Chiles v. Chiles
| Decision Date | 26 October 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. B14-88-00470-CV,B14-88-00470-CV |
| Citation | 779 S.W.2d 127 |
| Parties | Jerry E. CHILES, Appellant, v. Patti Sue Sullivan CHILES, Appellee. (14th Dist.) |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
John F. Nichols, Warren Cole, Houston, Oliver S. Heard, Richard R. Orsinger, San Antonio, for appellant.
Earle S. Lilly, Pamela E. George, Houston, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, ROBERTSON and SEARS, JJ.
OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On Motion for Rehearing, the original opinion is withdrawn and replaced with the following opinion.
In the dissolution of the marriage of Jerry E. Chiles and Patti Sue Sullivan Chiles, the trial court awarded Patti $900,000 as her share of the community property and $500,000 as compensation for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. In twelve points of error Jerry challenges the trial court's finding that the premarital agreement between Patti and Jerry was invalid, and contends the trial court's award of a tort judgment was error. We modify the trial court's judgment and, as modified, affirm.
On March 2, 1985, Jerry and Patti Chiles were joined in marriage. Approximately two weeks prior to the marriage, on February 15, 1985, Jerry and Patti signed a premarital agreement that precluded the acquisition of community property during their marriage. Twenty-two months after the marriage, Patti filed for divorce. In her original petition for divorce, she challenged the validity and enforceability of the premarital agreement and asserted a claim against Jerry for intentional infliction of emotional distress. After a jury trial, the court found the premarital agreement was not enforceable and awarded Patti $900,000 as her share of property which the court classified as community property. The court further awarded Patti $500,000 in damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In his first point of error, Jerry contends the trial court erred in finding a community property estate and awarding Patti a $900,000 money judgment as her share of that estate. He contends the agreement signed before the marriage is valid and enforceable.
Patti and Jerry signed a premarital agreement that stated it was their intent, during their marriage, that they would not own any community property. Any property acquired during the marriage was to be jointly owned in equal shares by their respective separate estates. At trial, Patti challenged the enforceability of the agreement claiming the agreement was unfair and that her signature was procured through fraud, duress, or overreaching. The jury found she did not sign the agreement as a result of fraud, duress, or overreaching, but also found that the agreement was not fair to Patti. Based on the finding that the agreement was not fair, the trial court found the agreement was unenforceable. Jerry challenges the trial court's finding, asserting the submission of a jury question concerning the fairness of the premarital agreement was immaterial.
To determine whether the question of fairness is material to the validity of premarital agreements, we will examine sections of the code that control the enforceability of such agreements. Sections 5.41 and 5.42 of the Texas Family Code Annotated (Vernon 1986) were enacted to allow persons intending to marry and married persons to enter into enforceable agreements concerning their property. However, to enforce the agreement, section 5.45 of the Family Code required that the party relying on the premarital agreement had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom enforcement was sought gave informed consent, and that the agreement was not procured by fraud, duress, or overreaching.
Because of the onerous burden of proof set forth in section 5.45 of the Family Code, the legislature adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which shifted the burden of proof from the party relying on the agreement to the party challenging the enforceability of the agreement. Section 5.46 now provides:
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that:
(1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution of the agreement, that party:
(A) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party;
(B) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and
(C) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
(b) An issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be decided by the court as a matter of law.
We are bound to apply the law as it existed at the time the divorce decree was signed. Sadler v. Sadler, 769 S.W.2d 886 (Tex.1989). The decree was signed February 2, 1988. At that time section 5.46 of the Texas Family Code was in effect. Under section 5.46, Patti had the burden to prove either: (1) the agreement was not executed voluntarily, or (2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and before execution, she was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of Jerry's property or financial obligations, she did not waive her right to such disclosure, and she did not have adequate knowledge of Jerry's property or financial obligations. There was no evidence of involuntary execution by Patti, that the agreement was unconscionable or that she had inadequate knowledge of Jerry's assets. A jury finding that the agreement was not fair to Patti does not satisfy her burden of proof, nor is it material to the enforceability of the agreement. The record shows that Patti was represented by counsel at all times during extensive negotiations and drafts of the agreement. Also, the agreement was executed a second time, immediately after the marriage, to further express the intent of the parties that there would be no community property.
