Childs & Childs v. Steamboat Brunette
| Decision Date | 31 March 1854 |
| Citation | 19 Mo. 518 |
| Parties | CHILDS & CHILDS, Respondents, v. THE STEAMBOAT BRUNETTE, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
1. A ship carpenter, who contracts to repair a boat and furnish materials, is not an agent within the meaning of the act concerning boats and vessels, and cannot create a lien upon the boat in favor of a party from whom he purchases materials.
Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.
Hudson & Thomas, for appellant.
The lumber furnished by the respondents was not furnished to any one of the persons authorized by the statute to bind the boat. The statute is in derogation of the common law, and must be strictly construed.
T. Polk, for respondents.
The question is, whether the ship carpenter was an agent of the boat, within the meaning of the act concerning boats and vessels. It is evident that the term “agent” is used to indicate some person different from the “master, owner, or consignee,” as otherwise it is surplusage. Now, in the case of repairing a boat by a ship carpenter, under a contract for the whole job, unless the contractor is an agent, within the meaning of the statute, no liability can be created against the boat, as a defendant, by any agent, nor indeed, by anybody but the owner or master, as there could be no consignee in such case. An owner who authorizes a ship builder to repair his boat, it would seem, authorizes him to incur all the liabilities that the statute imposes on a boat for materials furnished for repairs. In this case the carpenter had possession of the boat under the contract for repairs, and the boat is liable for materials furnished, upon the principle decided in the case of Steamboat Lehigh v. Knox 12 Mo. 508. See also the principle decided in the following cases. Rowe & Vandeventer v. Saltmarsh, 10 Mo. 38; 7 J. R. 311; 16 ib. 89; 1 Cowen, 290; 1 Dallas, 129; 7 T. R. 306.
The only question necessary to be determined in this case, involves the meaning of the term “agent,” as used in our act concerning boats and vessels.
The statute makes every boat or vessel used in navigating the waters of this State liable and subject to a lien in the following cases. I omit the first class. Second. “For all debts contracted by the master, owner, agent or consignee of such boat or vessel, on account of stores or supplies furnished for the use thereof, or on account of labor done or materials furnished by mechanics, tradesmen or others, in building, repairing, getting out, furnishing or equipping thereof.” In this case, the owner of the boat made a contract with a ship carpenter to make certain repairs to his boat, for a certain stipulated sum of money; the ship carpenter contracting to furnish the materials as well as to do the labor. The ship carpenter purchased of the plaintiffs materials for the repairs, and performed the work and received the payment therefor. The plaintiffs demand the price of the lumber used by the ship carpenter, and which he had purchased from them, and used upon the boat in making the repairs, and file their claim as a lien against the boat.
The owner denies ever having purchased any materials for the boat from the plaintiffs; denies that plaintiffs furnished the materials mentioned in their complaint, at the instance or request of the master, owner, agent or consignee of said boat, or at the instance or request of any person authorized to act for and in behalf of said boat, and denies, positively, that McDonald, the ship carpenter, had any authority to purchase said lumber, as charged in the complaint, and denies that McDonald ever had any right or authority whatever to bind said boat. The evidence showed that McDonald, the ship carpenter, got the lumber, to repair the boat, from the plaintiffs.
The following instructions were asked by the defendant:
2. If the jury believe from the evidence, that McDonald agreed to do the work and furnish the materials for the repairs of the defendant, and that the lumber furnished by the plaintiffs to McDonald was used by him in doing the work and making the repairs which he had agreed with Willard to do and furnish, then the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover in this suit.
3. If the jury believe from the evidence, that McDonald agreed with Willard to...
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Comer v. State Tax Comm'n of N.M.
...is understood by its associate terms, captain, owner, master, consignee; it is known by its associates-noscitur a sociis.” Childs v. The Brunette, 19 Mo. 518, 522. [6] The statute contemplates taxing the receipts of one engaged in the agency business as an independent contractor, not as an ......
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The James H. Prentice
...by the purchase of materials on her account. pit is equally clear that Beaudry had no such power, since he was a mere contractor. The Brunette, 19 Mo. 518. The statute above cited distinguishes the position of a contractor from that of an agent, and makes special provision for materials fur......
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Cavender v. Steamboat Fanny Barker
...and must be for supplies furnished for her use, or for such purposes as the law confers a lien therefor.--R. C. 1855, p. 303; Childs v. St. Bt. Brunette, 19 Mo. 518. All the notes were renewed from time to time; they were not produced at the trial, nor was the offer made to cancel or surren......
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