Chicago Home for Girls v. Carr

• Decision Date: 22 December 1921
• Docket Number: No. 14151.,14151.
• Citation: 300 Ill. 478,133 N.E. 344
• Parties: CHICAGO HOME FOR GIRLS v. CARR, County Treasurer.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

300 Ill. 478

133 N.E. 344

CHICAGO HOME FOR GIRLS

v.CARR, County Treasurer.

No. 14151.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1921.

Suit by the Chicago Home for Girls against Patrick J. Carr, County Treasurer. From a decree of dismissal complainant appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Charles M. Foell, judge.

Elmer E. Jackson, of Chicago, for appellant.

Robert E. Crowe, State's Atty., William H. Duval, and W. W. De Armond, all of Chicago (Hayden N. Bell, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

CARTER, J.

This was an amended bill for injunction filed by the appellant, the Chicago Home for Girls, against the county treasurer of Cook county, to enjoin the collection of taxes assessed against certain real estate of the appellant for the years 1915 to 1920, inclusive. A demurrer was filed to the amended bill, and after a hearing before the chancellor the demurrer was sustained. A decree was thereupon entered dismissing the bill for want of equity at appellant's costs. From that decree this appeal was taken to this court.

The amended bill sets out the charter under which appellant, under the name of ‘the Chicago Erring Woman's Refuge for Reform,’ was established, the charter being granted by the Illinois Legislature in 1865. The bill alleges that appellant was incorporated under said special act authorizing its incorporation, and that its name was changed to ‘the Chicago Home for Girls,’ and that, acting under said charter, buildings and equipment for carrying on this charitable work and receiving donations from time to time were provided, and that during all of its existence appellant has conducted a home for the care and reformation of erring females in accordance with its charter provisions, most of them being young girls of school age. The bill further alleges that the real estate here in question was obtained by said corporation about October 6, 1865, and has been owned and used by appellant continuously since that time as income-producing property, and has been rented to tenants, and that the revenue derived therefrom has been used solely for the charitable purposes of appellant; that the funds used in the purchase of said real estate were donated to appellant in order to provide income-bearing property, of which the income was to be used in carrying out appellant's charitable work; that no part of the income from said real estate or from any other investment of appellant has ever been diverted to any other purpose, or for the use of any private person or corporation, but that all of the income has been used solely for the support and maintenance of appellant's charitable work; that all the income which has been derived and is now being derived from appellant's real estate and other investments is necessary for the proper maintenance of appellant's charitable work. The bill further alleges that appellant had been led into a feeling of security in its charter right as to exemption from taxation of said real estate because the property from 1865 to 1915 has never been taxed by the taxing bodies of the state or county until 1920, when the property was assessed for taxes for the years 1915 to 1920, inclusive. The charter of appellant is annexed to and made a part of the bill of complaint.

Section 9 of appellant's charter reads:

‘The said corporation may receive, take, and hold, either by gift, purchase, devise, bequest, or otherwise, any real estate or personal property for the use of or for the purposes of said corporation, whether the same be purchased, given, devised, bequeathed, or conveyed directly to said corporation or to any of its officers for the use of said corporation; and any and all real estate or personal property held by or for the use of or occupied by said corporation shall be exempt from taxation, for any purpose, and no real estate of said corporation, or to which said corporation shall acquire title, shall be alienated or leased for a longer time than two years, at any one time, except by a majority vote of the members of said corporation,’ etc. 1 Private Laws of 1865, p. 100.

It is claimed by counsel for appellant in his brief, that, under the provisions of said section 9, all the property of appellant owned by it or held by it, or held in trust for its use, is exempt from taxation, while counsel for appellee urge that the exemption provision in said section of its charter embraces only property ‘held by appellant or for its use’ in the sense of being occupied by it, according to the language of the charter, and that the property here in question is leased and held by tenants for their use as homes; that it is not held for the use of or in trust for appellant nor occupied by it, and therefore is not exempt, and that the superior court therefore rightly dismissed the bill for want of equity.

As this special charter was granted in 1865 its provisions must be construed in connection with the provisions of the Constitution of 1848 rather than those of the present Constitution. University v. Illinois, 99 U. S. 309, 25 L. Ed. 387;Northwestern University v. Hanberg, 237 Ill. 185, 86 N. E. 734, and cases there cited.

Section 3 of article 9 of the Constitution of 1848 provides: ‘The property of the state and counties, both real and personal, and such other property as the General Assembly may deem necessary for school, religious and charitable purposes, may be exempt from taxation.’ Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 48.

There can be no question, under the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in University v. People, supra, and of this court in Northwestern University v. Hanberg, supra, that the Legislature, under the provision of the Constitution of 1848 quoted, could exempt all the property of appellant, both real and personal, had it desired so to do and had it drawn the charter in such way as to plainly express that intention; so the only question here to be considered is whether or not the wording of section 9 of appellant's special charter, fairly construed, did exempt all of appellant's real estate from taxation. In reaching a proper construction as to the meaning of the contract created by this charter certain rules should be observed. This court has held that all laws exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed (Montgomery v. Wyman, 130 Ill. 17, 22 N. E. 845); that it should not be presumed that the Legislature intended to exempt property from taxation; that such an intention, to be considered binding must appear affirmatively (People v. Theological Seminary, 174 Ill. 177, 51 N. E. 198, and cases there cited). We have also held that the rule as to strict construction in favor of the state does not relieve the courts of the duty of interpreting the exemption by the ordinary rules of construction and carrying out the intention of the Legislature if it can be ascertained; that if, after the application of all rules of interpretation for the purpose of ascertaining such intention, ‘a well-founded doubt exists, then an ambiguity occurs, which may be settled by the application of the simple rule which resolves the doubt against the grant. But the possibility of a doubt is not sufficient. It is out of such possibilities that controversies arise, and it is the duty of courts to ascertain by judicial interpretation, not whether a doubt may be asserted, but whether any ambiguity really exists.’ Northwestern University v. Hanberg, supra, 237 Ill. on page 189, 86 N. E. 734. See, to the same effect, Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 192 U. S. 73, 24 Sup. Ct. 181, 48 L. Ed. 346. Whether we are considering an...