Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Martelle
Decision Date | 10 July 1902 |
Docket Number | 11,258 |
Citation | 91 N.W. 364,65 Neb. 540 |
Parties | CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY v. E. H. MARTELLE |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ERROR from the district court for Butler county. Tried below before BATES, J. Reversed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
J. W Deweese and Frank E. Bishop, for plaintiff in error.
Matt Miller, contra.
This case was tried in the district court of Butler county, and resulted in a verdict and judgment against the defendant railroad company for the sum of $ 3,500. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and the case comes to this court on a petition in error. The amended petition, upon which the case was finally submitted to the jury, is as follows (omitting title):
To this petition the railroad company filed the following answer (omitting title):
The reply was a general denial. The plaintiff in the court below was allowed to file his amended petition after the evidence on his part was introduced, to which the defendant company objected and had its exceptions allowed, and this ruling is assigned as error.
1. The question of amendments to pleadings is one which calls for the exercise of the discretion of the trial court, and unless it is shown that there was an abuse of such discretion, the rulings upon such matters will be sustained. In this case the defendant company made no application for a continuance on account of the filing of the amended petition, and the record fails to show that the amendment caused any surprise, or was the occasion of any injury to the rights of the company, or in any manner necessitated a change in the trial. We hold that there was no error in allowing the amended petition to be filed.
2. It is contended that the court erred in overruling the objection to the introduction of any evidence on the part of the plaintiff, for the reason that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It is urged that inasmuch as the amended petition contains no prayer for a judgment, it is faulty and defective, and will not support or sustain the verdict and judgment in this case. We are satisfied that the judgment of this court must turn upon another question, and therefore we do not decide this point. We will say, however, that in all of the cases cited in support of the amended petition there was some kind of a prayer for a judgment, however defective it may have been. In this case there is no prayer for any judgment whatever. It is true that the prayer for relief is no part of the facts constituting the cause of action, yet the Code requires that the petition shall contain a prayer for such relief as the plaintiff deems himself entitled to. Will a petition which contains no prayer for any relief whatever sustain a verdict and judgment, quaere?
3. The defendant company at the close of all of the evidence, moved the court to instruct the jury that under the pleadings and the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and to return a verdict for the defendant. This motion was overruled. The ruling was excepted to, and is now assigned as a ground for a reversal of the judgment of the lower court. Giving to the amended petition in this case a fair and reasonable construction, we find that it charges the railroad company with negligence in not stopping its train of cars at Edholm, the destination of the plaintiff, a sufficient length of time to permit him to alight therefrom in safety. It is true that the petition contains an allegation that just as the plaintiff went to alight from the car, and just as he was about to alight and started to alight therefrom the train was given a sudden jerk, which then and there caused the plaintiff, when alighting on the ground on his feet, to fall over, and he was injured thereby; but the charge of negligence is not based on this allegation. An examination of the evidence shows that it was not sufficient to sustain an allegation of negligence on this ground. Without considering any of the evidence of the defendant company, and giving the most liberal construction to that introduced by the plaintiff in support of his cause of action, we find it fairly established that the plaintiff in the court below purchased a ticket and became a regular passenger on the defendant's train from Schuyler to Edholm; that it was dark when the train reached that place; that the company did not stop its train so as to allow him to alight at his place of destination; that it slowed its train as it passed the station so that the plaintiff's companion, Streeter, got off, at a place about twenty feet beyond the depot platform that the speed of the train was accelerated with a sudden jerk, which is the jerk complained of by the plaintiff, and thereafter continually increased its speed until the plaintiff finally jumped off at a point some 150 feet east of the station; that the jerk spoken of occurred just as the plaintiff commenced to get off; that he remained on the steps of the car platform from that time until he passed several obstructions which he saw, and when clear of them he stepped or jumped from the steps to the ground; that by this time the train was going with such speed as to cause him to fall down after alighting on his feet, and in that manner he sustained the injuries of which he complains. It is shown that he did not request the conductor to stop the train and allow him to alight, and that none of the persons in charge thereof knew of his intention to get off while it was in motion. The undisputed evidence of the plaintiff having established the foregoing facts, we are required to determine whether or not, as the pleadings and the evidence stood at the close of the trial, the instruction tendered by the company should have been given. It was clearly the duty of the company to stop its train and allow the plaintiff to alight at his place of destination, and in not doing so it was guilty of negligence, but this negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Proximate cause is defined to be that cause which is nearest, most immediate to, and is the direct cause of the injury complained of. The negligence of the railroad company in carrying the plaintiff past his place of destination was not the proximate cause of his injury. An act is the proximate cause of an event when in the natural order of things, and under the circumstances, it would necessarily produce that event; when it is the first and direct power producing the result. Beach, Contributory Negligence, sec. 31. The act of plaintiff in stepping or jumping from the train while it was in motion answers to the above definition, and was in fact the proximate cause...
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Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Martelle
... 65 Neb. 540 91 N.W. 364 CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. v. MARTELLE. Supreme Court of Nebraska. ... thereby, cannot maintain an action against the railroad company to recover damages therefor. Railroad Co. v. ...H. Martelle against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff. ......