Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. Co.  v. Vaughn

• Decision Date: 16 December 1903
• Citation: 69 N.E. 113,206 Ill. 234
• Parties: CHICAGO, P. & ST. L. RY. CO. et al. v. VAUGHN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

206 Ill. 234

69 N.E. 113

CHICAGO, P. & ST. L. RY. CO. et al.

v.VAUGHN et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 16, 1903.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jersey County; O. P. Thompson, Judge.

Suit by Edward J. Vaughn and others against the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Company and others. From a decree in favor of complainants, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Thos. F. Ferns and Wilson & Warren, for appellants.

H. W. Pogue, for appellee Edward J. Vaughn.

Brown, Wheeler, Brown & Hay, for appellee Sarah J. Vaughn.

This is a bill in chancery, filed on September 11, 1902, in the circuit court of Jersey county by the appellee Edward J. Vaughn for the partition of 160 acres of land, to wit, the southwest quarter of section 10, township 8 north, range 10 west of the third principal meridian, in said county. The defendants to the bill were Sarah J. Vaughn, wife of the complainant, Edward J. Vaughn; George D. Locke, holding a mortgage upon the premises executed to him by Edward J. Vaughn and his wife; and the appellant the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Company of Illinois. The bill alleged that the complainant Edward J. Vaughn and one of the defendants below, Sarah J. Vaughn, were the owners in fee, as tenants in common, of the 160 acres, and that each owned an undivided half thereof, the share of each being subject to an inchoate right of dower of the other; that said railway company was in possession of a part of the premises, using and occupying the same as a railroad right of way, and claimed some interest in the strip of land occupied by it, but had no interest in or title to the same, or right to the possessionthereof; that complainant is desirous of a partition between himself and Sarah J. Vaughn according to their respective interests, or, in case the premises could not be divided, then the same should be sold, and the proceeds divided. The bill prays that the railway company be declared to have no interest in the premises, or any part thereof, and no right to the possession and use of the same, and that it be required to surrender up and deliver to the complainant and said Sarah the possession of the strip or portion of the premises used and occupied by it; that partition be made, and, in case it cannot be made, that the premises be sold, and the proceeds divided.

The railway company above named filed a demurrer to the bill, which was overruled. The railway company then filed a separate answer, denying the ownership by Edward J. Vaughn and his wife, as alleged in the bill; admitting its possession of the portion of the premises used by it as a right of way, 50 feet wide on each side of the center line of its railroad; and averring that it was the sole and lawful owner of the said strip of ground occupied by it as a right of way. The answer avers that Sarah J. Vaughn had no interest in the premises, except an inchoate right of dower, and that the deed of conveyance to her by her husband was made for the purpose of giving a court of chancery jurisdiction; that the railway company was a corporation organized under the laws of Illinois for the purpose of carrying on the business of a public common carrier, and was then engaged in such business; that on January 11, 1881, one Josiah Vaughn, the father of Edward J. Vaughn, executed a contract with the St. Louis, Jerseyville & Springfield Railroad Company, by which he agreed to give said last-named company a good deed, free from all incumbrances, for a strip of land 50 feet wide on each side of the center line of the railroad, as the same might be located and constructed over the north half of said southwest quarter; that Josiah Vaughn put the St. Louis, Jerseyville & Springfield Railroad Company in possession of said strip, and said company located and constructed its line of railroad over said premises in the year 1881; that the appellant and its legal predecessors expended large sums of money in the construction and operation of said line of railroad over said premises; that said strip was part of a main line running from Springfield to a point near Grafton, or Jersey Landing, in Jersey county; that in 1881 Edward J. Vaughn had knowledge of the construction of the railroad across said tract, and did not protest against such use until September 13, 1900, when he demanded possession of the same, and on the next day commenced an action of forcible detainer against the railway company, in which action judgment was rendered in the circuit court in favor of Vaughn and against the railroad company, but upon appeal to the Appellate Court the judgment of the circuit court was reversed, etc.; that appellant, the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Company of Illinois, is the sole and real owner of said strip of land conveyed by Josiah Vaughn to its legal predecessor, the St. Louis, Jerseyville & Springfield Railroad Company, and by mesne conveyances to appellant; that, under said contract of 1881, Josiah Vaughn executed to the St. Louis, Jerseyville & Springfield Railroad Company a quitclaim deed conveying said strip of land, and that the legal predecessors of appellant entered into possession of the strip thereunder, and they and appellant have held the sole and exclusive possession thereof in good faith from that time until this suit in partition was begun; and that appellant and its legal predecessors during all the time of their possession of the said strip have paid all the taxes assessed thereon.

