Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stahley, 430.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1894
• Docket Number: 430.
• Citation: 62 F. 363
• Parties: CHICAGO, R.I. & P. RY. CO. v. STAHLEY.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

62 F. 363

CHICAGO, R.I. & P. RY. CO. v. STAHLEY.

No. 430.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

June 25, 1894

The facts in this case are, briefly stated, as follows: Plaintiff below (defendant in error) was in the employ of the railway company at Horton, Kan. At the time of the accident he was working in the roundhouse, which was situated near to the tracks, and contained stalls for 20 locomotives. A new locomotive had recently been brought from a manufactory in the east, and he, with three other employes of the railway company (one of whom was named Dougherty), was engaged in putting it in order for use; it being at the time of its arrival what is called a 'dead' engine,-- that is, an engine capable of being moved on the tracks, but with some of the machinery and rods as yet not attached. The four, while thus employed, attempted to lift a driving rod, and attach it to the engine. This driving rod was about eight feet long and weighing, according to the plaintiff's witnesses from 700 to 800 pounds, and, according to the defendant's testimony, from 400 to 433 pounds. Two took hold of the rod at one end, and two at the other, and, while carrying it to its place, Dougherty and his associate, at one end, without notice or warning to the others, let go their hold; and the sudden jerk caused by the dropping of that end on the ground resulted in injury to the plaintiff, who was one of the two holding the rod at the other end. To recover for such injury plaintiff brought this action against the railway company. The verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant sued out this writ of error.

There was at the time in force in the state of Kansas a statute as follows: 'Every railroad company organized or doing business in this state shall be liable for all damages done to any employee of such company in consequence of any negligence of its agents, or by any mismanagement of its engineers or other employees, to any person sustaining such damage. ' Comp. Laws 1879, p. 784, Sec. 4914. At the trial, the fact of the injury having been proved, the court was asked to charge that the plaintiff could not claim the benefit of this statute because it embraced 'within its meaning only those persons engaged in the hazardous business of operating a railroad,' and the refusal to give this instruction is the principal matter complained of.

The other error alleged is in giving this instruction: 'At this point is where, I think, the stress of the case comes, to determine in the first place whether Dougherty and his associate dropped the rod in the manner claimed by the plaintiff, without any warning whatever to plaintiff; and, second, whether or not the plaintiff was at the time in the exercise of ordinary care, that is, such as a man under such circumstances would ordinarily exercise. If you find these two propositions in the affirmative, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in this case such damages as you can say, from the whole evidence, is fair and proper compensation for the injuries suffered.'

A. F. Evans (M. A. Low and J. E. Dolman, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

A. F. Martin, for defendant in error;

Before BREWER, Circuit Justice, and CALDWELL and SANBORN, Circuit Judges.

BREWER Circuit Justice (after stating the facts).

The Kansas statute was taken from the legislation of the state of Iowa, and it is insisted by counsel for the railway company that Kansas, in adopting the Iowa statute, adopted it with the limitations and construction theretofore placed thereon by the supreme court of Iowa, and that, therefore, in order to determine its meaning and scope, we must look to the decisions of that court.

It is undoubtedly true that, when one state adopts the statute of another, it is presumed to take it with the settled construction given to it in the state from which it is taken. That proposition has been often recognized by the supreme court of the United States. Thus, in McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U.S. 619-628, 4 Sup.Ct. 142, that court, by Mr. Justice Bradley, said:

'It is a received canon of construction, acquiesced in by this court, 'that, where English statutes-- such, for instance, as the statute of frauds and the statute of limitations-- have been adopted into our own legislation, the known and settled construction of those statutes by courts of law has been considered as silently incorporated into the acts, or has been received with all the weight of authority.' Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 18; Smith, St. & Const. Law, Sec. 634; Sedge. St. & Const. Law, 363.'

And again, in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 284, 12 Sup.Ct. 844 it was said by Mr. Justice Brown:

'But, so far as relates to the question of 'undue preference,' it may be presumed that congress, in adopting the language of the English act, had in mind the constructions given to these words by the English courts, and intended to incorporate them into the statute.'

Indeed, in construing this very statute, the supreme court of Kansas, in Railway Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35, 53, said:

'We concur in the views expressed by the Iowa court as to the constitutionality of the statute, and hold it a valid exercise of legislative power. As our state has adopted the statute from Iowa, the judicial construction given to it in that state follows it to this state. Bemis v. Becker, 1 Kan. 226. Therefore, the act embraces only those persons more or less exposed to the hazards of the business of railroading.' See, also, Trust Co. v. Thomason, 25 Kan. 1.

But while this is an undoubted rule of construction, there is another which is more applicable to the present case; and that is that, when a right is given or a liability imposed by a statute of a state, the settled determination by the courts of that state as to its scope and meaning is controlling upon the federal courts. We follow the state courts in their construction of state statutes of this nature. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 2 Sup.Ct. 10; Claiborne Co. v. Brooks, 111 U.S. 400, 4 Sup.Ct. 489; Bucher v. Railroad Co., 125 U.S. 555, 8 Sup.Ct. 974; Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492, 10 Sup.Ct. 1012. This rule is paramount to the one heretofore referred to. Applying it to the case at bar, if the supreme court of Kansas, although the statute had been adopted from the state of Iowa after it had there received a settled construction, should construe it differently, the federal courts would accept the construction placed by the supreme court of Kansas as the true interpretation of the statute within the limits of that state. Or, to state the proposition in...