Chicago Motor Club v. Kinney
Decision Date | 24 February 1928 |
Docket Number | No. 18510.,18510. |
Citation | 329 Ill. 120,160 N.E. 163 |
Parties | CHICAGO MOTOR CLUB v. KINNEY, State Treasurer, et al. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit by the Chicago Motor Club against Garrett Kinney, State Treasurer, and others. Decree for defendants and plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Kane County; John K. Newball and William J. Fulton, Judges.
Miller, Gorham, Wales & Noxon and Joseph H. Braun, all of Chicago, and Ellis & Western, of Elgin, for appellant.
Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., and montgomery S. Winning and S. S. Du Hamel, both of Springfield, for appellees.
This appeal is from a decree of the circuit court of Kane county sustaining a general demurrer to and dismissing for want of equity an amended bill for injunction filed by the Chicago Motor Club, a corporation, as a taxpayer seeking to enjoin appellee, A. C. Bollinger, as director of the department of finance, for collecting the tax imposed by the act entitled, ‘An act to impose a license tax on the sale and use of motor fuel,’ approved June 29, 1927 (Laws 1927, p. 758), and appellees Garrett Kinney, as treasurer, Oscar Nelson, as auditor, and Bollinger, as director, from disbursing, using, or expending any of the funds appropriated by the act entitled, ‘An act making appropriations to the department of finance to carry out the provisions of ‘An act to impose a license tax on the sale and use of motor fuel,’' approved on the same day (Laws 1927, p. 44).
Section 1 of the act imposing the tax defines motor fuel as ‘all volatile and inflammable liquids produced or compounded for the purpose of, or which are suitable and practicable for operating motor vehicles,’ excepting kerosene, and defines a distributor as ‘a person who for sale or use in this state either imports into this state or produces, refines, compounds or manufactures in this state motor fuel.’ Section 2 provides for the licensing of distributors. Section 3 requires those acting as distributors on the 1st day of August, 1927, to file an inventory of motor fuel on hand. Section 4 requires those acting as distributors after July 31, 1927, to report to the department of finance on or before the 20th day of each calendar month the amount of motor fuel purchased, imported, produced, refined, compounded, manufactured, received, sold, distributed, or used by them during the preceding calendar month and the amount on hand at the close of business for such month. Section 5 reads:
Section 6 reads:
Section 7 reads:
Section 8 makes provision for collecting the tax on the first transfer after motor fuel which is imported into the stated loses the character of an interstate shipment.Section 9 requires every licensed distributor to keep records and makes these records subject to inspection by the department of finance. Section 10 reads:
Section 11 gives the department of finance authority to make reasonable rules and regulations relating to the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the act, and section 12 fixes penalties for persons failing or refusing to comply with the act. Section 13 gives the department of finance the right to revoke the license of a distributor for violations and the right to apply to a court of equity for an injunction to restrain the operations of distributors who refuse to comply with the act. Section 14 rends:
‘It is the purpose of this act to impose a license tax once upon either the sale or use of each gallon of motor fuel sold, or used within the state for the purpose of operating motor vehicles upon the public highways, so far as the same may be done under the constitution and statutes of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois.’ Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1927, p. 2334.
It is clear that the tax levied by this act is an excise. Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642, 41 S. Ct. 606, 65 L. Ed. 1139;Foster & Creighton Co. v. Graham, 154 Tenn. 412, 285 S. W. 570, 47 A. L. R. 971;Gafill v. Bracken, 195 Ind. 551, 145 N. E. 312,146 N. E. 109;State v. Hart, 125 Wash. 520, 217 P. 45;Altitude Oil Co. v. People, 70 Colo. 452, 202 P. 180. It is an occupation tax imposed upon distributors of motor fuels as defined in the act. It is a charge on the business of distributing motor fuel imposed for the purpose of raising revenue for the purposes mentioned in the act and measured by the number of gallons of motor fuel sold or used. In exercising its power to tax a business, the Legislature is specifically required by section 1 of article 9 of our state Constitution to tax ‘by general law, uniform as to the class upon which it operates,’ and under both the national and state Constitutions it is specifically prohibited from passing any law which will deprive any person of his property without due process of law. Section 13 of article 4 of our state Constitution provides:
‘No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title,’ and ‘no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act.’
Section 20 of article 4 provides that the state shall never in any manner give, loan, or extend its credit to or in aid of any corporation, association, or individual. By its amended bill, appellant invokes these provisions of the national and state Constitutions in its attack upon the constitutionality of the law imposing the tax in question, and makes seven specific charges against the validity of the act.
The first point which we shall notice is that challenging the validity of the act on the ground that section 6 amounts to an amendment of section 36 of the Motor Vehicle Act. Said section 36 provides:
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