Chiles v. Conley's Heirs
| Decision Date | 09 April 1834 |
| Citation | 32 Ky. 21 |
| Parties | Chiles et al v. Conley's Heirs. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY.
Messrs Wickliffe and Wooley and Mr. John Trimble for Appellants.
Mr Hanson for Appellees.
On a joint and several demise in the name of Arthur Conley's heirs, two of the lessors (now appellees) obtained a verdict and judgment, in ejectment, against William Chiles and others claiming under him, for two undivided seventh parts of a tract of land.
Character of the suit.
Chiles claimed the land in virtue of a conveyance to him, in 1816 by the heirs of William Hays, who was a patentee, and he also held a deed from some of the lessors, but not from either of those who obtained the judgment.
Title of the plaintiffs.
The precise sources, character and extent of the claim of the appellees, do not clearly appear; but we may infer that they rely chiefly on a conveyance from William Hays, the patentee to one Taylor, in 1793, for a part of the land in controversy, and a deed from Taylor to themselves, in 1825; a paper purporting to be a deed from one Bridges to their ancestor, in 1806, for another portion of the land; a sale by the same patentee (Hays) to Bridges, in 1794, and continuous occupancy, under those contracts, from their dates, for a period exceeding twenty, but less than thirty years.
Title of the defendants.
In revising the judgment, the following points only will be specially noticed:--
First. On the trial, the circuit court refused to permit the appellants to read the record of a suit in chancery which had been prosecuted by the lessors against the appellant, Chiles, and against the heirs of William Hays and of Bridges and others, for adjusting the title to the land for which this suit was brought; and that decision by the circuit judge is now complained of as erroneous.
A record offered entire as evidence, when some portions of it only are relevant, must be rejected.
This court need not decide whether every part of the record was so totally irrelevant as, on that ground, to be inadmissible as evidence in this case. Whether there is any thing in any part of it, that could operate in any way in counteracting any presumption of a conveyance from William Hays to Bridges, or whether, in other respects, it should tend, in any degree, to affect the claim of the appellees, are questions which we shall not consider; because, however the record, if any portion of it were admissible, might operate, there being much of it that would be illegal and irrelevant, the circuit court did not err in refusing to admit the record as offered, even had a portion of it been, by itself, admissible for any purpose or, in any degree, had been proper evidence. Moreover, two of the appellants were not parties to the chancery suit; and unless the record of that suit would be legal evidence against them it would not be admissible for them. The record does not show certainly what privity exists between those two of the appellants and Chiles, the other appellant.
A record which can not be used against parties to a suit on trial, because some of them were not parties to the record, can not be used for them.
Second. On the motion of the appellees, the circuit court gave the following instruction to the jury:--" that the deed from Hays' heirs to Chiles passes no title so far as said deed covers the land of Taylor; " that is, the land which Hays had previously conveyed to Taylor. As the deed to Taylor had never been recorded, it was inoperative so far as Chiles was concerned, if he was a bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice. Whether he was such a purchaser, and whether at the time of his purchase (that is when he paid the consideration and obtained his deed,) he had notice, express or implied, were questions which the jury, and not the court...
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