All the defendants below, except the appellant company, were defaulted, and the cause was referred to a master in chancery to take proofs; but a stipulation was made between the parties before the master by which all the material facts were agreed to.

The court rendered a decree upon the bill, answer of the railway company, replication thereto, and report of the master, which was approved, and therein found that Edward J. and Sarah J. Vaughn were each entitled to one-half of the 160 acres, as tenants in common in fee simple, and ordered that partition be made. The decree also found that the fee-simple title to that part of the premises occupied by the appellant as a railway company, being 100 feet wide, was vested in Edward J. and Sarah J. Vaughn, and the railway company was thereby adjudged to be ousted of the possession of said strip of ground, and directed to surrender possession thereof to Edward J. Vaughn and his wife within a period of 60 days from the date of the decree, and, in default, that a writ of possession be issued against the company. The decree then proceeds to appoint commissioners to make partition.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).

On November 11, 1879, Josiah Vaughn, being then the owner in fee simple and in the exclusive possession of the quarter section of land here sought to be partitioned, conveyed the same to his two sons, Edward J. Vaughn and Charles A. Vaughn, together with other lands, containing in all 342 acres, and the said deed contained the following reservation: ‘Reserves to the said Josiah Vaughn the sole control, use and occupation of the above-described premises, and all the rents and profits thereof, during the term of his natural life.’ This deed was recorded in the recorder's office of Jersey county on the day of its date, to wit, November 11, 1879. Unquestionably, after the execution and delivery of this deed Josiah Vaughn had only a life estate in the property thereby conveyed; and his two sons, Charles A. Vaughn, and the appellant, Edward J. Vaughn, owned the remainder subject to the life estate. Subsequently, on February 19, 1885, Josiah Vaughn executed and delivered to the St. Louis, Jerseyville & Springfield Railroad Company, the original predecessor of the appellant railway company, a quitclaim deed to the strip of land 50 feet wide on each side of the center line of the said railroad, as the same was located and built across the 160 acres here sought to be partitioned. The deed recited that it ‘is executed, acknowledged and delivered by the grantor, and accepted by the grantee therein, as a full performance of the covenants and agreements of the grantor,’ contained in the bond or contract for a deed previously executed.

By the quitclaim deed executed to it on February 19, 1885, the St. Louis, Jerseyville & Springfield Railroad Company took no other or greater interest in the strip of land conveyed to it than an interest for the life of Josiah Vaughn; and the appellant company, as the successor of the St. Louis, Jerseyville & Springfield Railroad Company, took the same interest held by its predecessor. The defense made by the appellant in this partition proceeding is that under the deed of February 19, 1885, as claim and color of title made in good faith, it went into possession of the strip of land, and has been in possession thereof for more than seven years, and during that time has paid all the taxes legally assessed against the strip or right of way. There is no dispute as to the facts of its possession and payment of taxes during seven years under the quitclaim deed, as color of title. But under the circumstances already stated, the appellant cannot make a successful defense on the ground of possession and payment of taxes under section 6 of the limitation law (Hurd's Rev. St. 1901, c. 83).

The possession of land by a tenant for life cannot be adverse to the remainderman or reversioner; and, if he conveys to a third person by words purporting to pass the absolute property, the possession of the purchaser is not, during the continuance of the life estate, adverse to the remainderman or reversioner. The statute of limitations does not run against the remainderman or reversioner until after the life estate falls in, and it is only after the latter event occurs that the possession will be adverse to the remainderman or reversioner. The possession of the tenant for life, or his vendee, during the continuance of the life tenancy, is, in contemplation of law, the possession of the remainderman or...