound to bear one-half the expense of keeping it in repair. The railroad track upon the upper “deck” of the bridge was paid for and is to be kept in repair wholly by plaintiff. The lower “deck” is used by the government for military purposes, and by the public, under control of the officer in charge of the military reservation of Rock Island, and is to be kept in repair by the government. As has just been said, the bridge is the property of the government, and plaintiff's right thereto is limited to its use for the connection of the parts of its road that lie on either side of the river. These facts are not denied by defendants, and are made to appear by the pleadings. Other facts, disclosed in the same manner, need not here be recited, as they become unimportant in the view we take of the case.

The plaintiff avers in its petition that under Code, § 1321, the executive council of the state certified to the defendant the number of miles of plaintiff's railroad that are taxable by the city, and the value thereof, and that plaintiff has paid the tax thereon for the year 1877, as well as the taxes upon the other real estate situated in the city.

The answer and an amended answer of defendants, do not deny that the ownership of the bridge is in the United States government, and that the only interest or right plaintiff holds therein is to use it as a means of transit for its cars in crossing the river. It is also alleged by defendant that the executive council of the state, in assessing plaintiff's property for the year 1877, included no part of plaintiff's rights in the bridge. Other facts stated in the answer need not be repeated, as they cut no figure in the case in the view we adopt. A demurrer to the answer was sustained by the court below.

The controlling facts of the case are these: The bridge was built by and is owned by the United States. Plaintiff, in consideration of the payment of half the cost of the construction, and its undertaking to pay one-half the cost of repairs, has the right to use the bridge as any other bridge upon the road. The plaintiff constructed the railroad track upon the bridge, and is to keep it in repair; the United States is to keep the wagon way on the first “deck” in repair.

II. It cannot be denied that plaintiff has a valuable right in the bridge, which the law regards as property. We need not here inquire whether the property be real, personal or mixed. Whatever name the law gives it, will not change the rights of the parties, nor require us to adopt a conclusion as to its use different from the facts regarding the use as disclosed by the record before us.

It cannot be claimed that plaintiff owns any part of the bridge, nor an interest in it that attaches to the bridge itself. Its property is limited to the right to use the bridge. The bridge itself is wholly owned by the United States. This counsel for defendants does not deny.

It follows that the bridge cannot be taxed as property of plaintiff. Neither can it be taxed as property of the United States, for such property is not subject to taxation by the states. Upon these points there is not and cannot be dispute.

If plaintiff may be taxed at all on account of the bridge, the taxation must be imposed upon the property owned by plaintiff connected...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT