Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Guthridge
| Decision Date | 13 January 1919 |
| Docket Number | 8328. |
| Citation | 179 P. 590,72 Okla. 190,1919 OK 21 |
| Parties | CHICAGO, R. I. & P. RY. CO. v. GUTHRIDGE. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied March 25, 1919.
Syllabus by the Court.
Record examined, and held: That there was not sufficient evidence tending to show that the injury and death of the deceased was the proximate result of any violation of the federal Safety Appliance Act [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8605-8615] by the railway company, to take the case to the jury on that question. That there was no evidence reasonably tending to establish any causal connection between the other alleged acts of negligence and the injury which is alleged to have resulted therefrom.
The fact that a defendant has been guilty of negligence, followed by an injury, does not make him liable for that injury unless the connection of cause and effect is established. There must always, in actions of this kind, be a causal connection between the alleged act of negligence and the injury which is supposed to have resulted therefrom.
Error from District Court, Grady County; Will Linn, Judge.
Action by Mrs. C. W. Guthridge, administratrix, against the Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded, with direction to grant a new trial.
C. O. Blake, W. H. Moore, and R. J. Roberts, all of El Reno, K. W. Shartel, of Oklahoma City, and Barefoot & Carmichael, of Chickasha, for plaintiff in error.
Ledbetter, Stuart & Bell, of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
This was an action for damages for personal injuries resulting in death, commenced by the defendant in error, plaintiff below, against the plaintiff in error, defendant below.
Hereafter, for convenience the parties will be designated "plaintiff" and "defendant," respectively, as they appeared in the trial court.
The petition alleged, in substance, that the deceased was the fireman upon the first engine of a double header freight train at the time of his injuries; that the defendant in violation of the federal Safety Appliance Act of 1893 (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531), as amended by the act of Congress of 1903 (Act March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943 [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8605-8615]), failed to equip the engine upon which the deceased was working with power driving-wheel train brakes for operating the train brake system so that the engineer on said engine could use and operate the brakes of the cars, engine, and tender on said train and control the speed of said train from his seat in the cab; that, on account of this violation of the Safety Appliance Act, the air hose between the first and second engine of said double header became detached, causing said train to suddenly slow up and stop with a lurch, thereby causing said James O. Guthridge to be thrown from the tender of his engine, where he was standing in the performance of his duties, and thereby fatally injuring and killing him. The petition further alleged that the defendant was also negligent, in that its agents and servants caused and permitted the top and surface of the back end of the tender occupied by the water tank to be covered with half a ton or more of lump coal, and also caused and permitted the electric headlight on the engine immediately following the engine on which the deceased was working to be burning at full force and so brilliantly that the said place on the back end of said tender became a dangerous place to work; that, while said deceased was at said place in the performance of his duty, he was blinded and dazed by the brilliance of said headlight, and on account of said headlight, and on account of said coal being scattered on said place, said J. P. Guthridge was caused to stumble and fall from said tender, when said train jerked and lurched as aforesaid, and was injured and killed as aforesaid.
The answer of the defendant consisted of a general denial and a plea of contributory negligence and assumption of risk on the part of the plaintiff. Upon trial to a jury there was a verdict for the plaintiff upon which judgment was duly entered, to reverse which this proceeding in error was commenced.
In the view we take of the case, it will only be necessary to notice the first and second assignments of error relied upon for reversal, which are stated by counsel for the defendant in their brief as follows:
Both of these specifications of error raise the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and will be considered together.
After a careful examination of the record, we are convinced that the evidence adduced at the trial wholly fails to show any violation of the Safety Appliance Act, or to show any other act or acts of negligence on the part of the defendant which it may be reasonably said was the proximate cause of the injury and death of the deceased.
The particular part of the act which it was alleged was violated requires all railway companies engaged in interstate commerce to equip their trains with power driving-wheel train brakes for operating the train system, so that the engineer can use and operate the brakes of the cars, engines, and tender and control the speed of the train from his place in the cab of the engine. In our opinion the evidence conclusively shows that this train was fully equipped with an adequate train brake system in the manner required by the act, and that the jerking, jaring, and lurching of the train complained of were but the ordinary and natural consequences to be expected from the severance of the air connection, between the two locomotives when the train is so equipped.
The uncontradicted evidence shows the accident to have occurred in the following manner:
The deceased, while the train was in motion, climbed from his place in the cab of the engine onto the tender thereof with a sack of wet sawdust, which he threw over...
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