Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe

• Citation: 98 Haw. 499,51 P.3d 366
• Decision Date: 09 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 23053.,23053.
• Parties: CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, State of Hawai`i, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee and Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jane DOE, Respondent/Defendant-Appellant, and Jane Roe and John Roe, Respondents/Defendants-Appellees and Petitioners/Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

51 P.3d 366

98 Haw. 499

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, State of Hawai`i, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee and Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jane DOE, Respondent/Defendant-Appellant, and Jane Roe and John Roe, Respondents/Defendants-Appellees and Petitioners/Defendants-Appellees.

No. 23053.

Supreme Court of Hawaii.

August 9, 2002.

Rosemary McShare and Trina Yamada, Deputies Corporation Counsel, on the writ, for petitioners/plaintiff-appellee and respondent/plaintiff-appellee Child Support Enforcement Agency, State of Hawai`i.

Laurent J. Remillard, Jr. and John C. McLaren, Honolulu (of Park Park Yu & Remillard), on the writ, for petitioners/defendants-appellees and respondents/defendants-appellees Jane Roe and John Roe.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, RAMIL, and ACOBA, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by MOON, C.J.

Petitioner/plaintiff-appellee Child Support Enforcement Agency, State of Hawai`i (CSEA), and petitioners/defendants-appellees Jane Roe (Mother) and Lloyd Y. Asato, Special Administrator for the Estate of John Roe (Putative Father) [hereinafter, Mother and Asato are collectively referred to as the Estate], each timely filed an application for writ of certiorari asking this court to review the opinion of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, 99 Hawai`i 138, 53 P.3d 277 (App.2002) (ICA Op.). In their respective petitions, both CSEA and the Estate contend, inter alia, that the ICA erred when it: (1) construed the motion filed by respondent/defendant-appellant Jane Doe [hereinafter, Grandmother] pursuant to Hawai`i Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rules 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3) (1982) as a timely motion filed under HFCR Rule 60(b)(6) (1982); and, (2) thereafter, vacated the family court's order denying Grandmother's motion. We granted certiorari as to both petitions. Because we agree with the petitioners and because the issue is dispositive of this case, we vacate the ICA's decision.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Family and Probate Court Proceedings

On August 23, 1996, Putative Father died as a result of injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident on the island of Hawai`i. On November 18, 1996, Mother gave birth to a child (Daughter) in Honolulu. CSEA filed a petition for paternity in the Family Court of the First Circuit on July 2, 1997, seeking to establish that Putative Father was Daughter's biological father and requesting that custody of Daughter be granted to Mother. The petition named as defendants Mother, Putative Father, and Grandmother, who was alleged in the petition to be Putative Father's mother and the "executor" of Putative Father's estate.

Although Grandmother was identified as the executor of the estate in the petition, Grandmother's ability to represent Putative Father's estate ultimately was more limited. On July 22, 1997, the Third Circuit Court appointed Grandmother special administrator of Putative Father's estate for the sole purpose of prosecuting a wrongful death action and receiving settlement funds in connection with the automobile accident that caused Putative Father's death.

On August 1, 1997, Grandmother appeared with counsel at a hearing in the first circuit family court in response to the paternity petition.¹ The parties agreed that genetic tests would be conducted, if possible, to determine the paternity issue. Although blood and tissue samples were readily available from Mother and Daughter, it was not known at the time of the hearing whether any body tissue or fluids from Putative Father existed. Therefore, it was agreed that CSEA would be responsible for attempting to locate samples that may have been taken from Putative Father following the August 23, 1996 automobile accident. The family court later filed a "(Stipulated) Order Regarding Genetic Testing[,]" which ordered, among other things, that: (1) if available, tissue samples of Putative Father be genetically tested; (2) Mother and Daughter submit to genetic testing; and (3) the results of the testing and the computation of probability statistics "shall be received into evidence at the trial ... without the need to lay a foundation, subject to the reservation by any party to call witnesses regarding the weight of evidence to be assigned or the procedures employed in conducting said tests."

