Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Claunts

• Decision Date: 22 May 1911
• Citation: 138 S.W. 332,99 Ark. 248
• Parties: CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. CLAUNTS
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

138 S.W. 332

99 Ark. 248

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. CLAUNTS

Supreme Court of Arkansas

May 22, 1911

Appeal from Logan Circuit Court, Southern District; Jeptha H. Evans Judge; reversed.

Judgment reversed and cause dismissed.

George B. Pugh and Thomas S. Buzbee, for appellant.

1. Appellant was not guilty of any negligence, and a verdict should have been directed in its favor. 63 S.E. 445; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cases (N. S.) 417; 93 Ark. 240.

2. Appellee was guilty of negligence or assumed the risk of injury in getting down and standing upon the step of the car while the train was in motion. 46 Ark. 528; 61 S.E. 826; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cases (N. S.) 326; 75 N.E. 515; 44 Am. & Eng R. Cases (N. S.) 755; 83 N.E. 32; 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cases (N S.) 302; 86 Ark. 325.

3. The first instruction given is erroneous in that it assumes that there is evidence tending to show that some employee of appellant led appellant to believe that the train would stop at Blue Mountain, and that appellee might safely alight there. The evidence does not justify any such assumptions.

Jo Johnson, for appellee.

The evidence shows that the agent at Blue Mountain had out a stop signal; that the engineer blew the stop whistle and slowed down as if to stop at the station, and that the station agent then caused the engineer to proceed without stopping, which he did with the sudden jerk which caused plaintiff to fall. There can be no question but that appellee was misled by the halting of the train and by appellant's servants. Having invited him to alight, it was appellant's duty to stop long enough to enable him to do so in safety. 83 Ark. 217; Id. 437; 131 S.W. 903; 134 S.W. 107; Id. 31; 150 Ill.App. 470; 134 S.W. 202; 112 P. 152. The question whether it was negligence for appellee to stand on the step of the car while the train was in motion was, under the facts of this case, a question for the jury. It was not negligence per se. 86 Ark. 325; 88 Ark. 12.

OPINION

FRAUENTHAL, J.

This was an action instituted by P. M. Claunts, the plaintiff below, to recover damages for an injury which he alleged he sustained while a passenger in attempting to alight from one of defendant's trains. Upon a trial of the case the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and it is contended by counsel for defendant upon this appeal that the judgment entered thereon should be reversed upon the ground that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Giving to the testimony its strongest probative force in favor of the plaintiff, it established the following facts:

The plaintiff became a passenger upon one of defendant's trains on the early morning of November 8, 1907, at Booneville, Arkansas, and desired to be carried to Magazine, Ark. He paid his railroad fare to the auditor or conductor upon the train, and at the time told that employee that he desired to go to Magazine, and he was then informed by said employee that the train, according to the regulations of the railroad company, did not stop at that station, and that the first stop would be made at Belleville, and that he could there take a train back to Magazine. It does not appear from the evidence what amount of fare was paid by the plaintiff, and to what distance the amount so paid would have carried him. The station next beyond Magazine was Blue Mountain, and according to the regulations of the company the train did not stop at that station, and at the time of paying his fare the employee so informed plaintiff. It appears that when the train was approaching Blue Mountain the engineer gave two blasts of the whistle, which the plaintiff understood to be a stop signal, and the train began to slacken its speed. About this time a person whom the plaintiff supposed to be a brakeman was passing through the coach, and the plaintiff said to him: "If this train stops here, I want to get off." As the brakeman got to the door of the coach, he replied, "All right," and opened the trap door and vestibule door of the coach. The plaintiff went down the steps of the coach preparatory to alighting from the train, and stood on one of them while the train was still in motion, waiting for it to stop. The train, however, instead of further slacking its speed, increased it, and the plaintiff, losing his balance and fearing that he would fall, jumped from the train on to the station platform and was injured.

This is substantially the testimony of the plaintiff himself, and the only evidence adduced upon the trial as to the manner in which the injury was received. It also appears from the testimony of the plaintiff that the station agent at Blue Mountain had a stop signal displayed as the train approached that station, but that as a matter of fact this train was not to stop there. Upon the engineer giving the two blasts of the whistle, indicating that the train would stop at the station, the agent noticed that he had made an error in his signal and immediately changed it so that the train would not stop but would pass on.

Giving to this testimony its full force and every inference that could be reasonably deduced therefrom, is the plaintiff entitled to recover?

It is the duty of a railroad company as a carrier of passengers to stop its trains at stations which it has, by its regulations, noted as the place for stopping, and to there stop for a sufficient length of time to permit its passengers in the exercise of due diligence to safely leave its trains. But it is well settled that a railroad company is not required to stop all of its trains at every station. The company has the right to make reasonable regulations to stop at its stations only such trains as, in the management of its business, it may determine should be stopped at certain stations. It is the duty of a passenger to inquire and learn whether the train upon which he intends to take passage will stop, under such regulations of the company, at the station to which he desires to be carried; and if such train does not stop at such station under such regulations, he can not require the employees in charge of the train to stop it there. 2 Hutchinson on Carriers (3 ed.) §§ 1160 and 1117; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Roseberry, 45 Ark. 256; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Atchison, 47 Ark. 74, 14 S.W. 468; Railway v. Adcox, 52 Ark. 406.

In the case at bar, when the plaintiff paid his fare, he was duly informed that the train did not stop at Magazine, the point where he desired to go, nor at Blue Mountain, the next station thereto, nor at any station short of Belleville; and he was not informed by any of defendant's agents that the train would stop short of said latter station. So that the plaintiff knew that, according to defendant's regulations, the train would not stop at Blue Mountain. But it is urged by counsel for plaintiff that when the train approached Blue Mountain he was misled by the stop signal given by the engineer and the conduct of the brakeman in opening the vestibule door into believing that the train would stop at said station, and that he was therefore justified in acting on such belief.

It is true that railway carriers of passengers must be extremely careful not to mislead their passengers into the belief that they are invited to alight from the train when it is not so intended. A carrier of passengers must be careful not to invite or to mislead its passengers into alighting at an improper place. If its servants in charge or management of a train induce its passengers...