Childers v. State
| Decision Date | 28 September 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 37868,37868,2 |
| Parties | G. W. CHILDERS v. STATE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1,2. Special grounds of the motion for a new trial which do not plainly specify the ruling or judgment complained of and the error therein will not be considered.
3. In the trial of a burglary case an instruction to the jury 'that if you find the offense alleged in the indictment was committed by someone, and that very soon thereafter the whole or any part of the goods so taken at the time the offense was committed, if any offense was committed, was found in the recent possession of the defendant, such possession if not satisfactorily explained consistent with his innocence, would authorize you to identify the defendant as the guilty party and to convict him of the crime charged' is not error as being unsound as an abstract principle of law.
4. Where the State did not rely solely on the confession of the defendant it was not error for the trial court to fail to charge 'the law on confessions.'
5. The evidence authorized the verdict of guilty.
John D. Edge, Calhoun, for plaintiff in error.
R.F. Chance, Sol. Gen., Calhoun, for defendant in error.
George W. Childers was convicted in the Superior Court of Gordon County for burglary alleged to have been committed on November 13, 1958, at a business establishment in said county. He made a motion for a new trial on the general grounds, which he amended by the addition of 11 special grounds. The trial court denied that motion and the exception here is to that judgment. The special grounds of the motion for a new trial are as follows:
'Ground 1. Because the following material evidence was illegally admitted by the court to the jury, over the objection of movant, to wit: Roy Davis after testifying about a burglary at his place advanced the information that a stolen car was left at his place. This statement was objected to for the reason it was a conclusion, immaterial, irrelevant and throwing no light on the issues involved in this case.
'Ground 2. George Hayes testifying on behalf of the State testified that 'he had found two people who had seen the defendant driving a car resembling the one alleged to have been stolen.' This was objected to as being a conclusion, the court at this point said: I will let it in to explain his conduct thereafter, if any, but instruct the jury that what somebody else said is pure hearsay and it has no probative value whatsoever. The court at this point illegally admitted the evidence and in the later part of the charge failed to charge the jury on the principle of hearsay evidence.
'Ground 3. That the court entered the trial of the case on the side of the State by assisting the State's attorney in laying the foundation for the introduction of the confession, in making the following remarks: No, it is not the court's place to instruct anybody but the jury on the law of the case, but when an objection is made upon the ground that someone hasn't complied with the law, I think it is the court's to call counsel's attention to what the law is. I do not believe you have shown that it was freely and voluntary made. The movant objected to the court instructing the solicitor along the line set out as above, as the solicitor had not at that time laid the foundation for the introduction of the alleged confession.
'Ground 4. That the court allowed the State's attorney to lead the witness and suggest the answer as follows: In response to a question from the solicitor general 'Why do you say that George he is objecting to it on the ground it was a conclusion.' The court at this point overruled the objection of the movant's attorney.
'Ground 5. That court illegally admitted hearsay evidence as follows: On January 10th I called Sheriff Davis about eight o'clock in the morning and the sheriff told me--This was objected to by movant on the ground that it was hearsay. The court sustained the objection but a moment later allowed the solicitor general to introduce it for the purposes of explaining his conduct and made the statement that he would instruct the jury that that part of it which is hearsay has no probative value whatsoever, the court did not at a later time so instruct the jury.
'Ground 6. That the court illegally admitted the answers to questions propounded to the defendant by sheriff to the defendant, movant moved to exclude any answers to question in response to that propounded by the said sheriff.
'Ground 7. The witness for the State was allowed at this point to read the confession of the defendant or movant. Movant objected to this on the ground it was testimony about another transaction subsequent to the one under investigation by the court at that time, the objection by overruled by the court. At the end of the alleged confession, movant made a motion for a mistrial on the ground that the confession tended to put the defendant's character in issue, and that the circumstances under it was given to the officers it was not voluntary, as the defendant had at all times since his arrest been in the custody of the officers. The objection and the motion for a mistrial was overruled by the court.
'Ground 8. Because the court allowed the sheriff Hughdon Davis to testify, the rule [of] having been asked at the beginning at the trial. Movant objected to the said witness Davis testifying, which objection was overruled by the court, the court stating: I know it but the sheriff is an officer of the court, he can stay in the courtroom all of the time.
'Ground 9. Movant objected to the reading of the confession in that it was a narrative of other crimes and tended to put the defendant's character in issue, this motion was overruled by the court. At this point the movant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the defendant was not proved guilty as charged, and that both statements be withdrawn from the jury on the ground they were not voluntary. This motion was overruled by the court. (a) Movant objected to the evidence in the form of a confession at the time it was offered. (b) The State offered the evidence in the form of a confession objected to. (c) The court at every objection overruled the motion and admitted the evidence. (d) The evidence in the form of a confession was prejudicial and hurtful to movant for the reason it tended to put his character in issue, and that the various parts of the confession was of things of which the movant had not been tried and convicted. (e) That name of the witnesses whose testimony was illegally admitted were George Hayes and Hughdon Davis. (f) Movant avers that the inadmissibility of the evidence was beyond question.
'Ground 10. Because the court erred in giving the following charge to the jury: 'I charge you that if you find the offense alleged in the indictment was committed by someone, and that very soon thereafter the whole or any part of the goods so taken at the time the offense was committed, if any offense was committed, was found in the recent possession of the defendant, such possession if not satisfactorily explained consistent with his innocence, would authorize you to identify the defendant as the guilty party and to convict him of the crime charged.' Movant avers that said charge was erroneous and not sound as an abstract principle of law.
1. The special grounds of the motion for a new trial in this case (excepting the 10th ground) are all so defective in form and substance as to present no question for a decision by this court. This court is reluctant to dispose of questions which are sought to be raised for its decision on their merits on purely technical grounds. Nevertheless, the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court and by this court over the years in literally hundreds of cases has set certain bare minimum...
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