Childress v. Nordman
Decision Date | 02 December 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 532,532 |
Citation | 238 N.C. 708,78 S.E.2d 757 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | CHILDRESS et ux. v. NORDMAN et al. |
Bell, Horn, Bradley & Gebhardt, Charlotte, for plaintiffs, appellees.
H. L. Strickland, Charlotte, for defendants Richard W. Nordman and Virginia P. Nordman, appellants.
Brock Barkley, Charlotte, for defendant Carolina Realty Co. of Charlotte, appellant.
The chief question raised by the assignments of error is this: Did the trial judge err in refusing to dismiss the action upon a compulsory nonsuit after all the evidence on both sides was in?
This question must be answered in the affirmative. This is so simply because there was no evidence at the trial sufficient to show that the representation concerning the state of the dwelling was false either at the time it was made by Wyman or at the time it was acted on by the plaintiffs. Cofield v. Griffin, 238 N.C. 377, 78 S.E.2d 131; Whitmire v. Heath, 155 N.C. 304, 71 S.E. 313; Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 137 N.C. 652, 50 S.E. 306, 70 L.R.A. 349; Ramsey v. Wallace, 100 N.C. 75, 6 S.E. 638; Lunn v. Shermer, 93 N.C. 164; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, page 251, § 17.
An analysis of the testimony invoked by the plaintiffs on this phase of the case demonstrates the soundness of this conclusion.
Wyman made the representation that the house was free from termites early in September, 1951, and the plaintiffs acted upon the representation on September 10, 1951, by contracting for the purchase of the property. They merely performed the obligations of their contract when they subsequently completed the payment of the purchase price and accepted the deed.
The plaintiffs did not attempt to prove the probable time of the entry of the termites into the dwelling by evidence of the habits or propensities of these insects in respect to forsaking old haunts and invading new ones. They undertook to establish this crucial date by calling the plaintiff Jack M. Childress and the termite eradicator William Ivey to the witness stand.
Childress deposed that this event occurred during the last week of October, 1951:
This testimony appears at first glance to be fraught with much evidential light. But when its vague generalities are reduced to their specific probative proportions, it leaves everything to uncertain conjecture except the naked fact that during the last week of October, 1951, Childress observed upon a bedroom floor in the dwelling indications of some termite damage whose character and extent he did not reveal. This interpretation of his evidence is corroborated by his own frank admission that he did not deem :the termite problem in the house' to be serious until sometime in December, 1951, when he 'went underneath the house' and discovered other indications of termite injury.
Ivey gave this evidence in response to a hypothetical question put to him by counsel for the plaintiffs:
When all is said, the testimony of Childress and Ivey merely shows the presence of termites in the dwelling during the last week of October, 1951. This being true, the case falls within the purview of the general rule that mere proof of the existence of a condition or state of facts at a given time does not raise an inference or presumption that the same condition or state of facts existed on a former occasion. Jarvis v. Vanderford, 116 N.C. 147, 21 S.E. 302; Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Nebraska Storage Warehouses, 8 Cir., 96 F.2d 30; Andresen v. Kaercher, 8 Cir., 38 F.2d 462; W. F. Corbin & Co. v. U. S., 6 Cir., 181 F. 296, 104 C.C.A. 278; Killoren Elec. Co. v. Hon, 211 Ark. 403, 200 S.W.2d 775; Eudora Motor Co. v. Womack, 195 Ark. 74, 111 S.W.2d 530; In re Dolbeer's Estate, 149 Cal. 227, 86 P. 695, 9 Ann.Cas. 795; Glenn v. Tankersley, 187 GA. 129, 200 S.E. 709; Erskine v. Davis, 25 Ill 251; Blank v. Township of Livonia, 79 Mich. 1, 44 N.W. 157; Snowwhite v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 705, 127 S.W.2d 718; Conduitt v. Trenton Gas & Electric Co., 326 Mo. 133, 31 S.W.2d 21; Doran v. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 94 Mont. 73, 20 P.2d 835; SloneCarter Grain Co. v. Jones, 56 N.M. 712, 248 P.2d 1065; Niehoff-Schultze Grocer Co. v. Gross, 205...
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