Chidsey v. Town of Scranton

• Decision Date: 30 January 1893
• Citation: 12 So. 545,70 Miss. 449
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: CHARLES E. CHIDSEY v. THE TOWN OF SCRANTON

12 So. 545

70 Miss. 449

CHARLES E. CHIDSEY v. THE TOWN OF SCRANTON

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 30, 1893

FROM the circuit court of Jackson county, HON. S. H. TERRAL Judge.

The opinion states the case.

Judgment affirmed.

H Bloomfield and H. B. Everrett, for appellant.

The contention of opposite counsel is that the local law under which appellant was exempted is repealed by paragraph (k) § 90 of the constitution. It will not be disputed that without the parenthetical clause referred to, no existing law of the character inhibited would be nullified. That clause may be construed as a comment on, or enlargement of, the sentence in which it is placed. That this is the more rational interpretation is evidenced both by the use of the parentheses and the word "exempted." Language used in legislation is to be considered according to its ordinary acceptation. The only proper use of the parenthesis is to comment on or explain the sentence of which it is a part. Such is the idea suggested by its use in this instance. The use of the word "exempted" is suggestive of the same idea. To say that no person shall be exempt by the local law, even if placed in the position of this clause, might convey the idea that existing exemptions should no longer exist, though that would be an unnecessary economy of language. But the same idea is certainly not conveyed intelligently by declaring, in this case, that no person shall be exempted by force of a local law. "Shall be exempted," means only to deny the act of exempting in future, and can, by no process of reasoning, apply to persons already exempt. This is the meaning of the language used, and it is borne out by the use of the parenthesis.

It may be said that this construction renders the clause superfluous, but it is as just to the convention to say that it did a silly thing as that it undertook to do a sensible thing by silly use of language.

We further insist upon our construction, because private rights are affected, and we invoke the rule that such contraction shall be given as will best protect such rights. 34 Am. Dec., 81.

The language should be strictly construed. Courts never favor repeal by implication. Pecot v. Police Jury, 41 La. Ann., 706; 6 So. 677.

Ford & Ford, for appellee.

That the act relied upon was local, and of a character condemned by § 90 of the constitution, is not disputed. It was repealed, not by implication, but by the express terms of paragraph (k) in said section. The intention of the convention could not have been more clearly or forcibly expressed if it had referred to the act in question by its title. The object was to have the subjects enumerated governed by general laws, and to annul all local or private legislation. To hold that a part of paragraph (k) in parenthesis was intended to serve no other purpose than to explain other parts of the section, is to declare the parenthesis meaningless. Referring only to the future, how could an act of the legislature ever be a local or private law if enacted on a subject prohibited?

All laws should receive a sensible construction. General laws should be so limited in application as not to lead to absurd consequences. It will be assumed that the legislature intended such exception to its language which would avoid injustice or absurd consequences. United States v. Kirby ...