Subsequently, a blood sample from Putative Father was reportedly located and held by Hilo Hospital, and the parties stipulated that the blood sample of Putative Father "shall be released to Laboratory Corporation of America, Inc. [[hereinafter, LabCorp]] for the previously ordered genetic testing[.]" The blood sample was transported to LabCorp, which is located in North Carolina, "by courier[.]" The test results were accompanied by a sworn affidavit of LabCorp's Associate Director, an expert in genetic testing, attesting to personal knowledge of the fact that the results reported represented those of the sample that was delivered. There is no other documentation in the record concerning the chain of custody. The test results indicated that the "probability of paternity" for Putative Father was 99.96%, with a "combined paternity index" of 2542 to 1.²

At a December 4, 1997 hearing held after the genetic test results were obtained, Mother identified Putative Father as the father of Daughter, and Grandmother, through her attorney, represented that "[t]he estate no longer contests the question of paternity." Consequently, the family court adjudicated Putative Father as the father of Daughter; final judgment was entered December 9, 1997.

Approximately eight months later, in August 1998, the First Circuit Court appointed Asato as Special Guardian of the Property of Daughter for the purpose of investigating and preserving any potential claims on her behalf arising from Putative Father's death. Asato later filed a motion in the Third Circuit Court, seeking to remove Grandmother from her role as a special administrator of Putative Father's estate. Following contested proceedings and a hearing that was attended by Grandmother on October 8, 1999, the Third Circuit Court apparently removed Grandmother as special administrator and replaced her with Asato.³

On October 19, 1999, eleven days after Grandmother was replaced by Asato as special administrator of the estate and over twenty-two months after the family court had adjudicated Putative Father as the legal father of Daughter, Grandmother, appearing pro se, filed a motion in the first circuit family court to set aside the paternity judgment, pursuant to HFCR Rules 60(b)(2) and 60(b)(3).⁴ HFCR Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his [or her] legal representative from any or all of the provisions of a final decree, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:... (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(d)(2); [or] (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.... The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the decree.

Attached to Grandmother's motion was, inter alia, an affidavit in which she claimed to be the appointed legal representative of Putative Father's estate. In support of her motion, Grandmother also attached a copy of an August 1999 newspaper article that referred to a well-publicized criminal case. The article stated that "people familiar with the case" had reported that a tissue sample had been taken from Putative Father following his death, apparently as part of the investigation into the crime. The article reported that "[a]n expert [had] testified only that tissue from a cadaver—she didn't say whose—had been obtained but that it couldn't be tested because it had been ruined by the formaldehyde used to preserve it." As a result of the statements in the article that tissue from a cadaver that was possibly Putative Father was not available for testing in the criminal case, Grandmother tried to ascertain the source of the blood sample used by the laboratory to determine that Putative Father was the biological father of Daughter. Although mostly unauthenticated evidence, various attachments to Grandmother's motion attempted to document her investigation. For example, Hilo Hospital records indicated that a blood sample from Putative Father had been sent to the Chemical Toxicology Institute (CTI), located in California, on August 29, 1996, for a comprehensive drug screen. Also attached to Grandmother's motion was a letter she had written to the Director of CTI, in which Grandmother writes that "I spoke with your assistant, Robert Tores[,]" and that "Mr. Tores recalls that the `blood specimen' [that presumably was sent to CTI by Hilo Hospital] was destroyed in May 1997[,]" prior to the paternity proceedings later that year. A letter from the Medical Records Department at Hilo Hospital indicated that there were no records regarding Putative Father dated after August 1996. Grandmother further ascertained that the police department and the medical examiner did not possess blood or tissue samples from Putative Father. Based on the above information, Grandmother argued in her motion that, because of "newly discovered evidence[,]" the previous paternity judgment should be set aside and further discovery and a full trial be permitted.

In memoranda opposing Grandmother's motion, the Estate and CSEA each asserted, inter alia, that Grandmother's motion was untimely and based upon inadmissible evidence.⁵ At the October 28, 1999 hearing on the motion, CSEA reasserted its argument that Grandmother's motion was untimely and characterized Grandmother's evidence as "hearsay, double hearsay, mostly innuendo, [and] mostly unsubstantiated." CSEA also argued that the paternity judgment was a validly obtained judgment and that Grandmother's...