Parties should be free to execute agreements as they see fit and whether they are "fair" is not material to their validity. We find the agreement is valid and enforceable. Jerry's first point of error is sustained.
Because points two, six, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve assert errors in the division of the purported community property, our disposition of point of error number one pretermits discussion of those points.
In his seventh point of error, Jerry asserts the trial court erred in holding him personally liable for Patti's attorney's fees in the amount of $134,534. The trial court does not have inherent authority to award attorney's fees in a divorce action. In the absence of statutory authority or the consent of the litigant, a court may not award attorney's fees to a party. Grigsby v. Hopkins, 218 S.W.2d 275, 276 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1949, writ ref'd). The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees if the claim is for rendered services, performed labor, furnished material, freight or express overcharges, lost or damaged freight or express, killed or injured stock, a sworn account, or an oral or written contract. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986). Attorney's fees in a divorce action are not permitted by any other statute. However, in a divorce suit the court may award either spouse his or her attorney's fees as part of the court's equitable powers to make a just and fair division of the marital estate. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1950) and Austin v. Austin, 619 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1981, no writ). Other than the court's equitable power to divide the community property, we can find no other authority for a trial court to award attorney's fees to one party in a divorce action. Because we have found that there was no community property estate, the award of attorneys fees was error. Jerry's seventh point of error is sustained.
Jerry's third point of error requires us to determine whether a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress lies in a divorce action. The question we must answer is: Does the law accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to independent legal protection against intentional invasions? Further, if the law recognizes such a tort, may it be pursued in a suit for dissolution of marriage?
First, we will address the Texas courts' recognition of the tort.
Texas first recognized emotional distress as a compensable injury in Hill v. Kimbal, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890). In that case, the plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress after suffering a miscarriage when she witnessed an altercation started by the defendant. The court recognized a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, but limited recovery to injuries where the emotional distress was manifested by physical symptoms. The court further restricted recovery for emotional distress only when coupled with a willful tort.
In recent years, the court has begun to remove the barriers by abrogating the physical manifestation requirement in cases of battery or other torts. Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.1967). The court later removed the physical manifestation requirement in wrongful death cases. Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.1986). Recovery for emotional distress reached its peak in St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.1987), which established that proof of physical injury is no longer required to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The courts of appeals have not fully embraced the holding in St. Elizabeth, and have resurrected some of the old barriers to recovery for emotional distress. City of Watauga v. Taylor, 752...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Twyman v. Twyman
...arguably be raised by one or both parties in most intimate relationships. 1 As the court noted in Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied): While we recognize the trial court may consider fault in the distribution of community property, we bel......
-
Boyles v. Kerr
...878 F.2d 893, 897 (5th Cir.1989), other "courts of appeals have not fully embraced [its] holding." Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.1989, writ denied). Moreover, some federal decisions have dealt with Garrard by limiting the decision to its particular fact......
-
Beard v. Beard
...to attorney's fees in a divorce case which does not involve a child custody determination. See Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied); see also Pletcher v. Goetz, 9 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). Rather, a court ......
-
Marriage of Spiegel, In re
...is placed at issue. Simeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (1990) (court's emphasis); accord Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex.App.1989) ("Parties should be free to execute agreements as they see fit and whether they are 'fair' is not material to their validity."), over......
-
§ 4.03A Points of Disagreement and Other Concerns
...v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass. 18, 762 N.E.2d 797 (2002). See also Missouri: King v. King, 66 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. App. 2001). Texas: Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. 1989). Other courts that have employed the "shock the conscience" test are: Maine: Hoag v. Dick, 799 A.2d 391 (Me. 2002). New Y......