Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Webster City

• Decision Date: 10 March 1964
• Docket Number: No. 51187,51187
• Citation: 256 Iowa 201,127 N.W.2d 115
• Parties: CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee, v. WEBSTER CITY, Iowa, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 115

127 N.W.2d 115

256 Iowa 201

CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee, v. WEBSTER CITY, Iowa, Appellant.

No. 51187.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 10, 1964.

M. Gene Blackburn, Webster City, for appellant.

R. G. Remley, Webster City, Ray H. Johnson, Jr., of Davis, Huebner, Johnson Burt & Fulton, and Frank W. Davis, Des Moines for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

Appellant levied a special assessment of $2,725.86 against appellee's right of way for a street improvement in Webster City, Iowa. When timely objections to the assessment were overruled by the council, an appeal was taken to the district court. The principal issues there raised were the same as those advanced here, namely: (1) Does the assessment exceed the benefits conferred; ferred; and (2) does the assessment exceed 25% of the actual value of the property assessed? When the district court found for the railroad property owner and reduced the assessment to $1,377.11, the city appealed.

As a basis of its claim for reversal appellant urges (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the trial court's action, and (2) that certain appellee exhibits were inadmissible and could not be considered as furnishing prima-facie evidence of actual value of the property assessed. In view of our conclusion on the first proposition, without giving consideration to the exhibits, the second question need not be answered at this time.

Evidence upon which there was no dispute disclosed that pursuant to a resolution of necessity, a section of River Street, which is parallel to the west line of appellee's right of way, was improved by placing gravel and oil thereon. The special assessment was made against eight separate tracts, as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit G, all of which are a part of the operating right of way abutting River Street. For convenience, we shall consider all eight tracts as one and deal only with the total assessment thereon.

Appellee offered evidence by two of its employees, a Mr. William Krucks, who is in charge of company tax matters, and Mr. William H. Huffman assistant chief engineer, whose duties are to investigate special assessment matters for the company. Krucks gave his opinion as to the actual value of appellee's operating property involved in this assessment, and Huffman gave his opinion as to the value of the special benefit conferred by the improvement.

I. In connection with Krucks' testimony appellee offered Exhibits B, C, D, E and F. Exhibits B and C were copies of letters the appellee received from the Iowa State Tax Commission advising the total tax assessed it in the state for the years 1961 and 1962 respectively. Exhibits D and E were computations made under Krucks' direction purporting to show the length of right of way involved in the eight tracts of land, the assessed values, the actual values, the special assessment, the maximum special assessment at 25% of actual value, and the overassessment. Exhibit F was a computation showing the allocation of value to the company property in Iowa and the ratio of tentative assessment to 100% value. Evidently this was an effort to establish prima-facie value and thereby show the actual value of the operating property at the time of the assessment. The city's objection that this evidence was not the best evidence, was hearsay, and was self-serving, seems to have merit, but, as we do not pass on this issue and do not consider these exhibits, we merely call attention to the provisions of chapter 434, and particularly sections 434.17 and 434.22, as setting out proper procedure to obtain the assessed value per mile of a railroad right of way in a county, city or town. That method was not followed by the company. As bearing on this question, also see Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Incorporated Town, 196 Iowa 504, 510, 194 N.W. 913.

II. As to the applicable law there seems to be no dispute. The appeal being in equity (section 441.39, Code, 1962, I.C.A.), we must decide anew the question of whether the admissible evidence of the property owner was sufficient to sustain its burden of showing the incorrectness of the assessment. Statutory limitations govern the extent of such levies for public improvements. Section 391.48, Code, 1962, I.C.A., provides: 'When any city council levies any special assessment for any public improvement against any lot, such special assessment shall be in proportion to the special benefits conferred upon the property thereby and not in excess of such benefits. Such assessment shall not exceed twenty-five percent of the actual value of the lot at the time of the levy, and the last preceding assessment roll shall be taken as prima facie evidence of such value.' (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously, then, the actual value of the assessed property at the time of the levy becomes of primary importance. Hansen v. City of Missouri Valley, 178 Iowa 859, 160 N.W. 340. This value can be established by direct testimony such as qualified opinions, similar sales, etc., and also by the production of the last preceding assessment. However, the latter is but primafacie evidence of such value and it may be overcome. It is not controlling on the question of actual value. Belknap v. City of Onawa, 192 Iowa 1383, 1385, 186 N.W. 452.

III. Before discussing the testimony of appellee's witness on the question of actual value and value of benefits received by it from the improvements, we should recognize certain...