State v. Hart

• Decision Date: 13 July 1923
• Docket Number: 17975.
• Citation: 125 Wash. 520,217 P. 45
• Parties: STATE v. HART.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

217 P. 45

125 Wash. 520

STATE v. HART.

No. 17975.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 13, 1923

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Mitchell Gilliam, Judge.

F. J Hart was convicted of violating a tax law, and appeals. Affirmed.

Guie & Halverstadt, of Seattle, for appellant.

John H Dunbar and E. W. Anderson, both of Olympia, for the State.

PARKER J.

The defendant, Hart, was charged, in the superior court for King county, with the violation of certain provisions of chapter 173, Laws of 1921, relating to the excise tax chargeable to distributors of liquid fuels, in that, in January, 1922, he brought into this state from the state of Oregon a quantity of gasoline, and on May 22, 1922, 'after breaking the original package in which said gasoline was imported, did willfully and unlawfully sell said liquid fuel' in violation of certain regulatory provisions of that law, and in thereafter unlawfully refusing to pay the excise tax required of him for the making of such sale. Upon this charge judgment of conviction was rendered against the defendant assessing against him a fine of $50, from which he has appealed to this court.

The argument here advanced by counsel in behalf of appellant is addressed wholly to their contention that chapter 173, Laws of 1921, if given effect according to its terms, is violative of his rights under the guaranty of section 12 of article 1 of the state Constitution that: 'No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation, other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations;' and also violative of his rights under the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States that: 'No state * * * shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;' in that the charging of the tax against appellant constitutes an unconstitutional class discrimination against him and in favor of others similarly situated who are not so charged with the tax. The only language of the law which we need here particularly notice is the following:

'Section 1. (a) The term 'internal combustion engine' whenever used in this act shall be held and construed to mean and include any vehicle, engine or machine movable or immovable which is operated or propelled by the combustion of volatile and inflammable liquid fuels.

'(b) The terms 'liquid fuel,' 'liquid fuels,' 'fuel,' and 'fuels' whenever used in this act shall be held and construed to mean and include gasoline and all volatile and inflammable liquid fuels, produced or compounded for the purpose of operating or propelling internal combustion engines: Provided, that kerosene shall not be considered to be a liquid fuel in the meaning of this act.

'(c) The term 'distributor' whenever used in this act shall be held and construed to mean and include any person, firm, or corporation which produces, refines, manufactures or compounds and thereafter sells such liquid fuel in the state of Washington for use and sale in this state, or who imports and sells such liquid fuel into this state except as hereinafter provided.

'Sec. 2. That in addition to the taxes now provided for by law each and every distributor, as defined in this act, who is now engaged or who may hereafter engage, in his own name, or in the name of others, or in the name of his representatives or agents in this state, in the sale of liquid fuel as herein defined, shall not later than the fifteenth of each calender month render a sworn statement to the director of licenses of the state of Washington of all such liquid fuel sold by him or them in the state of Washington during the preceding calendar month, and pay an excise tax of the cent per gallon on all liquid fuel so sold as shown by such statement in the manner and within the time hereinafter provided.'

Other provisions of the law have to do with regulations incident to its administration, punishment for its violation, and the saving of interstate commerce from the burdens it imposes.

It is conceded by counsel for the appellant that the tax in question is, as it is termed in the law, an 'excise tax'; that is, a privilege or license tax, and that it is not a property tax such as must be based upon the value of the property taxed, and measured by a uniform standard as to valuation and rates under section 2, art. 7, of our state Constitution. That this is the correct view of the nature of the tax, and that it is not controlled by the uniform requirements of that provision of our Constitution, we think is rendered plain by a number of our former decisions, among which we note the following: Fleetwood v. Read, 21 Wash. 547, 58 P. 665, 47 L. R. A. 205; State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 71 P. 20; In re Garfinkle, 37 Wash. 650, 80 P. 188; State v. Sheppard, 79 Wash. 328, 140 P. 332; Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 94 Wash. 291, 162 P. 558; Shell Co. v. State, 113 Wash. 632, 194 P. 835.

The last two cited cases are in principle directly in point in support of the view that this is an excise tax as distinguished from a property tax.

A...