Chiles v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 April 1907
• Citation: 101 S.W. 386,125 Ky. 299
• Parties: CHILES v. CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO. ET AL.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

101 S.W. 386

125 Ky. 299

CHILES v. CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO. ET AL.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 16, 1907

Appeal from Circuit Court, Fayette County.

"To be officially reported."

Action by J. Alexander Chiles against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

C. J Bronston, Allen & Duncan, B. E. Smith, and J. A. Chiles, for appellant.

John T Shelby, for appellee.

CARROLL C.

Appellant a negro, bought a first-class ticket over the appellee's line of railway from Washington, District of Columbia, to Lexington, Ky. At Ashland, Ky. on the line of railway between Washington and Lexington, all passengers for Lexington except those occupying sleeping cars, are required to leave the train on which they come from Washington and get on a train that leaves Ashland for Lexington. When the Washington train upon which appellant was a passenger, arrived at Ashland, in company with the other passengers in the day car in which he was riding, he got out for the purpose of getting on the Lexington train. This Lexington train is made up of four coaches, the first, and the one nearest the engine, being a combined baggage, mail, and express car. The second is a passenger coach, divided by board partitions, into three compartments. One of these compartments located in the end of the car is set apart for colored passengers, the middle compartment is for the use of colored passengers who smoke, and the end compartment is for the accommodation of white persons who smoke. The third car is a passenger coach intended for the use of white ladies and gentlemen. The fourth car is a sleeping car that runs through from Washington to Lexington. Appellant, when he attempted to get on the Lexington train, was told by the brakeman to go in the colored apartment. This he declined to do, and walked in and took a seat in the third coach set apart for the exclusive use of white passengers. In a few moments the conductor came in and asked the appellant in obedience to a rule of the company to go forward in the apartment set apart for colored passengers, but he refused to do so, stating that he had bought a through first-class ticket from Washington to Lexington, and was an interstate passenger who knew his rights, and that the separate coach law of Kentucky did not apply to him, and declared his intention of retaining the seat he occupied. Thereupon the conductor summoned a policeman, who also requested appellant to go in the other car, and, upon his refusal, he was informed that he would be compelled to leave the car in which he was seated. Appellant, yet insisting upon his right to remain in the car in which he was, followed the policeman into the colored passenger coach.

Afterwards he brought this action against the company for damages, alleging in his petition that he had purchased in Washington a first-class ticket for transportation to Lexington, Ky. and that he was forcibly and wrongfully ejected from the first-class car in which he was seated, thereby subjecting him to great mortification and humiliation, to his damage in the sum of $10,000. In its answer appellee set up that the car from which appellant was required to remove at Ashland was one set apart under its rules and regulations exclusively for the transportation of white passengers, and the car into which he was compelled to go was under its rules and regulations set apart exclusively for the accommodation and transportation of colored persons; that it was a first-class car, equal in quality, convenience, and accommodation to the car appellant was directed to remove from. A reply was filed, controverting the affirmative matter in the answer, and upon a trial before a properly instructed jury a verdict was returned for appellee.

There is really no material issue of fact involved in the case. No force or violence, or rude or oppressive conduct, was employed by the agents of appellee in removing appellant from the car in which he was seated to the car set apart for colored persons; and, except that the car into which he was removed is divided by partitions into three compartments, it was substantially equal in quality, convenience, and accommodation to the car in which he first seated himself and the compartment into which appellant was directed to go was clean and ample for his accommodation, and equipped with the same conveniences as the other passenger coach on the train from which he was ejected. It is admitted that sections 795-801 of the Kentucky Statutes, requiring all railroad companies to furnish separate coaches for transportation of white and colored passengers, and imposing upon the company and conductors a penalty for refusing or failing to carry out the provisions of the law, does not apply to appellant, who was an interstate passenger; it being conceded that the statute is only operative within the territorial limits of this state, and effective as to passengers who travel from one point within the state to another place within its border. The question presented for our consideration is: Has a common carrier, such as a railroad company, the right, independent of the statute, to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the transportation of passengers, and to establish such rules and regulations as will require white and colored passengers, although they may be interstate, to occupy separate coaches or compartments upon the train? To put it in a simpler form, and one that will present squarely the issue involved: Has a railroad company within this state, independent of any statute, the right to adopt and enforce rules and regulations requiring colored passengers, although they may be interstate, and solely because of their color and race, to occupy coaches or compartments in coaches separate and distinct from those occupied by white persons? Both of these queries must be answered in the affirmative. A passenger who purchases a ticket entitling him to transportation on a railroad, and who conducts himself properly, and is not laboring under any mental or physical infirmity or disease that would render it unsafe, improper, or dangerous to carry him, has the right to demand that the carrier shall furnish him with accommodations and conveniences substantially equal to those given to other passengers holding similar tickets; but, subject to these qualifications, a railroad company may adopt and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the transportation of passengers, such as requiring that those who smoke shall occupy a certain car or compartment, or that gentlemen not accompanied by ladies shall take a car other than the one set apart for the exclusive use of ladies. Many other regulations not here necessary to mention may be made; the rule being that the passenger takes his ticket with the understanding that he will conform to all the reasonable regulations of the carrier as to the conduct of the carriage, it being understood and recognized as the law that the carrier assumes the responsibility of the reasonableness of the regulation, and, if it should be held unreasonable, the carrier will be liable in damages to the passenger against whom it was enforced. Hutchison on Carriers, § 1077. In 6 Cyc. p. 545, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is thus stated: "Without regard to any statutory authority, a carrier of passengers has under the common law the right to make reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of his business. The passenger is not bound to...