Chiles v. Drake

• Decision Date: 30 June 1859
• Citation: 59 Ky. 146
• Parties: Chiles vs. Drake.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

59 Ky. 146

Chiles vs. Drake.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 30, 1859.

APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT.

R. H. STANTON and F. T. HORD, for appellant.

W. H. WADSWORTH, for appellee.

CHIEF JUSTICE SIMPSON DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:

This action was brought by Elizabeth W. Drake. She stated in her petition that she was the widow of George Drake, deceased, and had duly qualified as his administratrix.

She alleged, in the first paragraph in her petition, that the defendant, Chiles, "had unlawfully killed, by shooting him with a pistol, her said husband, George Drake, not in self-defense."

In the second paragraph she alleged that the defendant, "by means of his willful neglect, shot and killed her said husband, to her great damage, &c."

The defendant demurred to the petition, and his demurrer was overruled. It is now insisted that the court below erred in that decision.

Two objections are urged against the petition. First, that it does not allege that the killing occurred in the time allowed by the statute for the prosecution of such an action. Second, that it fails to set forth the facts which constituted the "willful neglect," by which the life of the husband of the plaintiff is alleged to have been destroyed.

First. The statute under which the action was brought, and recovery had, contains a provision that all actions brought under it shall be commenced within one year from the time of the death complained of. It is therefore contended that it was necessary for the plaintiff to allege, in order that it might appear she had an existing cause of action, that the killing had occurred within one year next preceding the commencement of her action. The provision referred to constitutes the whole of the fourth section of the act, and is as follows: "The actions under this act shall be commenced within one year from the time of such death."

This provision is nothing more than a limitation of the time within which such an action can be brought. It is no more necessary that the plaintiff in an action like the present should allege in her petition when the cause of action accrued, in order to show that it is not barred by the statute of limitations, than it is that it should be done by the plaintiffs in other kinds of actions. The statute of limitations being regarded as a matter of strict defense, must, if relied upon, be pleaded by the defendant in all actions, unless the petition shows that the action is barred by time, and that the plaintiff is not within any of the exceptions mentioned in the statute, when any exceptions are contained in the statute, which prescribes the limitation. It is not necessary that the plaintiff should allege in the petition that the action has been brought in due time. This objection to the petition cannot therefore be allowed to prevail, but must be deemed invalid.

Second. In actions for personal injuries, resulting from negligence, it has always been regarded as sufficient for the plaintiff to allege, in general terms, that the injury complained of was occasioned by the carelessness and negligence of the defendant. He has not been required to state the circumstances with which the infliction of the injury was accompanied, in order to show that it had been occasioned by negligence. An allegation of the extent of the injury, and of the manner in which it was inflicted, has been always regarded as sufficient. (2 Chitty on Pleading, 650.)

What constitutes "willful negligence" must be determined by the jury, with the aid of the court. It is not a mere matter of law, but a matter of fact as well as of law. The injury complained of was the killing of the plaintiff's intestate. The manner of its infliction was by shooting. The shooting and killing were occasioned, as alleged, by the "willful neglect" of the defendant. These facts were all set forth in the petition, and nothing more was necessary. The second objection to the petition is therefore also unavailing.

Another question was made upon the trial, which properly arises on the demurrer to the petition. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the act of the Legislature, under which this action was brought by the plaintiff, was unconstitutional, because it was in conflict, as alleged, with that provision of the constitution which is contained in the 37th section of the 2d article, and which declares that "no law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."

The action was brought under two acts of the Legislature, one of which was passed in March, 1856, (Session Acts 1855-56, page 96,) and the other in March, 1854, (Session Acts 1853-54, vol. 1, p. 175.) As, however, the court below decided that the plaintiff could not recover on the first paragraph in her petition, and so instructed the jury, by which instruction her right to maintain her action was restricted to the act last mentioned, we will confine our examination of the constitutional objection exclusively to that act.

The title of the act reads as follows, viz: "An act for the redress of injuries arising from the neglect or misconduct of railroad companies or others."

The first two sections of the act relate to the destruction of the life of persons or of stock through the negligence or carelessness of the agents or servants of railroad companies.

The third section under which this action was brought reads as follows, viz:

"That if the life of any person or persons is lost or destroyed by the willful neglect of another person or persons, company or companies, corporation or corporations, their agents or servants, then the personal representative of the deceased shall have the right to sue such person or persons, company or companies, corporation or corporations, and recover punitive damages for the loss or destruction of the life aforesaid."

The only object contemplated by the statute is the redress of injuries to the life of persons or of stock, occasioned by negligence. It provides a remedy for such injuries, whether inflicted by corporations or by natural persons. That, however, does not change its character or make it relate to more than one subject. The redress of injuries consisting in the destruction of life resulting from negligence, is the exclusive subject to which all the provisions of the statute relate. The persons by whom such injuries may be inflicted are enumerated in the act, but they cannot, with any propriety, be regarded as the subject to which it relates. The object the legislature had in view in its enactment was to provide a remedy for certain injuries, and it contains nothing but what was necessary to effect that object. The fact that a remedy for such injuries was furnished against natural as well as artificial persons, does not impart to it the character of a law which embraces various and distinct subjects. The subject is the redress of injuries to life resulting from negligence. No other subject is embraced by the act, nor does it contain any provision that does not relate to that subject.

The subject of the act, as thus defined, is clearly and fully expressed in its title. It is not, therefore, embraced by the constitutional prohibition relied on, and the decision of the court below, that it was not unconstitutional, was correct.

It is also contended that this law is liable to another constitutional objection. The act of the defendant for which it authorizes an action to be brought, and punitive damages recovered, is, according to the argument in support of this objection, an offense for which he is criminally responsible, and, therefore, if he can be subjected to punitive damages in this action, he may be punished twice for the...